The Rise of Ayatollah Moqtada al-Sadr

All this takes a minimum of 15 to 20 years, with each of the three cycles lasting nearly seven years. The first phase, the introduction (al-muqaddimat,) includes a study of rhetoric and logic. The second cycle, known as the externals (as-Sutuh), involves the study of major scholarly texts on Shiite jurisprudence and theology. The third stage of final discussion (dars al-Kharij) usually requires attending public lectures conducted under the supervision of a high-ranking scholar. The talks focus on specific themes within the vast array of theological discourses. It is at this final stage when the intellectual maturity of a student is recognized by his peers and instructor. During the weekly sessions, usually three to four hours a week, an outstanding student will be noticed for his scholarly abilities and declared a mujtahid.

Apparently, Sadr is somewhere at this final cycle of studies, attending tutorials (rather than lectures) under a high-ranking cleric, most likely an Arabic-speaking grand ayatollah with close ties to Tehran.

The status of mujtahid, however, does not automatically entitle a Shiite scholar to become an ayatollah. First, the student will take on the post-graduate status of hujjatul-Islam, or defender of Islam. The boundary that separates a mid-ranking hujjatul-Islam from the higher-ranking ayatollah is usually a thin one, and changing circumstances or political situations can permit a junior mujtahid to rise in the ranks. In the early 1960s, for example, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was detained for his political activities by the shah, so Grand-Ayatollah Hossein Borujerdi, a traditional conservative cleric, granted Khomeini ayatollah status as a way to speed up his release. After the death of Khomeini in 1989, hujjatul-Islam Ali Khamenei succeeded his mentor and immediately became an ayatollah with the approval of a number of high-ranking clerics in Qom.

With the backing of a single high-ranking cleric, Sadr could follow the same precipitous rise, becoming a practicing mujtahid with ayatollah stature, at any time. Neither the opposition of other high-ranking scholars nor the quality of scholarly training he may have acquired in his so-far limited studies could prevent such a promotion.

So what if Sadr becomes an ayatollah? How would his standing in Iraq change?

The good news is that U.S.-Iraqi military offensive against the Mahdi Army in spring 2008 has considerably marginalized Moqtada Sadr and his political movement in Iraq. The movement's diminishing clout became particularly poignant after the 2009 provincial elections. The Sadrists suffer not only from declining public support but a lack of the same coherent, organized military that gave them political leverage in Baghdad back in 2005.

But the bad news is that, in spite of recent setbacks, Sadr remains a major political figure in Iraqi politics. For the most part, his inexperience, and at times incompetence, has not eclipsed his appeal, and his charisma continues to attract many downtrodden young Shiites. They seem him as the khalifa, the representative of the 12th descendent of the Prophet of Islam, Imam Mahdi, whose eventual return is believed to culminate in the establishment of divine justice on Earth. Sadr's pedigree also links him with legendary clerical figures including his father, Ayatollah Sadeq al-Sadr, revered by many Iraqi Shiites as a saint. That heritage has given the young cleric legitimacy, despite his weak religious credentials.

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