
Even in this era of drones and sophisticated air and satellite technologies, as long as there are boots on the ground, the basics of warfare still dominate: The troops need food, fuel, heavy equipment, weapons, construction material, medical treatment, and more. The tail of the modern military beast is weighty and as vital as its head.
Indeed, getting supplies into distant, landlocked, and mountainous Afghanistan, which has few workable road connections to its neighbors, is a primary challenge of the Af-Pak wars -- and help on this front may be one of the most significant achievements of U.S. President Barack Obama's Moscow meetings this week. Although there are highly contentious issues on the agenda, one significant agreement has emerged: Russia will formally support the expansion of land and air transit for lethal U.S. war supplies across its territories, headed for the Afghan theater.
Although some may argue that such an agreement creates an undue dependence on Russia, it comes at a critical juncture: In the past year, Taliban attacks went up nearly 60 percent in the first five months of this year, and such attacks are at their highest level since the ouster of the Taliban in 2001. The Taliban are advancing in the east, and even toward the north and nearer Kabul, and hold virtual sway over the rural south. Along with their Pakistani counterparts, they are also threatening supply routes through Pakistan that carry about 75 percent of U.S. food, fuel, vehicles, and other war materiel through the chaotic miniwars unfolding in the Waziristans. Reliable supply lines across Russia, however arduous and long -- or temporary -- are now a U.S. priority.
And with the first batches of Obama's promised troop expansion of up to 30,000 troops arriving in Afghanistan, rapidly expanding the United States' global logistics capability is even more critical. Last week, 4,000 marines, partnering with a modest Afghan contingent, began their surge into Helmand province. The United States already has 56,000 troops in Afghanistan, up from 32,000 less than a year ago. By the end of the year there will be 68,000 U.S. troops in the country. These soldiers must be equipped and ready for heavier fighting during the peak months of summer and fall, before the brutal winter virtually blocks land movement (although the air base at Bagram can and has increased the percentage of cargo moved, helping relieve some of the dramatically increased demands of supply, it is hardly enough).
As Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, head of the U.S. Transportation Command told Congress in March, establishing the Northern Distribution Network -- supply routes through Central Asia and the Caucasus to provide "alternative routes" to Afghanistan -- has become a "high priority." It is the requirements of this supporting command, and the Army engineers and related teams who build and protect roads, organize bases, and ensure the mobility of troops, materiel, and the injured, that have occupied Centcom commander Gen. David Petraeus and former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher as they traversed Central Asia and the Caucasus in an effort to find secure supplements and alternatives to the two major land routes through Pakistan. Their travel footprint in the past year belies the necessarily careful, even sanguine statements of military spokesmen that logistically, all is well, as 60 to 90 days of fuel and food are available.
Flickr user Army.mil
Mahnaz Ispahani is an independent scholar of South Asia based in New York City. She has been a senior fellow for South and West Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations and is author of Roads and Rivals: The Political Uses of Access in the Borderlands of Asia.
Mahnaz Ispahani has been a pioneer in writing about the enduring importance of basic strategic geography in southwest Asia, in particular the constraints posed by terrain on access by road to Afghanistan. So long as Afghanistan, Pakistan and much of central Asia remain plagued by conflict, new grandiose projects to develop energy pipelines, railroads and new road construction connecting central Asia to South Asia, China, the Middle East and Europe will remain problematic. As long as land routes are vulnerable to local warlords and chaos, the value of air transportation for high value, low bulk military and civilian products will be enhanced.
But even more important in the broader context of Asia, for the foreseeable future, most of the high bulk products moving from Europe and the Middle East to Asia and vice versa will continue to go by sea, which means the strategic importance of access to the Indian Ocean and control of the choke points, such as the Bab al-Mandab, Suez, the Strait of Hormuz and the Southeast Asian straits, will remain a vital interest for all trading nations.
The question for American planners is will we have the resources to perpetually be the policeman of this region? More likely, we will have to engage in more cooperative security ventures with the key Asian powers. But how cooperative the Asian powers will be with each other, given their own unresolved conflicts, remains the most challenging question.
Geoffrey Kemp
The Nixon Center
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