• NOVEMBER 21, 2009
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Doubting Afghanistan

A compelling case for continued U.S. involvement in Afghanistan can be made, but only by answering these 10 questions.

BY BERNARD I. FINEL | AUGUST 25, 2009

I have become a skeptic of the continued American involvement in Afghanistan. Like many skeptics of the policy, I am willing to be convinced to change my views. But unfortunately, most of the arguments in favor of an escalation of the conflict provide unconvincing strategic rationales. I believe that a compelling case for increasing our commitment must be able to provide convincing answers to these 10 questions.

(1) Why does the possibility that al Qaeda might establish a sanctuary in Afghanistan justify a multi-year commitment of American forces, while the reality of an al Qaeda sanctuary in Pakistan justifies nothing more than financial support to the Pakistani government and occasional Predator strikes?

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(2) Is a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan inevitable without a significant American presence on the ground?  Or might some other form of aid to the Karzai regime be sufficient to stave off that eventuality?

(3) What precisely is the nature of the risk a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan would pose to the stability of Pakistan? From 1996 to 2001, the Taliban controlled Afghanistan, and yet by most indications, Pakistan was under less threat from Islamist radicals then than now. What has changed to make Afghanistan now the lynchpin on which the stability of Pakistan rests?

(4) The escalation of our commitment to Afghanistan is intimately connected to the acceptance of population-centric counter-insurgency theory popularized by General Petraeus in Iraq.  How does this sort of campaign actually contribute to the long-term stabilization of Afghanistan? And if the goal is simply to dampen the insurgency to create space for a political process to occur, why is there any reason to assume that the Afghan government would be able to utilize this space more effectively than from early 2002 to early 2005 when there was only limited Taliban activity in the country?

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MANAN VATSYAYANA/AFP/Getty Images

 

Bernard I. Finel is a senior fellow at the American Security Project (ASP) where he directs research on counterterrorism and defense policy. He is the lead author of ASP’s annual report, “Are We Winning? Measuring Progress in the Struggle against Violent Jihadism.”

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BOREDWELL

12:37 AM ET

August 26, 2009

afghan doubt

While Afghanistan may harbor terrorists, Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria, Turkmenistan, Oman, Chechnya and Kenya, to name just a few, are fertile grounds for incubating and training them, too . I've read there are Islamic terrorist encampments along the Amazonian border between Brazil. Bolivia and Peru. General Petraeus used cash for guns (bribery) to win over the Sunni insurgents which in turn bred an exclusive club of new warlords: sheiks who now dominate, controlling the corporate and political structures of those cities in which they operate. The program may have succeeded in drawing these local militias away from al-Qaeda but it has, as a consequence, underwritten a different kind of tyranny which could erupt in a war between the local haves and haves not. These short-term strategies for building rapport with Afghan citizens seem as idealistic (given the country's geographical logistics) as they are feckless and fiscally enervating. The escalating cost of maintaining our burgeoning troops is commensurate with our inability to establish law and order in Afghanistan. Combined, these with ultimately undermine us and determine our future withdrawal.

 

OMARALI50

5:13 PM ET

August 26, 2009

with reference to question 3.

with reference to question 3. Pakistan was in "less danger fo falling to islamic militants" because Islamic militants were full allies of its security establishment. Half a million jihadis were being trained in broad daylight. The taliban were allies. The madressas and assoc networks were turning out the alumni who would move on to every "front" from Indonesia to phillipines to china. Is that the status quo ante you wish to return to? You should rephrase the question to ask: Now that we have flipped the Pak army, can we leave? The answer depends on your assessment of how permanently the army has given up on the worldwide jihad. (I am assuming the US sees no need to fight a costly war to stop the jihad against India or IRan or China, that would be their problem).

 

CHEEMA

9:13 PM ET

August 27, 2009

Here are brief answers: 1)

Here are brief answers:

1) Al Qaeda (Jihadist) have no state sponsored sanctury in Pakistan or elsewhere but they may hide anywhere and there will always be some people who will have soft corner for them. 2) Afghan government can't survive on it's own. Afghanistan Govt will require a GDP of US $50 billion, trust of afghan people and help of neighbouring countries to survive. 3) It is unlikely that few hundered thousand Taliban will take over 173 million Pakistanis unless Pakistanis are radiculized by worsening economic conditions, support of separatist movements by foreign powers (US, India, Israel), intimidation and attack by foreign force (US, India). In such a scenario Pakistan Military and ISI will be forced to call a truce with Taliban and for the same they want to keep Mullah Omar alive as India has signifcantly funded Bloach Separatist Movement and Pakistan Army may not be able to fight on multiple fronts. Pakistanis, in general don't like rule of the religious entities like Taliban 4) Afhgnaistan is a tribal society and they don't like the strong central govt to med with the affairs of local tribes. Western style democracy will not work in Afghanistan. You can take example of Pakistan tribal areas. 5) They will need to be part of political process for lasting stability and they are usually very good at keeping their words if they are asked to swear on Koran while signing an agreement, they will certainly abide by it. 6) West can't force it's defination of human rights on Taliban (if they are in power), they may target some people as they are targeting now. A large scale prosecution can be avoided by talking to them and making agreements with them, in this regard. 7) Afghanistan will need a GDP of $50 billion US or a permanent support of funds which is highly unlikely once NATO pull out from there and focus shift to other issues like local economy and politics. 8) Other places are not ruled by one central ideology like Taliban and if left prematurely (which is very likely) the neighbouring countries will try to install their puppet regimes. Russia will support Nothern Alliance. India will like a friendly Govt to whom it can supply weapons to destabilize Pakistan and raise the issue of durand line. India and China will love to see Taliban go. Pakistan will support Pashtoons as they make 20 percent of it's population and 35 per cent of it's Army and it will like to see friendly Govt there who doesn't play on the hand of Indians. Pakistan, if pushed to the wall may start supporting Taliban. 9) Both stretegic and political factors will keep US there, unless US Citizens start demanding for pull out. There is certainly a political factor in it. 10) Not at all, as far as pentagon and administation is concerned, however more Americans will start demanding for the pull out, should that happen.

 

OMARALI50

11:31 PM ET

August 27, 2009

Hmmm, Pakistan may be forced to support the taliban?

Cheema sahib, what "forced" pakistan (or rather the Pak army, as the pakistani people were never consulted) to train half a million jihadis and support the taliban in the nineties? (remember colonel Imam?) US invasion or Indian invasion?
your email may imply that the "good taliban" policy is very much still in place. but somehow I dont think it is likely to succeed. It is even possible that the US WILL get frustrated and will want Pakistan to make a deal with the taliban so they can get out. But I dont think it will work because its the taliban who will not behave according to script. In short, the US may be willing to play ball, the ISI may have a plan, but their old friends, the taliban, are not going to cooperate. As a result, the likelier scenario is not that Pakistan will be "forced to support the taliban". The likelier scenario is that the Pak army will one day be asking India to help it fight the bad taliban....

 

SANJEEV BERY

2:00 PM ET

August 30, 2009

The Question of America's Moral Responsibility

Mr. Finel,

Thank you for posing some tough questions that deserve deeper discussion. To complicate matters, I would like focus a bit more on your question six -- the nature of America's "moral obligation" to protect, among others, Afghan women from Taliban oppression.

The fear of a return to Taliban misogyny should be weighed against the reality of significant misogyny in the policies being put forward by the Karzai government. After all, it was the Western-backed Afghanistan regime that recently produced legislation allowing husbands to starve sexually unwilling wives.

So in considering our moral obligation, we should also remember that U.S.-backed Afghan elites are making their own deals within the same misogynist political culture. In effect, the U.S. goal of building a stable, non-Taliban Afghan regime may itself result in a perpetuation of misogynist governance and human rights violations.

This kind of oppression may well differ from the level of oppression that we all would expect if Taliban militias regained power. But how big would the difference be? Given that the U.S. is explicitly exploring negotiations with certain Taliban leaders, this too is a question worth asking.

Sanjeev Bery

 

SANJEEV BERY

2:02 PM ET

August 30, 2009

America's Moral Responsibility in Afghanistan

Mr. Finel,

Thank you for posing some tough questions that deserve deeper discussion. To complicate matters, I would like focus a bit more on your question six -- the nature of America's "moral obligation" to protect, among others, Afghan women from Taliban oppression.

The fear of a return to Taliban misogyny should be weighed against the reality of significant misogyny in the policies being put forward by the Karzai government. After all, it was the Western-backed Afghanistan regime that recently produced legislation allowing husbands to starve sexually unwilling wives.

So in considering our moral obligation, we should also remember that U.S.-backed Afghan elites are making their own deals within the same misogynist political culture. In effect, the U.S. goal of building a stable, non-Taliban Afghan regime may itself result in a perpetuation of misogynist governance and human rights violations.

This kind of oppression may well differ from the level of oppression that we all would expect if Taliban militias regained power. But how big would the difference be? Given that the U.S. is explicitly exploring negotiations with certain Taliban leaders, this too is a question worth asking.

Sanjeev Bery
http://digdeeper.us/spilledink

 
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