This Week at War, No. 23

U.S. soldiers won't be back to Iraq

The government of Iraq declared June 30th a national holiday as it celebrated the planned withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq's cities. The celebration, which included a military parade in Baghdad, was marred by a car bombing in Kirkuk.

In an interview by satellite with the Pentagon press corps, General Ray Odierno, the U.S. commander in Iraq, explained that the removal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq's cities was both more and less than it seemed. He asserted that people familiar with day-to-day life in Iraq's cities would certainly notice the absence of U.S. patrols and combat outposts. On the other hand, Odierno reminded the reporters that the United States's 12 combat brigades continue to execute "full spectrum operations" outside Iraq's cities.

Last February, President Barack Obama announced his administration's plan for Iraq. To implement the Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) negotiated in 2008, the Obama administration intends to completely withdraw all U.S. combat forces by August 31, 2010, leaving 35,000-50,000 soldiers for training, support, counterterrorism, and force protection duties. By the end of 2011, both the SoFA and the administration's plan call for the final departure of U.S. forces.

Obama's disdain for the decision to invade Iraq is well-known. He campaigned for the presidency promising to end the U.S. military presence in Iraq and has frequently asserted that Iraq's future is the responsibility of Iraqi society and its leaders.

But some analysts are skeptical that Obama's plan will really lead to withdrawal. Writing on his Foreign Policy blog, the Center for a New American Security's Tom Ricks believes that Iraq will unravel, forcing the Obama administration to abandon its over-optimistic plan. On the other side, Duke Professor and former National Security Council staffer Peter Feaver wonders, in a post on FP's Shadow Government blog, whether the Administration's plan risks squandering the payments the United States has made in Iraq. Misguided or not, the president seems highly committed to his plan. What possible change in circumstances would it take to force him to scrap it?

Only Obama can answer this question, but I believe it is safe to assume that Iraq's unraveling would have to be very severe indeed to compel him to reinsert U.S. combat brigades back into urban combat. At a practical level, the growing U.S. combat commitment in Afghanistan removes much of the capacity to significantly reinforce Iraq. Politically, President Obama would wish to avoid disappointing some of his most passionate supporters. And at a personal level, President Obama has none of the commitment to Iraq that President Bush had.

What are the "metrics of failure" that could compel a turnaround in Obama's Iraq policy? Domestic Iraqi political difficulties would not likely suffice to change existing U.S. plans. Car bombs in Sadr City, Sunni versus Shiite fighting in west Baghdad, or Arab versus Kurdish bloodletting over Kirkuk, even if at 2007 levels, likely won't be enough change Obama's mind. He will view these problems as Iraq's, not his. The U.S. media is likely to sympathize with this view, reducing pressure on Obama to change course.

One thing that could change Obama's plan is the growing foreign influence inside Iraq. The top concern here is Iran. Happily, the Shiite religious parties most closely tied to Tehran performed poorly in last January's provincial elections, but they're hoping for a better showing in the January 2010 parliamentary elections. Second, can al Qaeda form a sanctuary inside Iraq from which it could launch global operations? That does not seem like a concern. Finally, an Iraqi government might feel the need to demonstrate its independence from the United States by fashioning an informal alliance with China or Russia that undermines U.S. interests in the region.

But even here, increased large-scale U.S. military action inside Iraq hardly seems the solution for these scenarios. Iraq may or may not fall back into renewed civil warfare. There is a remote chance it may succumb to unfriendly (to the U.S.) foreign influence. But none of these events will bring U.S. infantrymen back to the streets of Baghdad or Basra.

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J THOMAS

6:54 PM ET

July 3, 2009

The era of "persistent

The era of "persistent irregular conflict," if that is what we are in, will not occur in European or Asian capitals, but at forward operating bases and combat outposts. In these cases, the interlocutors of U.S. diplomats and development specialists will in many cases be tribal and non-state groups rather than government officials.

Is there any reason to think we are in an era where we will persist in irregular combat among tribal and non-state groups?

One rationale is 9/11. The theory is that tribal people can provide a base to teach advanced espionage and sabotage, that people trained in these areas -- without flush toilets or EFT stations -- can then hide in US cities long enough to commit giant atrocities. But this is utter bullshit. If we are vulnerable to hi-tech sabotage then anybody who has access to the sabotage mehods can attack us. Anybody. Our job is then to become less vulnerable, not to occupy every third-world hellhole where we think training bases are possible.

A second rationale is oil and other vital resources. If we need the resources and tribal people are sitting on them, then we might feel it useful to do COIN to suppress the people who might otherwise interfere with our extracting those resources. But this is short-sighted. Better to find the minimum group of natives that can protect the resources from the rest and recognise them as a nation. They can suppress the rest, or give them a share -- whatever they think will work. If they get caught up in a destructive internal war that interferes with exports then they lose. If the USA winds up with extensive military forces doing COIN it means the locals we're supporting are too small and weak a group and we ought to be supporting a larger coalition, one that can win without a lot of foreign troops.

Is there a third rationale? Well, maybe a strategic location, and we suppress the locals so we can keep our bases there? I guess our atrocities in the philippines were for that. So, we need the strategic locations so we can threaten somebody else, and the COIN is a minor preventive thing? The bases can't be valuable enough for the COIN turns into a big deal for itself.

Then there's the ideological thing. Somebody else is being undemocratic so it's our responsibility to force them to be better for sheer morality.

Is there any particular reason to think that after the current aberrations are settled, that we'll persist in any of this?

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BY ROBERT HADDICK | JULY 2, 2009

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