It's Not About Us

On Aug. 17, Judith McHale, my successor as U.S. undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs, sat down with a Pakistani journalist in a hotel conference room in Karachi. According to a New York Times account, the one-on-one meeting was part of U.S. President Barack Obama's strategy to convince "the Pakistani people that the United States is their friend."

McHale gave a "polite presentation about building bridges between America and the Muslim world." Then, the Pakistani journalist, Ansar Abbasi, told her, "You should know that we hate all Americans. From the bottom of our souls, we hate you."

Winning Abbasi's heart and mind would be, to say the least, an ambitious undertaking. He is known for his xenophobia, his support for conspiracy theories, and his knee-jerk anti-Americanism. In an article last September, he floated a rumor that the U.S. government was involved in the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad. In April, he vigorously defended on television the Taliban's public flogging of a 17-year-old Pakistani girl, saying, "Those people who are transgressors against God's law should not be given any mercy."

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Reasoning with people like Abbasi is futile, but even more counterproductive is the broader reconciliation strategy, described in the Times as "one message: America cares about Pakistan." Making people like us better is a perfectly decent U.S. goal, but is an image-building strategy the most effective use of public diplomacy's tools in such a crucial relationship? And should the U.S. public image even be such a priority in the first place?

I don't think so. Abbasi is right about one thing. Pakistanis don't like the United States, and they are unlikely to change their minds soon, no matter how many bridge-building meetings we have with them.

Rather than trying to win Pakistanis over, the United States should focus on undercutting support for the mutual enemy -- violent extremists -- by helping Pakistanis in government and civil society engage their fellow citizens with a powerful narrative about the threat posed by the enemy and how to combat it. This promises to be a better use of U.S. diplomatic resources and a more beneficial mindset for Washington as well.

Although views of the United States have become more positive in most countries since Obama's inauguration, they have deteriorated in Pakistan. The most recent Pew Global Attitudes survey, conducted this spring and released last month, found that only 16 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of the United States, with 68 percent unfavorably disposed.

But even as U.S. favorability has slipped, support for al Qaeda and the Taliban has plummeted. In spring 2008, some 25 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of al Qaeda, with 34 percent unfavorable -- a disturbingly close split. Today, just 9 percent have a favorable opinion, with 61 percent unfavorable.

So too with the Taliban: The ratings shifted from 27 percent favorable and 33 percent unfavorable in 2008 to 10 percent favorable and 70 percent unfavorable today. In addition, the percentage of Pakistanis concerned about "extremism in our country" rose from 72 to 79 percent in a year.

The State Department and other U.S. agencies -- including the broadcasters of Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, which have expanded their objective coverage for Pakistanis -- helped effect this change. But most of the credit should go to the terrorists themselves.

With their assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, their attacks on innocent civilians in Islamabad and elsewhere, and the Taliban's bloodthirsty behavior after Pakistan ceded them judicial control in the Swat Valley, the violent extremists have turned a largely complacent Pakistani population against them. Similar shifts in support for terrorism occurred in Arab countries after attacks by terrorists in Amman, Casablanca, and elsewhere.

Until very recently, Pakistanis treated the lawless terrorist havens along the Afghan border in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North-West Frontier Province like the American Wild West -- outside the control of the central government, anarchic, and on their own. What happened in FATA stayed in FATA, they hoped. Now, Pakistani minds are changing. And the U.S. State Department, military, intelligence community, and private sector should continue to support this change -- and can do so with relatively little money.

We should not abandon attempts to make Pakistanis admire and respect us, but we must recognize that those efforts are long-term and expensive. Currently, about $600 million, or about two-thirds of the State Department's overall public diplomacy budget, goes to efforts such as educational and cultural exchanges. But at a time of violent extremist threats, public diplomacy, as during the Cold War, must be more immediate, countering pernicious ideologies and helping divert young people from following a path that leads to terrorism.

That job is best accomplished not by direct U.S. action but by support for indigenous people and organizations. With what I call Public Diplomacy 2.0, which started toward the end of the George W. Bush administration, we positioned the U.S. government as a facilitator and convener of a broad, informed, and free conversation, often using new social-networking technologies. That conversation brings Pakistan and other Muslim countries the vivid story of terrorism and a potent narrative that leads to action to enhance these societies' own security.

The Obama administration certainly understands this approach. In his inaugural address, the new president said, "To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect." He repeated this powerful phrase in speeches in Istanbul and Cairo.

Americans have a clear mutual interest with the Pakistanis: defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda for the sake of a stable, free Pakistan and a safer America. That interest can be achieved even if Pakistanis harbor an animus toward Americans. The United States has seen the power of mutual interest against terrorism succeed in similar situations with Jordanians, Egyptians, Saudis, and, yes, Iraqis. They may not like Americans, but they cooperate against a common enemy toward a common goal.

The latest Pew data reinforces this notion. By a margin of 63 percent to 12 percent, Pakistanis support the United States' "providing intelligence and logistical support to Pakistani troops fighting extremist groups." And by a margin of 47 percent to 24 percent, Pakistanis even support U.S. "missile strikes against leaders of extremist groups."

Still, the default position in U.S. public diplomacy -- getting people to like us better -- has an irresistible inertia. When in doubt, policymakers reflexively turn to brand-burnishing. But does likeability actually help achieve the national interest?

Consider the release last month of the "Lockerbie bomber" from a Scottish prison. The government agreed to repatriate Libyan Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, the only person sentenced in the 1998 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, because he has terminal cancer. The U.S. government tried strenuously to prevent it, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton personally intervening. A State Department spokesman said, "[She] spoke to the justice minister ... and expressed again fairly strongly our view that Megrahi should serve out his entire sentence in Scotland."

According to Pew, U.S. favorability in Britain increased from 53 percent in 2008 to 69 percent this spring. Yet, in at least a mild embarrassment, Clinton was rebuffed in her attempts at securing a simple and innocuous policy objective. The Scottish rejection does not bode well for the power of popularity.

Even worse, the quest for foreign approval diverts the United States from more important tasks at hand. I worry, for instance, that the United States' apparent lack of effort (with the exception of VOA and Radio Farda) in strategic communications in Iran since the protests following the June election is the result, simply, of not knowing what to do if the aim is not improved ratings. After all, most Iranians like the United States, as numerous polls have shown.

"It's not about telling our story," wrote Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an article about global strategic communications published Aug. 27 in Joint Force Quarterly, an official military journal. "We shouldn't care if people don't like us; that isn't the goal."

These are brave words, and needed. But Mullen proceeds in his brief article to imply strongly that, well, maybe it is about us. "Each time we fail to live up to our values or don't follow up on a promise," he writes, "we look more and more like the arrogant Americans the enemy claims we are." And though likeability isn't the U.S. objective, the "goal is credibility."

Of course, the United States needs credibility, just as it needs to develop friendships over the long term. What I advocate is change in emphasis. For the war-of-ideas part of public diplomacy (call it "global strategic engagement" if you don't like the word "war"), the constant admonition to U.S. policymakers should be that it's not about us. Bite your tongue when you say "we."

The dangerous narrative in Muslim societies is that the United States and the West are out to destroy Islam. The way to counter that narrative is not to protest that the United States has clean hands and that if you really knew us you would love us -- but to change the subject entirely. The United States is the scapegoat, the animal on which all cares and hatreds are loaded. We only contribute to that way of thinking when we defend ourselves, or talk about ourselves at all.

The accurate narrative, the one that strategic communications should promote, is that Muslim societies are today in the midst of profound change and upheaval. In general, they are coping with the upheaval well and in the end they will succeed, but the struggle is extremely difficult.

There are three conflicts, and for each of them the West can play a supporting role. Americans are affected by these conflicts (after all, terrorists killed more than 3,000 people in New York and Washington on a September day eight years ago), and Americans have a stake in their outcomes. But the conflicts are primarily within Muslim societies. They are endogenous, not imposed by the United States or by anyone else on the outside.

The first regards violent extremism. An intolerant, power-hungry minority is trying to wrest control of a great religion from the vast majority of Muslims. The second is freedom. Muslims are trying to determine their own destinies and are being thwarted by authoritarian regimes. Finally, Iran. An aggressive clique, Persian and Shiite, is attempting to control the Middle East, holding sway over Arabs and Sunnis.

The United States could disappear off the face of the Earth tomorrow and these conflicts would persist. Muslim societies are undergoing a period of revolutionary ferment, much like the Reformation, the Enlightenment, or the Industrial Revolution. (The latest Pew survey, by the way, asks about a "modernizer" vs. "fundamentalist" dichotomy and finds that 73 percent of Pakistanis who think a conflict exists identify themselves with the modernizers.)

The resolution of these conflicts cannot be imposed from the outside, but the United States can help. We indeed have a "mutual interest" with the vast majority of Muslims: against violent extremism, in favor of freedom, and against Iranian hegemony. Still, when the conflicts are resolved, the achievement will be a matter of great accomplishment and an occasion of great pride -- for Muslims. This is their struggle, just as the American Revolution and the Civil War were ours.

And what does Ansar Abbasi have to do with such a narrative? Nothing at all. Which is why he is exactly the kind of person not worth talking to.

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JAY GETTY

11:49 PM ET

September 1, 2009

Glassman is clueless how to win the Moslem street.I know exactly

On first blush you will not get it because your underLying assumptions are so incorrect.

Think about it:

Osama Bin Laden is portrayed by the west as a “religious…” but there is no “English” definition of religious that could encompass flying airplanes into buildings; so by English definition: Bin Laden could not be religious. So we are left to “duck theory”: the portrayal that fits Bin Laden perfectly: “mercenary marketing director for various government owned weapons manufacturers parading as a religious” Islime c 2001; now whether or not you believe Ben Laden is weapons marketing director is of no relevance whatsoever; What is relevant is that Ben Laden could easily only be portrayed that way; the Moslem street would not think much of or be inclined to follow a person attempting to use Moslems as fodder for a weapons deal: a war.

This writer is of course the only person to have 1) predicted by 1980 the downfall, by popular uprising, of the government operating out of Moscow; 2) The World Trade Center hit, and I refused to travel south of 40th street to avoid being anywhere near the World Trade Center prior to 9/11; 3) copyright 1991: “long lasting war” and sell lots of weapons under the title “Syrious Business” 4) wrote the strategy for avoiding this war in 1978. 5) The outcome of the Iraq war (weapon deal) by June 2003. et al

MED

4:04 AM ET

September 2, 2009

Duck theory.

Way to peddle your own works. You weren't the only who predicated the fall of USSR. I did too. I wrote it in my diary back in third grade. Not published. Funny enough, everyone knew the outcome of the Iraq war. I wrote that in my diary too. Let me put it this way, creativity is hiding your source. I agree with glassman in how to go about getting the world to work with us (as opposed to his economic prowess, Dow 36000) on a global scale. While you assume all extremist are of the same brush, and all fall under the ideology of Bin Laden, thus giving a narrow solution to a narrow problem (some genuinely believe in the jihad, some want the power and use religion as a front). Even then it's flawed solution to a flawed assumption. For one, you want to change the image of the enemy from a religious fighter to a unscrupulous mercenary. He has the advantage (market leader), and this would require us to change his image through guess what...propaganda. We have been doing that and as evidenced by several works of art on this subject, we suck at it. Since you know so much about the middle east and other muslim nations, you would also know rightly or wrongly they are fans of the conspiracy theory. Just as easily as we can portray him as a merc, so can it be dismissed as conspiracy or fear mongering by americans. If you want to destroy Bin laden, sow dissent and rumors from within. Much like the Abu-Nadal group was taken down by the Jordanians. It destroys their image faster than we can. It invalidates their ideology and you can bet at least one guy will squeal on the rest. Now you ask, how to sow dissent and rumor? Easy, plant money in their family bank accounts, on them, and pretend we are working with them. Actions speak louder than words.

7:45 AM ET

Med made a mistake. I delivered my analysis to Congress

Yes, I delivered those analysis/predictions from the last paragraph of my post to every member of Congress. Your conclusions about my post seem emotional and you seem extremely frustrated. Once you finally got intellectual and suggested an alternative micro propaganda strategy: disinformation campaign, you made some since. Only difference is my suggestion is a perfect shoe fit. Your suggestion is the conspiracy theory, not mine: to plant stuff on Ben Laden you must know where he is. It is of course true that after lying and portraying Ben Laden as religious, it will be hard to tell the truth now. With respect to your claim that some just like jihad, I would say we do a good job of beating up low level soldiers while the leaders that send them to kill us are in many cases invited to the White House as honored guest. That is called denial. Obviously the war being waged against “free speech to criticize Islime” has been going on long before 9/11; the war is based on the premise that if: “free speech to criticize Islime and no Honor killing and education/jobs/cars for women, freedom of/from religion et al”, continue to exist then Islime can not continue to exist; as a means of subjugating ethnic masses. That’s right, for the promoters of Islime, the West successes means the fall of Islime and that is the underlying motivation of all jihad against the West; that some people just like killing/hating others for the “cause”, in this case: jihad, is true of followers of most “causes”.

JIMMYBOBBY

1:52 PM ET

Right and wrong

"Abbasi is right about one thing. Pakistanis don't like the United States, and they are unlikely to change their minds soon, no matter how many bridge-building meetings we have with them."
That's right, and what's wrong is the notion that Americans care about Pakistan. Nonsense. They wouldn't mind if Pakistan ate shit and died, but beyond that...I don't think so. That's why the message doesn't work -- because it simply isn't honest or true.

MOWAHID.KIANI

4:50 PM ET

Do you really care for us ?

I am a Pakistani. Fortunately I represent an educated coterie of our very unfortunate junta. Its obvious from the ongoing discussion that Pakistan is a very important country for America, or so to speak, for the West. I don't agree that our importance is because we want to Islamize the whole world (we don't have the power to do that). But we are the only nuclear people stopping the West to Westernize the whole world.
After the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, some said, "Pakistan Army stood for the free world against the red army". But now it seems as if we the people of Pakistan are standing for the God against the Godless Army.

AARUN

5:37 PM ET

Please explain

Mowahid,

Could you please elaborate on why and HOW you believe the US is seeking to Westernize the whole world? Or, you can at least focus on Pakistan.

5:33 PM ET

Glassman is absolutely right

The information war is not about talking the Muslim world out of hating the US. It is more so about undercutting the appeal of radical groups by forcing some of the hate their way.

There at least two major strategies on how to conduct an effective strategic communication or public diplomacy campaign: build yourself up or bring your enemy down. Recently, Adm Mullen correctly (but obviously) pointed out that any US effort to bolster its own appeal with the Muslim world is bound to fail because our policies are seen as a threat to Islam.

What the US has thus far not done enough of, however, is de-legitimizing the enemy by focousing on their inner contradictions, mistakes, etc. A major factor in Al-Qaida's downfall in Iraq was their strategic mistake in brutally killing Muslim civilians. Zawahiri even had to send a letter to Zarqawi essentially telling him to wake up, as his tactics were drastically hurting al-Qaida's image.

If we can find a way to facilitate or assist (covertly, of course) credible Muslim voices in de-legitimizing al-Qaida’s ideology, tactics, and particularly its propensity for killing fellow Muslims more than anyone else, this could further undermine the exremist's support base.

Increased efforts to undercut the enemy's ideology, tactics, and appeal do not require Muslims to like the US or accept its policies. They can continue to hate the US, as long as they hate groups like al-Qaida too.

Of course, this does not absolve the US or eliminate the need to take a serious look at our policies toward the Muslim World. Re-assessing our policies in the region is imperative. Yet I am less hopeful that these policies will change anytime soon and much more hopeful that our enemies will continue to make foolish mistakes we can capitalize on.

OCHIENG100

6:09 AM ET

September 3, 2009

Slave of Opinion

I doubt whether military means can be used to achieve humanitarian solution, whether through resource allocation or seeking alliances within and without the government, particulary when those government are just about to be shown the door.

Seeing each other as enemies is leaving in denial, the best approach is to view each other as power contenders.. atleas this gives room for first step in mutual discussion and agreement.

Slavery of opinion is to fail to recognise that you are standing alone, in a multitude whereby everyone has his own opinion. It is time to listen, and talk later.

DAVID COLBORNE

1:56 PM ET

September 4, 2009

There's an old saying...

When you're trying to outrun a bear, the goal isn't to outrun the bear - it's to outrun the person behind you.

At some point, everyone in the State Department and beyond needs to apply what I call the "Grade-school Test": Would this work when I was a fifth-grader? If the answer's "no", we should probably try something else. Case in point - if somebody doesn't like you, would they like you more if you kept pestering them about how great you are and how you two should, like, TOTALLY hang out and stuff, 'cause you have lots of toys to share? Probably not, right? If anything, you're more likely to enrage them further. On the other hand, keeping your mouth shut and helping them with that bully that's been pestering you two might not necessarily make them your friend, but it might help them realize that openly hating you is counterproductive.

Don't get me wrong - I'm not saying that all diplomacy should be seen through the eyes of a 10-year-old. However, I do think it'd make a solid reality check.

ZURSTADT

5:26 PM ET

September 5, 2009

What?

One thing the State Dept. could do is work its message, if this post is any indication.

- The author suggests peddling a "neutral" source of information - the VOA - while at the same time politicizing it with ramped up rhetoric in Iran. So Iranians like us and know that their election was stolen - what else is VOA going to tell them? "Keep protesting and fighting the good fight for Uncle Sam. Hey, ho, Ahmedi Nejad has got to go!"? Don't think that's going to resonate. Just as we can tell the difference between FOX and MSNBC, so can the rest of the world differentiate between the news sources available to them. If strong internal dissent isn't going to bring the Iranian government down this time with multiple "new media" platforms and excellent on-the-ground organization, will fomenting dissent over the radio?
The author has a good point of distancing ourselves from these discussions as a way to abate anti-US action or sentiment, but we don't need to counter this by trying to cram a bunch of self-professed propaganda down their throat.

- Similarly, how does telling Arabs that the Persians are trying to take them over help anything? This is "preaching to the choir" to the umpteenth degree. What will increased efforts to disseminate this message accomplish? Playing up fears between the sides doesn't necessarily push anyone into our corner - especially entities who aren't already siding with us. Asking people to pick their boogey-man hasn't always worked out in US foreign policy.

- FTA "There are three conflicts, and for each of them the West can play a supporting role. Americans are affected by these conflicts ... and Americans have a stake in their outcomes. But the conflicts are primarily within Muslim societies. They are endogenous, not imposed by the United States or by anyone else on the outside."
Again, how is telling Arabs that the problem lies with them going to help anything? "Listen guys, I know you don't like us, but the only way we're going to get anywhere is if you buy some Tony Robbins tapes and discover your own deep-seated probelms." This was effective in situations where the US had an intermediary role (South Africa, N. Ireland), but hasn't proven very effective in direct relations, to my knowledge. This policy doesn't work on a basic human level, as Mr. Colborne stated above, and will probably prove even less effective on a diplomatic scale. Divide and conquer games haven't worked with the modern Arab world as well as we would have liked. Maybe we could give something else a shot. Mr. Obama's idea of meeting on issues of mutual interest in good-faith seems to have captured the interest of Syria, though temporarily.

The "credibility" the author talks about is sorely needed, and utilizing some of the tools suggested within the article might not be a bad idea. But applying them in way the author suggests smacks of insincerity and the SOS to the people they are intended to reach. Stronger stances may help us, but only if applied with more verve than what has been suggested in this article.

MEKHONGKURT

1:43 AM ET

September 21, 2009

Working with others

Interesting article, and some interesting comments from readers, too.

I'm from the US, though I have lived in Asia 22 of the past 24 years (mainland China, Macau when it belonged to Portugal, and, since mid-1994, in Thailand). Maybe my views are somewhat different from my fellow Americans who have stayed in the US.

Mr. Glassman's basic departure point that people don't have to like us to work with us is correct. But I do strongly believe we should tread very, very carefully in demonizing the opposition, for the simple reason it's easy to be seen as demonizing Islam and all its followers.

We had success in Iraq partly because al-Qaeda badly misstepped, true. But that wasn't the only factor, and no, I've not been there. However, I've spoken with scores of people, mostly military, who have been there, and a common complaint is how little news coverage the positive stuff does us -- building schools and hospitals, projects of that nature. Maybe the affected neighborhoods' residents still dislike, even hate, Americans -- but according to the people with whom I've spoken, they sure do appreciate such projects, like or or not.

Yes, that strand of soft diplomacy is expensive, especially when corruption is endemic. But I'd rather see my tax dollars -- yes, I pay a bundle every year, since my income is US-based -- go for those projects than to continue asking our people to go off to fight. (I'm *not* advocating folding up the tents and pulling out of Iraq or Afghanistan with undue haste without regard to a safe, orderly withdrawal.)

Though I supported President Bush in many ways, I do think President Obama's efforts at image building are potentially more effective than were President Bush's.

There's something else that can help, though it's not something the US government can do. That is, many Americans unwittingly and with no ill intent inadvertently offend others when traveling abroad. And it takes so little to make a positive impression. Maybe the Thai noodle vendor still won't love me, but maybe, just maybe, she'll think, "Well, he's still an unkempt, uncouth foreigner, but at least he's polite." And that's about all I feel I have a right to expect. These steps are obvious ones that seasoned travelers know. I see mistakes often here, partly because Thais generally react to most things with a smile, even when they're upset or angry.

I did enjoy the article, Mr. Glassman.

The United States need not be Miss Congeniality to win the war of ideas. We just need to make moderates hate extremists more than they dislike us.

BY JAMES K. GLASSMAN | SEPTEMBER 1, 2009

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