Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition

Two years ago, a controversial military manual rewrote U.S. strategy in Iraq. Now, the doctrine's simple, powerful -- even radical -- tenets must be applied to the far different and neglected conflict in Afghanistan. 

BY NATHANIEL C. FICK, JOHN A. NAGL | JANUARY 5, 2009

For the past five years, the fight in Afghanistan has been hobbled by strategic drift, conflicting tactics, and too few troops. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Michael Mullen, got it right when he bluntly told the U.S. Congress in 2007, "In Iraq, we do what we must." Of America's other war, he said, "In Afghanistan, we...

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Nathaniel C. Fick, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security, served as a U.S. Marine infantry officer in Afghanistan and Iraq. John A. Nagl, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, served as a U.S. Army officer in Iraq and helped write The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.

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 SUBJECTS: IRAQ, MILITARY, AFGHANISTAN