Why the Taliban Are Winning -- for Now

The war in Afghanistan has not been going well, and it is no surprise that Americans are frustrated. Many observers can rightly point to signs of progress: the functionality of specific Afghan government ministries and programs, the slow growth of the Afghan National Army, the building of major infrastructure such as roads and dams, and agricultural improvements. These accomplishments, however, have not created the conditions that the United States has aimed to achieve: an Afghan state with a competent government considered legitimate by its people and capable of defending them, such that Afghanistan can no longer function as a safe haven for Islamist terrorist groups. Indeed, as Gen. Stanley McChrystal, commander of coalition forces, recently suggested, the situation shows signs of deteriorating: Afghan enemy groups remain highly capable, have gained momentum, and have expanded their areas of operations. Violence against coalition forces is rising. So the question is: Why haven't we been winning in Afghanistan?

Foreign Policy and the New America Foundation present The AfPak Channel, a Web site bringing you the latest news and analysis from the wars and turmoil of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Although I served on McChrystal's assessment team, I do not know how he would answer this question, nor could I speculate about his recommendations for the strategy going forward. But after much research, as well as two visits to Afghanistan this year, I personally think that the military operations themselves are failing because there has been no coherent theaterwide counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. Despite U.S. President Barack Obama's newly announced "Af-Pak" strategy, the U.S. and coalition campaign this summer is a continuation of the poorly designed operations from 2008. And the sheer inertia of military operations means that it will be hard to turn this supertanker around for the better part of this year. But turn it around we must, starting with correcting the following flaws in the strategy that McChrystal and his team inherited from their predecessors.

1. Fighting in the wrong places

NATO forces are widely dispersed throughout Afghanistan, even in the Pashtun areas in the south and east, rather than concentrated on one or two priorities. A possible exception is Helmand, the only province in which two brigades are deployed -- the British force and the recently arrived U.S. Marine expeditionary brigade. In contrast, during the surge in Iraq, the United States concentrated about half of its forces in Baghdad and its suburbs. Baghdad was the center of gravity of the fight. If we controlled it, we'd win; if the enemy controlled it, we'd lose. So five brigade combat teams -- roughly 25,000 troops with their enablers -- protected the city of 8 million people. Four more teams protected Baghdad's southern approaches, and at least one, sometimes two, additional teams protected the city's northern suburbs.

There is no simple equivalent to Baghdad in Afghanistan. Instead, most of the population -- and the insurgency -- is dispersed in rural areas. Nevertheless, some areas, such as Kandahar city and the districts around it, are more important -- to the enemy, to the Afghan government, and to us -- than others. And yet, there are almost no counterinsurgents whatsoever in all but two of the districts around Kandahar, and none in the city itself, just a scant footprint from the Afghanistan national security forces. Worse still, the ratio of counterinsurgents to the population in those two districts is approximately 1 to 44, close to the minimum requirement. A good evaluation of our priorities in Afghanistan would yield a significantly different, and more effective, distribution of coalition forces. This is undoubtedly why McChrystal recently told reporters that he will be concentrating forces around Kandahar city.

123NEXT

Save over 50% when you subscribe to FP.

TILLKAN

2:21 AM ET

August 12, 2009

dreamland

This is fantasy from some other planet. On this planet, it is the presence of foreign troops that guarantees the success of the Taliban.

THINK_TANK

7:10 AM ET

superficial drivel

This is superficial analysis that contradicts the doctrine cited (COIN) and itself. If military protects Kabul and 5 largest cities they protect less than 20 % of the population and direct contradictions of COIN tenant that says you must separate the people from the insurgents. Point 2 is invalid as a cookie cutter timline will fail each operation must be analyzed during planning threat and capabilities of local government etc will determine if time line is days weeks or months. The other point are less flawed but also suffer from weak ananlysis. Two visits in a year does not trump months on the ground. Let the military do its job.

JEFFERYTHAYER

10:59 AM ET

Winning View Point

Fighting in the Wrong Places
We must secure the Lines of Communication, LOC, in order to resupply the force and transport construction materials and commerce to all corners of the country to include across borders. In addition position forces amongst the populace, “oil-spot” (Galula). The populace is the center of gravity and living with them gives coalition forces credibility and also assists with securing them. These forces assist the populace with establishing their security. We strive to work our way out of a job.

Fighting in the Wrong Ways
The enemy cannot defeat us on the field of battle. We need to push for a more robust Civil-Military Operations package after the fight. This includes training local security forces, government assistance, construction, etc. This effort can initially come from the Civil Affairs forces then transferred to the Civilian Response Corps out of the U.S. Department of State. An employed populace tends to be happier and less likely to support the insurgency. We must never leave a void for the insurgent to fill.

Fighting with the Wrong Assumptions
A robust force structure with unity of effort is necessary to conduct the “oil-spot” strategy. In addition to the central government perception, politics begin at the local level. The central government can say and promise many things but if it is not felt by the local populace those efforts do not mean anything. A grass-roots approach is needed to suppress the insurgency.

Fighting Successfully…or Failing
Measures of Effectiveness are needed to indicate whether we are on the right track or not. An example of a MoE is whether the girls in the community are attending school freely without potential of harm. Another is whether the local schools or government buildings require walls around them to prevent explosives from destroying them. These are just two of many to consider. Enemy body-counts and money spent for projects are poor MoE’s.

Can We Win
Yes we can win. It will take many years and the political and popular will to “work our way out of a job.”

J THOMAS

5:45 PM ET

We can win if we pay the full costs for long enough

Afghanistan is a poor country. If we spend 10 times the aghan GDP for 100 years, we can surely win. Maybe we can do it in 50 years. Or possibly even in 25 years.

What was the goal again? What are we winning?

We have almost completely abdicated the moral war. The people we choose to think of as enemies think of themselves as righteous religious folk. Rather than argue that some other approach is better and more righteous, we only try to kill them. Is it any wonder that the government we support is widely thought of as corrupt? We have made hardly any attempt to explain how they can be good guys by joining us against the faithful.

In context, don't our arguments in favor of democracy translate more to "it's good to compromise with evil"? Of course when it isn't good and evil, it makes sense to try to find solutions that are good for everybody. But to argue that democracy is good even in matters of right and wrong, good and evil, don't we need to make our points clearly?

It's true we can't lose on the battlefield as long as our supply lines hold up. The afghans will run out of bullets before we run out of 2000 pound bombs. But to actually win, don't we need to find a way to persuade afghans that we are not the bad guys? How could we do that?

KUNINO

10:47 PM ET

Liberty? Force? And the winner is ...

As the retired Australian miltary strategist Kilcullen -- invited to help the US government on two separate occasions, once by Wolfowitz under Rumsfeld, and the second time by SecState Rice; both government-to-government invitations -- points out, most field officers, whether they care to say this publicly or not, believe that generals and senior officers are hopelessly out of touch with what's going on in the field. What such officers should think about pundits weaving dreams on Foreignb Policy from a keyboard somewhere in the northeastern US, is probably even less respectful; rightly so.

In Fiasco, Tom Ricks points out that sundry US officers, none of them generals, found many useful tips on how to engage in Iraq in battered cheap old books by foreigners that the officers came across more or less by accident in used-book remainder baskets. The Kilcullen doctrine has arrived for general readership in his 2009 book "The accidental guerrilla", which starts with this quotation from the July 4 address by former SecState John Quincy Adams, speaking in the year 1821: Doing things like what we've been up to in Iraq and Afghanistan "would see the fundamental axioms of national policy ïnsensibly change from liberty to force ... [The United States] might become the dictatress (sic) of the world; she would be no longer be the ruler of her own spirit."

To this distinguished early American, and most everybody else of the time, the United States was a nurturing female that loved liberty. The idea has vanished; and what Kimberley Kagan calls for is ... more forcein an Afghanistan like Silly Putty, needing only forceful foreigners to mold it into a more pleasing -- to some Americans -- shape. It's doubtful that Kagan could see Americans as foreigners in any part of the world at all. To those in all foreign nations, the idea is naked and basic.

Why the Taliban Are Winning -- for Now

The last few years have been a strategic fiasco, but this war is still winnable. Here's how.

BY KIMBERLY KAGAN | AUGUST 10, 2009

(5)