Les New Misérables

La France qui tombe (France Is Falling Over)
By Nicolas Baverez
135 pages, Paris: Editions Perrin, 2003 (in French)

In his slim, controversial book, French historian and economist Nicolas Baverez proclaims the economic and political decline of his homeland. Not surprisingly, French politicians of all stripes are taking requisite offense. The left, which governed the country from 1997 to 2002, faces accusations that it contributed to the decline through misguided social "innovations," such as the 35-hour work week, introduced precisely as global economic norms demand higher worker productivity. And the right, currently in power, remains paralyzed by fear of social protest and does not dare implement the reforms needed to invigorate the economy.

Critics have lampooned and caricatured Baverez's arguments, whereas commentators in newspapers such as Le Monde have done little more than highlight the author's factual errors. (For example, France's private sector is generally considered far more competitive than the author suggests.) Nevertheless, La France qui tombe (France Is Falling Over) is the subject du jour among the social elite as well as France's popular classes. Indeed, such mournful, soul-searching books are also popular in Germany these days -- a regional phenomenon that The Economist calls European "declinism."

Baverez's thesis -- that France is slow in adapting to new realities borne out of the fall of the Berlin Wall, technological developments, and globalization -- is convincing as well as timely. Many of those who voted for French President Jacques Chirac in 2002 are now disappointed that he seems focused on foreign policy grandstanding at the expense of domestic policy and state reforms. The book also resonates with the business community, which has long believed that lazy government officials and public-sector unions stunt progress. "For the moment, we have no political project, or leaders to carry it out," Baverez explained in a recent interview. "Neither American growth, nor Europe, will reform France today. It is up to the French to reform their country."

In the international arena, the author contends that France remains frozen in a Cold War mindset. French leaders perceived the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the attacks of September 11, 2001, less as revolutionary events than as the mere continuation of 20th-century geopolitics, with al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden usurping the role of the Soviet Union. Baverez worries that if France clings to its feisty stubbornness on the global stage -- evinced by its opposition to the United States during the war in Iraq -- its leeway for diplomatic action will narrow dramatically.

Already, the gap is widening between France's proud diplomatic rhetoric and the nation's ability to translate words into action. Although it imagines itself a privileged interlocutor between the major powers, France has underestimated the potency of a revitalized Britain, the growing clout of Mediterranean countries, and the democratic awakening in Central and Eastern Europe. Even in Africa, France seems incapable of adjusting its diplomatic posture in the face of ethnic violence and the growing preeminence of South Africa.

On the Iraq conflict, Baverez agrees with many analysts that the White House dramatically underestimated the postwar complications. However, he criticizes Chirac for isolating France during the debate over the war. By aligning France with Germany's pacifism, Chirac not only failed to avert war, but also undermined the United Nations and isolated France (along with Germany) in Europe, with eight European Union countries opposing France by supporting U.S. President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Indeed, French arrogance ultimately quashed any hopes for French multilateralism.

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