Afghanistan Is the New Afghanistan

In a recent ForeignPolicy.com article, Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason argue that Afghanistan is the new Vietnam. They are right, but there is another historical parallel which is both more obvious and less discussed: the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.

U.S. government officials have understandably avoided the comparison. For one, the United States supported the other side: Afghan "freedom fighters" who later became enemies. Further, the Soviets became bogged down in a costly and bloody decade-long quagmire before Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev ultimately pulled the plug and withdrew. Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan and its attempt to create a working central government in Kabul is broadly (if somewhat inaccurately) deemed a failure.

It's a failure the United States apparently has no intention of repeating -- to the extent that it doesn't even seem to study it. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual does not mention the Soviet experience once. One analyst told me that when she suggested including the conflict as a way to inform current policy, Pentagon officials seemed to have little awareness about what Moscow had been trying to do there or for how long.

But the United States has much to learn from the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Of course, there are vitally important differences. The United States has Pakistani support, while the Soviets did not. No superpowers back the Taliban now, but the United States supported the insurgents then. American forces are now fighting a distant war, but Afghanistan was proximate to the Soveit Union. And global networks like al Qaeda now fund insurgency in Afghanistan, but barely existed in the 1980s. Still, the similarities are worth considering.

When the United States helped topple the Taliban in the heady days after the September 11 attacks, the plan was to get Osama bin Laden and establish a democratic, pro-American government. No one planned on an eight-years-and-counting presence that would cost 800 U.S. lives, tens of thousands of Afghan lives, and half a trillion dollars.

Similarly, when Soviet leaders decided to invade Afghanistan in 1979, they did not intend to commit hundreds of thousands of troops over a decade to fight a domestic insurgency. They hoped that while Soviet troops provided training and logistical support to the military of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, economic aid and a massive advising effort would help build up the governing ability of the main political party. The Kabul government would then have the legitimacy and defense capability to stand on its own two legs without Soviet troops. Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader at that point, seems to have genuinely believed that soldiers would be home within a few months.

In practice, of course, things did not quite work out that way. Much like the efforts of the United States and its allies -- building schools without teachers to man them and promoting farming in desertlike areas where nothing grows -- the Soviet attempt at nation-building suffered from poor coordination, ill-planning, and a misunderstanding of indigenous culture. Moscow informed soldiers they were not in Afghanistan to spread communism, but to help people feel the tangible benefits of a working government. Still, enthusiastic party workers drew on Soviet propaganda and organizing principles, often alienating the local population.

These problems were compounded by rivalries among various Soviet agencies and institutions operating on the ground. Aid sometimes did not reach its destination because military commanders refused to relinquish the necessary transport vehicles or provide security. In other cases, Soviet representatives found that their Afghan "clients" had no intention of playing along with their nation-building plans. On one occasion, the KGB cultivated and promised protection, money, and a house to the leader of an insurgency group. The local governor, in turn, promptly denied the insurgency leader the promised housing and seized the cell's weapons.

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HELENA COBBAN

10:03 PM ET

September 4, 2009

The Afghan pullback and the Soviet Union's collapse

Artemy, thanks so much for this really helpful perspective. However, I think you fail to connect the dots between what you say about Gorbachev's not unreasonable fears re the geopolitical consequences of a Soviet pullback and what actually ended up happening...

Your reference here-- "Had the Soviet Union not collapsed, the regime in Kabul might have grown and survived indefinitely. ..."-- seems to just skate over the causes of the Soviet collapse. Among which, surely, the pullback from Afghanistan was one proximate cause or at least a strong precipitating factor?

AMKALINO

1:42 PM ET

September 6, 2009

Did Afghanistan contribute to the collapse of the USSR

Dear Helena,

Thank you for your question. No, I do not think that the war was a proximate cause or even a strong precipitating factor. The reason is that the costs of the war were actually quite managable, as were Soviet losses. The war was of course not popular, but the withdrawal was well received by the Soviet public and even boosted Gorbachevs popularity. Since the regime in Kabul did not collapse the Soviet leadership never had to face charges of causing a defeat there - on the contrary, the regimes survival seemed to justify the decision to withdraw.

Still, there are a few related issues worth mentioning. Discussion of the war in the Soviet press, which really took off in earnest after 1989 and was generally very critical of the decision to intervene, served as ammunition for those who wanted to deligitimize the Soviet state. But even that criticism focused mostly on the Brezhnev cohort, not the contemporary leadership. News of hazing and other problems with the military also undermined faith in that institution.

Nevertheless, none of this discussion would have been possible if Gorbachev had not initiated glasnost and expanded press freedoms so greatly between 1985 and 1989. And this goes to the broader question of what caused the Soviet collapse - it was the processes unleashed by Gorbachev from 1985 onwards and his rejection of the use of force when those processes got out of control that led to the collapse of the state.

There is much, much more to say on this, but this is as much as I think is appropriate for the forum (particularly as I am travelling and with only sporadic access to a computer). I may try to write a more satisfying answer in the coming weeks...

All best,

Artemy

KITCHN10

11:16 AM ET

September 7, 2009

Afghanistan may be Afghanistan, the US is certainly not the USSR

Artemy,

An excellent piece, although it brings to mind the dictum that we should beware historians bearing analogies. Whilst, as you say Afghanistan may be Afghanistan, the US is certainly not the USSR. Even given the United States current imperial difficulties - that world decline is rearing its head once more, a historical regularity seemingly without end - its position is far stronger than the Soviet Union's was in the early 1980s.

Where the United States is in a military and financial position to surge, especially as it draw down its commitment in Iraq, the Soviet military in 1985 was dead on its feet, desperately under-resourced. Had Gorbachev had the capabilities to hand that Obama can bring to the table he surely would not have considered pulling out.

Afghanistan may yet defeat the United States - assymmetry is the curse of empires. But Afghanistan will surely not defeat the US as it defeated the USSR.

Nick Kitchen

SUBHASISPAUL

3:25 PM ET

The Pakistan factor

Why should one need to go through U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual to know about Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? This is now history and available in standard text books. This article is only about defeats. US now, should rather look forward for victories. As detailed by Christian Brose & Daniel Twining in the article Our Pakistan Problem in TWS, defeating terrorist groups supported by Pakistan in Afghanistan should be the immediate goal of US & NATO forces. India can play a key role here by defeating the terrorist forces supported by Pakistan in Kashmir and other Indian territories. Crippled of the proxy arm on either sides of the boarder, Pakistan army may start seeing the reality. This is not a straight line process, but need several iterations. Terrorism in Afghanistan and India is only surviving because of Pakistan army’s support. Without external support, no insurgency or terrorist movement survives. If only Pakistan army and government live by their words and stop providing any support to terrorists, the Af part of the war will become quite winnable by US, NATO and Afghan forces. That in turn will help Pakistan army and government win the Pak side.

KHALID MUFTI

4:00 PM ET

September 8, 2009

You've already lost!

Losers almost always blame others for the mess. Just look at all the wars ever fought.

Vietnam? We lost because the USSR and China were supporting the Vietnamese fighters.

Afghanistan? Because USA and Pakistan were supporting the Mujahideen.

The freedom struggle in Kashmir? Because Pakistan is backing the patriots.

Reading your response makes it look like Pakistan was a superpower, with a finger in every pie, backing every insurgency. India has even accused Pakistan of feeding the rebels over 1,200 miles away in Assam!

Get real. Pakistan is having difficulty getting its own house in order just now, what to talk of being active all over South Asia.

Wars are won or lost even before the first battle has taken place. This war has been lost. We can either come out in defeat now, or come out in defeat two years from now with many more dead on both sides. Take your pick.

KEROKAN

12:56 PM ET

USA and USSR have different definitions of success

Thank you Artemy for the informative article.

I don't agree with the last 2 paragraphs where you argue that USSR neither won nor lost in Afghanistan and this might be a useful lesson for the USA today. USSR in 1980's may have been content with a puppet regime holding Kabul and a loose alliance around the country but I think the same achievement would count as defeat for the US today. If after US's departure Taliban returns to power in some areas and allows Al Qaeda to train militants, if Afghanistan continues to be the major supplier of drugs to the world the US will be defeated. It does not matter whether Karzai holds Kabul. What happens outside of Kabul is much more important for US today than it was for USSR in 1986. For that reason it is much more difficult for the US to save face while making its exit.

Afghanistan Is the New Afghanistan

Twenty years ago, the Soviets cut their losses and withdrew from Afghanistan. If it wants to avoid that outcome, the United States should learn its history.

BY ARTEMY KALINOVSKY | SEPTEMBER 4, 2009

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