The Musharraf I Know

Pakistan's judiciary has never been an effective check on the power of the executive. Constitutional provisions help the government appoint judges who are loyalists, rather than objective thinkers. The beneficiaries of this long-standing practice are customarily Pakistan's military dictators. So it was with Pervez Musharraf -- the general who seized power from Nawaz Sharif's democratically elected government in 1999, was ousted last summer, and, incidentally, was a dear friend of mine when we served together in the Army from the early 1980s through 2000.

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Now, since Musharraf's ouster and exile, it appears the tide has turned against judicial corruption. Six weeks ago, Pakistan's highest court ruled some of Musharraf's judiciary maneuvers illegal -- paving the way for a trial against the general himself. For the first time in decades, the country's judges seem capable of enforcing the Constitution. But does this promising development really mean that change has come to Pakistan? And what does it mean for Musharraf, who faces possible execution for what the courts think could be treason?

I knew Musharraf intimately from our early days in the Army. We belonged to the Artillery Corps and served together on a number of appointments. He was a brave field soldier, and an intelligent and thoroughly professional officer, though he could be a hothead and pick fights over petty matters. Still, he steadily ascended the Army ranks, serving in the 1965 Indo-Pak War, assuming the role of company commander in the Special Service Group during the 1971 confrontation, being promoted to major general in 1991, and ultimately becoming Army chief of staff in 1998. However, when I served as adjutant general of the Army, it became increasingly clear to me in my daily interactions with him that Musharraf was a reactionary, not a visionary. Indeed, he could be trigger-happy, taking steps on critical matters without taking their potential consequences into account.

Numerous incidents testify to that observation. Most importantly, Musharraf seized power in a bloodless military coup in October 1999 -- yet even his takeover of a country had a thrown-together quality to it. Although he had been plotting to dislodge Sharif for some time, he did not know what to say in his first address to the Pakistani people after he assumed office. One of his subordinates gave him a hastily drafted speech that omitted mention of many salient challenges confronting Pakistan.

Musharraf soon succumbed to the temptation to stay in power no matter what it might cost the country. He, like his predecessors, removed the Supreme Court's independent judges and appointed his own. They certified his legitimacy and allowed him to amend the constitution however he saw fit. Musharraf introduced an amendment, which came into force in December 2003, that allowed him to head both the government and the military. (The constitution had previously required separate heads of the Army and the state.) His handpicked parliament rubber-stamped the measure.

And so, he decided to run again, in uniform, in contravention of still-existing laws. Another presidential candidate submitted a case to the Supreme Court that challenged the general's eligibility for that reason. This time, however, Musharraf was concerned that he would not be able to count on the court's subservience on account of two high-profile cases. One involved the privatization of Pakistan Steel Mills (PSM), the country's largest industrial asset, for only one-third its actual value. The court opposed its sale to a Russian-Saudi-Pakistani consortium on the grounds that it had been conducted with "indecent haste." The other case involved some 250 "missing persons," Pakistanis who were alleged to have been detained by U.S. and Pakistani intelligence agencies in connection with the war on terrorism without any warrant or court order. Here, too, Musharraf was implicated.

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