When the United States is armed with sufficient intelligence to indicate that a proposed target is a terrorist operative or someone involved in the command and control of terrorist operatives, the use of a targeted strike is consistent with the authority derived from the principle of military necessity, perhaps the most fundamental rule of war.
Of course, there are many who argue that outside the confines of Afghanistan or Iraq, the United States must operate within a law enforcement framework to deal with such individuals, but the new administration, at least, seems to have come around to the logic of wartime authority. It is noteworthy that President Barack Obama continues to treat this struggle as an armed conflict, albeit without the hyperbolic characterization of a "global war." Democrats in Congress might complain that they weren't briefed about the CIA program, but they made no move to limit the use of military force against al Qaeda.
The reason seems obvious: They, too, realize that the struggle against al Qaeda is not simply a law enforcement job. The nature of the threat requires a response that includes the authority to kill as a measure of first resort. One need only consider how history might have been altered if the same tactic had been adopted prior to 9/11.
This is not to say that there aren't legitimate legal concerns raised by the Predator program and the proposed assassination teams. Whether such operations should have been authorized by then Vice President Dick Cheney, and whether to allow CIA personnel to execute such operations, are both interesting questions. It is hard to identify a legal basis for the vice president to order such attacks without implied authority from President Bush. Assuming, however, the president did grant such authority, what about the CIA's role? Leon Panetta, the new agency director, may have canceled the Bush-era program to train CIA assassins, but the Predator strikes continue. Under what legal authority can the CIA participate in programs like this?
Throughout the "war on terror," there has been the consistent perception that the Bush administration tried to take advantage of the authority of war without accepting the obligations and limitations associated with such authority. This was at the very core of the debate over the treatment of detainees at Guantánamo. Targeted killings by the CIA raise the same concern. If the United States is in an "armed conflict" with al Qaeda, then it would seem only lawful combatants should be authorized to participate in combat operations. It is difficult to reconcile the U.S. treatment of alleged "unlawful combatants" with a practice that permits civilians -- albeit members of a government agency -- to take such a significant role in the execution of combat missions.
But, perhaps unfortunately, this is not the aspect of this issue that most critics have seized on. Instead, it is the fact that Predator strikes symbolize an expansive conception of war powers. They would be well advised to consider the alternative. Is the fight against terrorism really just a law enforcement matter? Are the objects of these attacks really like any other criminals? Should the United States forego the opportunities to kill them if they present themselves? From my perspective, the answer to all these questions is no. If I'm right, then let's hope that our killings remain "targeted."
Rob Jensen/USAF via Getty Images
Geoffrey Corn is associate professor at the South Texas College of Law. He previously served as senior law of war expert in the U.S. Army's Office of the Judge Advocate General.
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