
Discussion over the fate of Foggy Bottom usually focuses on the tenure of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the troubles of public diplomacy, and the rise of special envoys on everything from European pipelines to Afghanistan and Pakistan. But Americans would benefit more from a reassessment of the core functionality of the U.S. State Department.
Years of neglect and marginalization, as well as a dearth of long-term vision and strategic planning, have left the 19th-century institution hamstrung with fiefdoms and bureaucratic bottlenecks. The Pentagon now funds and controls a wide range of foreign-policy and diplomatic priorities -- from development to public diplomacy and beyond. The world has changed, with everyone from politicians to talking heads to terrorists directly influencing global audiences. The most pressing issues are stateless: pandemics, recession, terrorism, poverty, proliferation, and conflict. But as report after report, investigation after investigation, has highlighted, the State Department is broken and paralyzed, unable to respond to the new 21st-century paradigm.
But how did it get so bad? Is it possible to fix? Or should we just push it over the wall like a great Humpty Dumpty and reassign the pieces?
Can Mosquito Nets Stop Terrorists?
The battle between the State Department and the Department of Defense to control public diplomacy.
By Elizabeth Dickinson
There is growing evidence that the internal machinations of the State Department have corrupted its "core missions" of traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy. This year, for example, the Government Accountability Office (gao) found that the department completely failed in its now four-year-old attempt to reorganize its nonproliferation bureau (a bureau that remains leaderless). Besides failing to address mission overlap, low morale, and lack of career opportunities, the failed reorganization caused a significant drop in expertise in offices focused on proliferation issues -- including "today's threats posted by Iran, North Korea, and Syria," the gao's report said -- and coordination with bodies like the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Another report by the State Department's inspector general this year described severe and broad dysfunction within the Africa bureau, while ignoring -- perhaps considering it a given -- the lack of departmentwide integration and leadership in operations. Examples of the dysfunction range from not providing public diplomacy personnel with computers capable of reading interoffice memos to a failure to effectively work with the new Africa Command.
By necessity, the Defense Department has stepped in where State Department has tuned out: Foggy Bottom relies on Pentagon funding and even personnel for basic operations central to its mission. For example, the Defense Department now performs much strategic communications work traditionally the purview of the State Department. In Somalia, for example, the State Department's budget for public diplomacy is $30,000. The Pentagon's is $600,000. And, in the State Department's bureaucratic wisdom, the $30,000 does not even belong to its undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs.
Further, rivalries between the different "cones" -- or career tracks, referred to by one insider as the "conal caste system" -- at the State Department severely impact morale, career growth, and even operations. The report on the Africa bureau noted that in 2002, public affairs and public diplomacy was a "failed office" -- and that the situation is worse in 2009. Public outreach workers said the bureau's leadership "does not understand public diplomacy." The sentiment is widespread. A 2008 report by a congressional ombudsman, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, described a systemic failure to support and train public diplomacy officers in the field, as well as professional discrimination against those in the career track.
Attempts to fix the State Department have focused on short-term issues, such as ameliorating its shortages in human and financial resources. The last eight secretaries of state have attempted to bolster the department by bolstering its bottom line. No less than Defense Secretary Robert Gates and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, have long suggested transferring funds from the Defense Department to State Department. But the situation is so dire that the State Department, at this point, could not even absorb and spend that much-needed infusion of cash. If there were a wholesale transfer of funds tomorrow, the lack of capacity and skills at the State department would mean it would have to give it back to the Defense Department or dole it out to contractors.






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