How Ahmadinejad Stole an Election -- And How He Can Fix It

In June, 40 million Iranians voted in their presidential election. The degree of tampering and fraud has made it impossible to determine the winner -- and has heightened the need for reasonable changes to create free and fair elections.

Rarely does a country have such a clear choice as Iran did on June 12. On that day, nearly 40 million people voted for a president.  The incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, pledged to continue his economic policies and his anti-Western, Holocaust-denying, nuclear-confrontational approach. His main opponent, Mir Hossein Mousavi, promised economic reform, increasing openness with the West, human rights, and nuclear negotiations.

While some polling stations were still open, the Interior Ministry declared Ahmadinejad the winner by a landslide. The opposition rejected it, and despite arrests and beatings, the protests have continued. Ahmadinejad's and Mousavi's supporters both proclaim their candidate won.

But to all others, it is clear there were substantial irregularities. Although Ahmadinejad's crackdown appears designed to end questions about his legitimacy, even conservative clerics are demanding answers from the state. Here is what we know happened -- and a plan to prevent fraud in the next election.

Using even a minimal standard, there are good reasons for Iranians not to trust election results. The president-controlled Interior Ministry conducts elections in Iran. It denies opposition observers access to polling stations and counts the votes. Only half of Mousavi's observers were permitted to observe polling stations in the capital city of Tehran; they had even less access in the rest of the country. None of the observers were permitted to see whether the ballot boxes were empty when the vote began. Nor were they permitted to accompany the mobile ballot boxes, which collected nearly one-third of the votes. And no Mousavi or impartial observers accompanied the ballot boxes from local wards to the provincial committees and finally to Tehran for the count.

Before the election, the reformists' Committee for Safeguarding the Votes expressed concern that 54 million ballots were printed -- millions more than for past elections and 8 million more than the number of eligible voters. Moreover, some ballots did not have serial numbers. About 40 million people voted, but no one accounted for the other 14 million ballots.

The Committee for Safeguarding the Votes also said it found a large number of Mousavi votes after the election, including some in the northern forests of Iran. It surmised that these votes were removed from the boxes and replaced with votes for Ahmadinejad. Mousavi himself claims he has evidence that the total number of votes exceeded the number of eligible voters by as much as 40 percent in more than 170 constituencies. Some of the party observers claim ballots for Ahmadinejad featured the same handwriting in the same ink.

These accusations of fraud are credible. Even the conservative Guardian Council has acknowledged that as many as 3 million votes might have been fraudulent. But, given the way the system operates, no one knows with certainty how many votes were legitimate and how much fraud occurred.

In many other countries with rigged electoral systems, opposition members boycott. That did not happen in Iran -- and now, millions are risking their lives to compel the authorities to count their votes accurately. As the protest moves to its next phase, the country could stave off a crisis by agreeing to four fundamental electoral safeguards.

The single most important step is to transfer election responsibilities from the Interior Ministry and the Guardian Council to a nonpartisan and independent national election commission. Iran should also create a nonpartisan elections court, composed of judges and lawyers. All the major political parties should have a veto on nominees so as to ensure that the judges are acceptable to all the parties.

Second, the Election Commission should certify the candidates according to clear and fair criteria, and they should prevent any intimidation, and guarantee access to the entire electoral process by domestic and international election observers. Domestic observers are absolutely essential to assuring a free election and detecting fraud; and international observers help the process by magnifying the voice of the domestic observers.

Third, the ballot boxes should be opened for all to see before the election begins, and observers should accompany mobile and other ballot boxes through the day.

Finally, counting should occur at every polling site. Observers should watch the count, sign the declaration of results, and keep a copy. The final announcement should publicize the results of each of the polling stations, so that people can detect any vote discrepancy.

Much else needs to be done to build confidence in the electoral process and assure votes are counted fairly. But if these four fundamental elements of electoral reform are accepted and implemented, the next election in Iran would be much freer and fairer. The reforms would also allow Iranians and the world to locate and denounce any fraud. The opposition has asked for a new election, but without these four reforms, that is unlikely to be any fairer than the previous one. Only with such reforms can Iranians know when their votes count, and when their voices are stolen.

What role should the West and the United States play at this time? It is obvious that Ahmadinejad and his allies would like to blame all of Iran's problems on the West -- especially the United States and Britain. The government's case against the opposition is that its members are surrogates of the West. For these countries to be seen as meddling in Iran's affairs would be counter-productive.

On the other hand, the democratic community cannot be silent; it needs to find the most appropriate and legitimate way to express its support for democracy in Iran and elsewhere. The best way to reconcile these two somewhat conflicted messages -- avoid meddling but provide more support for Iran's democrats -- is if the world's great Muslim democracies, which have diplomatic relations with Iran -- like Indonesia and Lebanon -- to carry the message. Those countries should propose a resolution to the U.N. Human Rights Council, calling for an end to repression and for genuine electoral reform.

It now appears that Ahmadinejad will try to consolidate a hard-line government and will ruthlessly suppress all legitimate protest movements. If he chooses this path, he will further undermine his efforts to win legitimacy.

The battle for reform has just begun. The only question is when it will prevail. Within Iran's regime, a group of clerics holds that the Islamic Republic should be genuinely democratic. In the end, the major hope for democracy will depend on their acknowledging the flaws in the electoral system and deciding to reform it.

Getty Images


The Day After

The Taliban will still be winning -- unless what comes after the election is real change.

It is campaign season in Afghanistan. Thirty-eight presidential candidates and more than 3,000 prospective Provincial Council members are on the hustings. Colorful posters of candidates posing in the regional dress of sought-after constituencies festoon the walls throughout the capital. Candidates of all stripes are promising change: an end to the war with the Taliban, the start of a new war on corruption, and any number of wild schemes: One hopeful told me in Kabul that he would distribute 100 acres of land to every Afghan family. 

At the same time, in the insurgency-riddled south of the country a different campaign is underway. With nearly 17,000 new U.S. troops in place, NATO and Afghan forces have launched operations Panther's Claw and Khanjar to clear militants from key population centers -- the first phase of the Obama administration's robust new counterinsurgency strategy. There is a hope that this push will also benefit the national elections on Aug. 20 by making voting more secure for millions of Afghans. However, just days before the election, violence is at a seven-year high and it is difficult to say whether Afghans in the most restive provinces will have the confidence to show up in force at the polls. Taliban threats to cut off voters' fingers and otherwise interfere with the voting have given even more cause for doubt in the last few days.

The campaign that is missing, however, is as central to success in Afghanistan as the other two: the move to meet demands for justice and accountability shared by ordinary Afghans across the country.

The twin pillars of legitimacy in Afghanistan are security and justice. In the absence of either -- or both -- people will look for alternatives. This is where the Taliban come in. From 1994 to 1996, as the Taliban swept across an Afghanistan rent by chaos and warlordism, it was their approach to security and justice, not Islam, that won them legions of supporters. The Taliban brought law and order, often absurd in form (no kite-flying) and brutal in application, but always swift and effective. Today, they are drawing from the same playbook, and it is still working.

Why? Because the Karzai government and its international backers have failed after nearly eight years to create a government that is respected and trusted by many of its people. Warlords who committed well-documented atrocities -- some after the U.S. invasion in 2001 -- continue to occupy high positions in the government. The return of Gen. Rashid Dostum this week to Afghanistan -- the infamous Warlord of the North who has a well-documented human rights abuse beat sheet going back nearly three decades -- is only one example of how the Karzai government has undermined itself by cozying up to criminals.

Corruption is also endemic in the country. Afghanistan was ranked among the top five most-corrupt countries in the world by Transparency International this year. Ties to the $4 billion opium trade are found at every level of government. Even when the justice system seems to function, the powerful go free. In April, President Hamid Karzai pardoned five convicted drug traffickers -- one the nephew of his campaign manager. And most ordinary Afghans don't have access to a reliable court to resolve their disputes.

The most dangerous direction for Afghanistan, and the United States, is increased military engagement that props up an increasingly illegitimate government. Instead, the United States must act aggressively with its Afghan partners in the lead to break the cycle of impunity and corruption that's dragging us all down and providing a hospitable environment for the insurgency.

A few key steps should be taken immediately after the election to set a clear tone for the next Afghan government. First, the Afghan president should make a major speech indicating zero tolerance for corruption and criminality. Second, this demonstration of leadership should be accompanied by the creation of a new, empowered anti-corruption and serious-crimes task force, independent of the government agencies it may be investigating. The international community must devote intelligence and investigative support, as well as the manpower to support dangerous raids. In the first few months, several high profile cases including the removal and/or prosecution of officials engaged in criminality, including members of parliament, should be highly publicized. We should approach this mission with the same vigor as other key elements of the counterinsurgency campaign. Third, the new Obama administration counternarcotics strategy that shifts resources from feckless eradication programs to focus on interdiction and prosecution must be successfully implemented.

Finally, we must put real effort into strengthening Afghan institutions that will be responsible for these matters over the long haul, giving them the capacity and tools they need to lead. At the same time, we must be realistic in understanding that most Afghan disputes will continue to be resolved by traditional councils of elders, tribal and religious leaders. Rather than fight what works, we should embrace it and develop ties between the formal and informal justice systems.

All of these efforts will require significantly more resources and attention than we've devoted to justice over the last eight years -- but still a fraction of the cost of elections and military campaigns. Most importantly, it will require political will, from Washington and Kabul, to reverse the perception of injustice that threatens our success.