How to Reform Saudi Arabia Without Handing It to Extremists

To survive, the monarchy must battle the militants, reassure the religious establishment, and give the middle class a taste of democracy.

BY F. GREGORY GAUSE III | SEPTEMBER 1, 2004

TO: Crown Prince Abdullah

FROM: F. Gregory Gause III

RE: Saving the Kingdom

The combination of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, rising oil prices, and the recent upsurge in violence in Saudi Arabia has made your political system enormously important to the rest of the world. Many observers in the West blame your schools and mosques for anti-Western hatred in the Muslim world. They portray your family's rule as both unstable and impervious to reform. Much of what is said about you outside the kingdom is, of course, uninformed or exaggerated for political effect. But external pressure will not disappear. Here are some steps you can take to placate your critics and strengthen your regime:

The Political Battle: Liberalize with Care
Security is your foremost challenge. Even after the attacks of September 11, some in your government believed you did not face an al Qaeda problem at home. The murderous assaults in Saudi Arabia over the last 15 months have given the lie to that view. Crushing the violent Islamist opposition now must be the first priority. You have embarked on a two-pronged policy that is conceptually sound but in need of some tailoring and more vigorous implementation.

The first element of your policy is armed confrontation with your opponents. Your June 2004 offer of limited amnesty to militants is appropriate, as long as it is a last chance for violent extremists to surrender, and not a gambit for negotiations with them. As the escape of three terrorists during the bloody May 2004 confrontation in Khobar indicates, your security forces require immediate attention. If the extremists have sympathizers in the security forces, you must root them out. If competence and vigilance are the problem, find more capable officers. The second element involves using the country's religious establishment to delegitimize the bin Ladenist message espoused by your opponents. This essential effort has already borne fruit: Last year, three prominent religious figures withdrew their earlier fatwas condoning political violence. However, you still must take several important steps to survive politically.

• Win the Battle of Ideas: The ideological battlefield in Saudi Arabia has long been tilted toward extreme positions that their proponents cloak in Islam. You need to reverse that trend. Some figures on the fringes of the religious establishment still want it both ways: They claim loyalty to you but waffle on the issue of violence against non-Muslims, particularly Americans. They style themselves as "mediators" between you and the extremists, implying that there is some middle ground in this struggle. You know who these sheiks are. Some of them have already spent time in your jails. If they persist in their positions, they should be reacquainted with those facilities.

Maybe they could even take the cells currently occupied by some potential allies in the ideological fight. Why are organizers of a petition supporting a constitutional monarchy in custody while you permit the authors of incendiary jihadist Web sites to publish freely in the kingdom? You do not have to accept all the reformers' proposals, but their voices may at least help to stem the jihadist tide, which has produced the violent opposition you now face. If an activist eschews violence and does not advocate the overthrow of the monarchy, why silence him?

• Resist Full-Scale Democratization: Outside observers, some well meaning and some Machiavellian, prescribe political liberalization as the antidote to your domestic terrorist problem. Don't take their word for it. An immediate move to an elected parliament would do more harm than good. Given their superior resources and organization, Islamist activists would do very well in these elections, which could complicate your security strategy. Moreover, elections make the religious establishment nervous, and with good reason. Mainstream religious leaders know that elections will end their monopoly on legitimate political discourse in the kingdom. You need these leaders to play their part in battling extremists; do not alienate them on this issue.

While fending off rapid democratization, you still must prepare for more participatory politics down the road. It will be important to reassure the Saudi middle class that their desire for greater openness will not be forgotten in the heat of the battle against militants. You can do so by proceeding with the municipal council elections scheduled for late this year. Only half of the seats on these councils will be elected. Go further. Move swiftly to fully elected membership. Give the councils genuine power on municipal issues and a real budget. If Islamist ideologues dominate the councils, let their constituents get a small taste of life under extremist leadership. But be careful how you set up the election system. Insist on single-member districts, which encourage moderation by requiring candidates to appeal to a majority of voters.

• Give the Consultative Council a Higher Profile: King Fahd created the Consultative Council in 1993 to provide public input into decision making. Although its members are appointed, the council represents educated and politically aware Saudis. Let it score some public victories over government ministries and allow its members to scrutinize a detailed government budget. The money question is central to the credibility of your governance. People want to know where state funds are going, particularly the windfall of recent years. Secrecy on money matters spawns rumors that are more critical of your governance than reality probably merits. Granting the council budget oversight will complicate the work of your ministers but enhance the credibility of this important representative institution.

• Expand Religious Tolerance: Saudi Arabia will always be a Wahhabi state, and the religious establishment offers crucial legitimacy for your family's political role. But in the large cities such as Riyadh and in regions outside of Najd, you should gradually permit greater public expression of the various Muslim religious and cultural traditions that the kingdom encompasses. Including Shia and Sufis in the ongoing national dialogue and allowing Shia to observe rituals publicly in the Eastern Province this year were good first steps. The limited decentralization produced by municipal elections could also boost religious tolerance. Although convincing the kingdom's men of religion will not be easy, these modest steps need not challenge the establishment's perks of power or its primacy in interpreting the "state religion."

 

F. Gregory Gause III is associate professor of political science at the University of Vermont and author of Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994).