On first blush you will not get it because your underLying assumptions are so incorrect.

Think about it:

Osama Bin Laden is portrayed by the west as a “religious…” but there is no “English” definition of religious that could encompass flying airplanes into buildings; so by English definition: Bin Laden could not be religious. So we are left to “duck theory”: the portrayal that fits Bin Laden perfectly: “mercenary marketing director for various government owned weapons manufacturers parading as a religious” Islime c 2001; now whether or not you believe Ben Laden is weapons marketing director is of no relevance whatsoever; What is relevant is that Ben Laden could easily only be portrayed that way; the Moslem street would not think much of or be inclined to follow a person attempting to use Moslems as fodder for a weapons deal: a war.

This writer is of course the only person to have 1) predicted by 1980 the downfall, by popular uprising, of the government operating out of Moscow; 2) The World Trade Center hit, and I refused to travel south of 40th street to avoid being anywhere near the World Trade Center prior to 9/11; 3) copyright 1991: “long lasting war” and sell lots of weapons under the title “Syrious Business” 4) wrote the strategy for avoiding this war in 1978. 5) The outcome of the Iraq war (weapon deal) by June 2003. et al

Yes, I delivered those analysis/predictions from the last paragraph of my post to every member of Congress. Your conclusions about my post seem emotional and you seem extremely frustrated. Once you finally got intellectual and suggested an alternative micro propaganda strategy: disinformation campaign, you made some since. Only difference is my suggestion is a perfect shoe fit. Your suggestion is the conspiracy theory, not mine: to plant stuff on Ben Laden you must know where he is. It is of course true that after lying and portraying Ben Laden as religious, it will be hard to tell the truth now. With respect to your claim that some just like jihad, I would say we do a good job of beating up low level soldiers while the leaders that send them to kill us are in many cases invited to the White House as honored guest. That is called denial. Obviously the war being waged against “free speech to criticize Islime” has been going on long before 9/11; the war is based on the premise that if: “free speech to criticize Islime and no Honor killing and education/jobs/cars for women, freedom of/from religion et al”, continue to exist then Islime can not continue to exist; as a means of subjugating ethnic masses. That’s right, for the promoters of Islime, the West successes means the fall of Islime and that is the underlying motivation of all jihad against the West; that some people just like killing/hating others for the “cause”, in this case: jihad, is true of followers of most “causes”.

"Abbasi is right about one thing. Pakistanis don't like the United States, and they are unlikely to change their minds soon, no matter how many bridge-building meetings we have with them."
That's right, and what's wrong is the notion that Americans care about Pakistan. Nonsense. They wouldn't mind if Pakistan ate shit and died, but beyond that...I don't think so. That's why the message doesn't work -- because it simply isn't honest or true.

I am a Pakistani. Fortunately I represent an educated coterie of our very unfortunate junta. Its obvious from the ongoing discussion that Pakistan is a very important country for America, or so to speak, for the West. I don't agree that our importance is because we want to Islamize the whole world (we don't have the power to do that). But we are the only nuclear people stopping the West to Westernize the whole world.
After the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, some said, "Pakistan Army stood for the free world against the red army". But now it seems as if we the people of Pakistan are standing for the God against the Godless Army.

The information war is not about talking the Muslim world out of hating the US. It is more so about undercutting the appeal of radical groups by forcing some of the hate their way.

There at least two major strategies on how to conduct an effective strategic communication or public diplomacy campaign: build yourself up or bring your enemy down. Recently, Adm Mullen correctly (but obviously) pointed out that any US effort to bolster its own appeal with the Muslim world is bound to fail because our policies are seen as a threat to Islam.

What the US has thus far not done enough of, however, is de-legitimizing the enemy by focousing on their inner contradictions, mistakes, etc. A major factor in Al-Qaida's downfall in Iraq was their strategic mistake in brutally killing Muslim civilians. Zawahiri even had to send a letter to Zarqawi essentially telling him to wake up, as his tactics were drastically hurting al-Qaida's image.

If we can find a way to facilitate or assist (covertly, of course) credible Muslim voices in de-legitimizing al-Qaida’s ideology, tactics, and particularly its propensity for killing fellow Muslims more than anyone else, this could further undermine the exremist's support base.

Increased efforts to undercut the enemy's ideology, tactics, and appeal do not require Muslims to like the US or accept its policies. They can continue to hate the US, as long as they hate groups like al-Qaida too.

Of course, this does not absolve the US or eliminate the need to take a serious look at our policies toward the Muslim World. Re-assessing our policies in the region is imperative. Yet I am less hopeful that these policies will change anytime soon and much more hopeful that our enemies will continue to make foolish mistakes we can capitalize on.

I doubt whether military means can be used to achieve humanitarian solution, whether through resource allocation or seeking alliances within and without the government, particulary when those government are just about to be shown the door.

Seeing each other as enemies is leaving in denial, the best approach is to view each other as power contenders.. atleas this gives room for first step in mutual discussion and agreement.

Slavery of opinion is to fail to recognise that you are standing alone, in a multitude whereby everyone has his own opinion. It is time to listen, and talk later.

When you're trying to outrun a bear, the goal isn't to outrun the bear - it's to outrun the person behind you.

At some point, everyone in the State Department and beyond needs to apply what I call the "Grade-school Test": Would this work when I was a fifth-grader? If the answer's "no", we should probably try something else. Case in point - if somebody doesn't like you, would they like you more if you kept pestering them about how great you are and how you two should, like, TOTALLY hang out and stuff, 'cause you have lots of toys to share? Probably not, right? If anything, you're more likely to enrage them further. On the other hand, keeping your mouth shut and helping them with that bully that's been pestering you two might not necessarily make them your friend, but it might help them realize that openly hating you is counterproductive.

Don't get me wrong - I'm not saying that all diplomacy should be seen through the eyes of a 10-year-old. However, I do think it'd make a solid reality check.

One thing the State Dept. could do is work its message, if this post is any indication.

- The author suggests peddling a "neutral" source of information - the VOA - while at the same time politicizing it with ramped up rhetoric in Iran. So Iranians like us and know that their election was stolen - what else is VOA going to tell them? "Keep protesting and fighting the good fight for Uncle Sam. Hey, ho, Ahmedi Nejad has got to go!"? Don't think that's going to resonate. Just as we can tell the difference between FOX and MSNBC, so can the rest of the world differentiate between the news sources available to them. If strong internal dissent isn't going to bring the Iranian government down this time with multiple "new media" platforms and excellent on-the-ground organization, will fomenting dissent over the radio?
The author has a good point of distancing ourselves from these discussions as a way to abate anti-US action or sentiment, but we don't need to counter this by trying to cram a bunch of self-professed propaganda down their throat.

- Similarly, how does telling Arabs that the Persians are trying to take them over help anything? This is "preaching to the choir" to the umpteenth degree. What will increased efforts to disseminate this message accomplish? Playing up fears between the sides doesn't necessarily push anyone into our corner - especially entities who aren't already siding with us. Asking people to pick their boogey-man hasn't always worked out in US foreign policy.

- FTA "There are three conflicts, and for each of them the West can play a supporting role. Americans are affected by these conflicts ... and Americans have a stake in their outcomes. But the conflicts are primarily within Muslim societies. They are endogenous, not imposed by the United States or by anyone else on the outside."
Again, how is telling Arabs that the problem lies with them going to help anything? "Listen guys, I know you don't like us, but the only way we're going to get anywhere is if you buy some Tony Robbins tapes and discover your own deep-seated probelms." This was effective in situations where the US had an intermediary role (South Africa, N. Ireland), but hasn't proven very effective in direct relations, to my knowledge. This policy doesn't work on a basic human level, as Mr. Colborne stated above, and will probably prove even less effective on a diplomatic scale. Divide and conquer games haven't worked with the modern Arab world as well as we would have liked. Maybe we could give something else a shot. Mr. Obama's idea of meeting on issues of mutual interest in good-faith seems to have captured the interest of Syria, though temporarily.

The "credibility" the author talks about is sorely needed, and utilizing some of the tools suggested within the article might not be a bad idea. But applying them in way the author suggests smacks of insincerity and the SOS to the people they are intended to reach. Stronger stances may help us, but only if applied with more verve than what has been suggested in this article.

Interesting article, and some interesting comments from readers, too.

I'm from the US, though I have lived in Asia 22 of the past 24 years (mainland China, Macau when it belonged to Portugal, and, since mid-1994, in Thailand). Maybe my views are somewhat different from my fellow Americans who have stayed in the US.

Mr. Glassman's basic departure point that people don't have to like us to work with us is correct. But I do strongly believe we should tread very, very carefully in demonizing the opposition, for the simple reason it's easy to be seen as demonizing Islam and all its followers.

We had success in Iraq partly because al-Qaeda badly misstepped, true. But that wasn't the only factor, and no, I've not been there. However, I've spoken with scores of people, mostly military, who have been there, and a common complaint is how little news coverage the positive stuff does us -- building schools and hospitals, projects of that nature. Maybe the affected neighborhoods' residents still dislike, even hate, Americans -- but according to the people with whom I've spoken, they sure do appreciate such projects, like or or not.

Yes, that strand of soft diplomacy is expensive, especially when corruption is endemic. But I'd rather see my tax dollars -- yes, I pay a bundle every year, since my income is US-based -- go for those projects than to continue asking our people to go off to fight. (I'm *not* advocating folding up the tents and pulling out of Iraq or Afghanistan with undue haste without regard to a safe, orderly withdrawal.)

Though I supported President Bush in many ways, I do think President Obama's efforts at image building are potentially more effective than were President Bush's.

There's something else that can help, though it's not something the US government can do. That is, many Americans unwittingly and with no ill intent inadvertently offend others when traveling abroad. And it takes so little to make a positive impression. Maybe the Thai noodle vendor still won't love me, but maybe, just maybe, she'll think, "Well, he's still an unkempt, uncouth foreigner, but at least he's polite." And that's about all I feel I have a right to expect. These steps are obvious ones that seasoned travelers know. I see mistakes often here, partly because Thais generally react to most things with a smile, even when they're upset or angry.

I did enjoy the article, Mr. Glassman.