Think Again: Israel vs. Hezbollah

The recent war revealed neither a vulnerable Jewish state nor a Lebanese militia carrying the hopes of the Arab world. In truth, Israel could never have delivered the decisive victory its citizens expected, and Hezbollah has been left weakened and resented. The conflict was bloodier than anyone anticipated, but it just might set the stage for a new order in the Middle East.

BY NAHUM BARNEA | OCTOBER 10, 2006

"Israel Lost the War"

No. Israel did not decisively win the war against Hezbollah, but nor did it lose. The goal of the Israeli operation was to force Hezbollah out of southern Lebanon and to weaken the militia's capabilities considerably. In both of these objectives, Israel succeeded. Israeli air strikes destroyed 70-80 percent of Hezbollah's medium- and long-range missile arsenal, and the militia lost hundreds of its best guerrilla fighters. Hezbollah has earned the resentment and suspicion of much of the Lebanese public. Israel also sought the deployment of the Lebanese Army along its border, a move the Lebanese government had long rejected, due to Hezbollah's dominance in the south. Today, the Lebanese government has taken on this commitment, and UNIFIL, the U.N.-mandated force, is keeping the peace.

This summer's war was a battle over expectations, and the Israeli public expected too much. The cost of the conflict was higher than the Israeli public anticipated, and the benefits fewer. The war offered few tangible military achievements that could comfort the public: Hezbollah's leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah evaded capture or death, no white flags of surrender were flown, and Hezbollah prisoners weren't thrown into Israeli jails by the truckload. But despite the blistering criticisms of the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) performance, Israel did achieve one of its primary objectives. The border with Lebanon is expected to be calm for the foreseeable future.

The war ultimately resembled a minor heart attack: It served as a warning that unless Israel solves its fundamental problems with its neighbors, it will be haunted by troubles on a grander scale. Observers fret that the war reveals a weakened and vulnerable Jewish state. They would do well to remember that military victories often result in historical defeats. Israel achieved a stunning military victory in 1967 with the Six Day War, and it has been cursed ever since with the irresolvable problems of occupation. Israel was handily defeated in the first phase of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, but it emerged with the outline of a peace treaty with Egypt. This war provides a similar historic opportunity. Although the conflict was not handled as well as Prime Minister Ehud Olmert promised, it was no defeat.

"Hezbollah Won the War"

Hardly. Hezbollah wears two hats: Under one, it advocates a perpetual, regional fight against Israel, encouraged and sponsored by Iran and Syria. Under the other, it is an active player in Lebanese politics, representing the Shiite community in government. Nasrallah did an impressive job balancing these roles. He rallied the Arab street to his cause, while insisting that he had nothing but the security of Lebanon at heart.

But the war revealed his weaknesses. It devastated his primary constituency, the Shiite community of Lebanon. More than 700,000 Lebanese, many of them Shiites, were displaced, and the economy of the south is in shambles. He lost hundreds of fighters and much of his Iranian-provided arsenal of arms. Nasrallah's popularity rose across the Middle East, but he lost ground in Lebanon.

The real challenge Nasrallah faces now is to retain his veto power in Lebanese politics. Hezbollah is making amends with the Lebanese people by distributing tens of millions of dollars provided by Iran. But, despite leading reconstruction efforts, Hezbollah is under attack in Lebanon and around the region. Many Lebanese, including influential Shiites, are furious with the organization for provoking Israel and setting back the country's hard-won rebuilding efforts for decades. Arabs across the Middle East are increasingly wary of a militia that takes orders from Tehran.

Nasrallah can no longer pretend that he is the great defender of Lebanon. He managed to score a propaganda coup this summer, but he leads a broken and battered force. He has, in effect, been neutralized. To remain a political player, he must lead the rehabilitation effort, distance himself from the mullahs in Iran, and deepen his relationship with Hamas.

 

Nahum Barnea is a columnist for Israel's Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper. He covered the Lebanon conflict while embedded with an Israeli combat unit.