When arrests are impossible, what results is a terrorist haven of the sort present along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border today. Free from the threat of apprehension, terrorists have a space in which to plot, organize, train, and relax -- an extremely dangerous prospect. In such a haven, terrorist leaders can recruit hundreds or even thousands of potential fighters and, more importantly, organize them into a dangerous network. They can transform idealistic but incompetent volunteers into a lethal legion of fighters. They can also plan long-term global operations -- terrorism "spectaculars" like the September 11 attacks, which remain one of al Qaeda's goals.
Killing terrorist operatives is one way to dismantle these havens. Plans are disrupted when individuals die or are wounded, as new people must be recruited and less experienced leaders take over day-to-day operations. Perhaps most importantly, organizations fearing a strike must devote increased attention to their own security because any time they communicate with other cells or issue propaganda, they may be exposing themselves to a targeted attack.
Given the humanitarian and political risks, each strike needs to be carefully weighed, with the value of the target and the potential for innocent deaths factored into the equation. In addition, the broader political consequences must be evaluated; the same death toll can have vastly different political consequences depending on the context. But equally important is the risk of not striking -- and inadvertently allowing al Qaeda leaders free reign to plot terrorist mayhem.
We must not pretend the killings are anything but a flawed short-term expedient that at best reduces the al Qaeda threat -- but by no means eliminates it. Even as U.S. strikes have increased, Pakistan has suffered staggering levels of terrorism as groups with few or limited links to al Qaeda have joined the fray. Al Qaeda itself can also still carry out attacks, including ones outside Pakistan in Europe and even the United States. Thanks to the drone strikes, they are just harder to pull off. The real answer to halting al Qaeda's activity in Pakistan will be the long-term support of Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts. While this process unfolds, targeted killings are one of America's few options left.
TARIQ MAHMOOD/AFP/Getty Images
Daniel Byman is director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He is author of the forthcoming book, A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism.
Those who harbour terrorists are terrorists too
I keep on reading this in different articles that the drone attacks in tribal Pakistan have killed only 13 or so Al-Qaida members and more than 600 civilians, this article says about 60 (1:10) militants have been killed along with 600 civilians so far, but how could u say that all those 600 were innocent civilians.
Providing safe passage and hiding places to these terrorists is terrorism too. Why is then there a dominant opinion that the hideouts always contain a few high value Al-Qaida terrorists surrounded by innocent civilians who in my opinion are facilitators.
Is it possible that a high value Al-Qaida terrorist will move around with out sufficient men cover?
In most cases families of those who harbor these terrorists get killed, but then it is a choice that the terrorist made. In most cases people take such risks for money. There is no doubt that civilian casualties emanate out of such operations but statistics should be right and more logical. 10% and 50 or 60% are miles apart.
When these terrorist have made our lives insecure and frightful, then they should themselves live with the terror of drones. Those who suffered at the hands of these terrorist have a certain liking for the drones.
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