The Day After

It is campaign season in Afghanistan. Thirty-eight presidential candidates and more than 3,000 prospective Provincial Council members are on the hustings. Colorful posters of candidates posing in the regional dress of sought-after constituencies festoon the walls throughout the capital. Candidates of all stripes are promising change: an end to the war with the Taliban, the start of a new war on corruption, and any number of wild schemes: One hopeful told me in Kabul that he would distribute 100 acres of land to every Afghan family. 

At the same time, in the insurgency-riddled south of the country a different campaign is underway. With nearly 17,000 new U.S. troops in place, NATO and Afghan forces have launched operations Panther's Claw and Khanjar to clear militants from key population centers -- the first phase of the Obama administration's robust new counterinsurgency strategy. There is a hope that this push will also benefit the national elections on Aug. 20 by making voting more secure for millions of Afghans. However, just days before the election, violence is at a seven-year high and it is difficult to say whether Afghans in the most restive provinces will have the confidence to show up in force at the polls. Taliban threats to cut off voters' fingers and otherwise interfere with the voting have given even more cause for doubt in the last few days.

COMMENTS (0) SHARE:

Digg

 

Facebook

 

Reddit

 

More...

The campaign that is missing, however, is as central to success in Afghanistan as the other two: the move to meet demands for justice and accountability shared by ordinary Afghans across the country.

The twin pillars of legitimacy in Afghanistan are security and justice. In the absence of either -- or both -- people will look for alternatives. This is where the Taliban come in. From 1994 to 1996, as the Taliban swept across an Afghanistan rent by chaos and warlordism, it was their approach to security and justice, not Islam, that won them legions of supporters. The Taliban brought law and order, often absurd in form (no kite-flying) and brutal in application, but always swift and effective. Today, they are drawing from the same playbook, and it is still working.

Why? Because the Karzai government and its international backers have failed after nearly eight years to create a government that is respected and trusted by many of its people. Warlords who committed well-documented atrocities -- some after the U.S. invasion in 2001 -- continue to occupy high positions in the government. The return of Gen. Rashid Dostum this week to Afghanistan -- the infamous Warlord of the North who has a well-documented human rights abuse beat sheet going back nearly three decades -- is only one example of how the Karzai government has undermined itself by cozying up to criminals.

12NEXT