
A U.S.-Gulf alliance against Iran?
On Sept. 4, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates granted an interview to Al Jazeera. In the final segment of the interview Gates got a chance to deliver a message on Iran's nuclear program. He said:
I think there's a central question or a central point here to be made. And it has to do with both our friends and allies in the region, our Arab friends and allies, as well as the Iranian nuclear program. And that is, one of the pathways to getting the Iranians to change their approach, on the nuclear issue, is to persuade them that moving down that path will actually jeopardize their security, not enhance it.
And so the more that our Arab friends and allies can strengthen their security capabilities, the more they can strengthen their cooperation both with each other and with us, I think, sends the signal to the Iranians that this path that they're on is not going to advance Iranian security but in fact could weaken it.
And so that's one of the reasons why I think our relationship with these countries and our security cooperation with them is so important.
Gates realizes that there is a stalemate on the Iran nuclear problem, a stalemate that allows Iran to advance its nuclear program and eventually bring online whichever options it wishes to pursue. For a variety of reasons, U.S. and European policymakers have been unable to achieve sufficient leverage to change Iranian policies. Targeted economic and financial sanctions against Iranian leaders and organizations have been too tepid or leaky to be persuasive. The Russian and Chinese governments have thus far blocked more wide-ranging sanctions. Subtle threats of military force by Israel or the United States have lacked credibility. The United States and Europe have been unwilling to impose economic measures that would abruptly harm the Iranian people. And these policymakers have been deterred by fears of violent Iranian retaliation.
In his remarks to Al Jazeera, Gates fished in the Persian Gulf for the leverage over Iran the United States has thus far lacked. If U.S. or Israeli military options lack credibility, perhaps, Gates is hoping, the prospect of an increasingly capable Sunni-Arab military alliance might provide the leverage necessary to change Iranian behavior.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recently published a report on the Iran versus Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) strategic balance. According to the report, GCC air power dominates Iran's defensive and offensive air combat capabilities. On paper, Saudi Arabia and the other mostly Sunni-Arab states in the Gulf could strip Iran of its air defenses and pummel Iran's military targets while defending against Iranian aerial counterattacks. According to CSIS, Iran's advantage in ballistic missiles would not be useful against GCC military targets but could terrorize population centers. Yet as the CSIS report itself explains, the Gulf states, even after decades of Western assistance, need to do much more work on military doctrine, training, supporting infrastructure, sustainment, and cooperation with each other before the GCC will be a persuasive military force.
Gates is hoping that Gulf-state unity and effective U.S. security assistance to the GCC will persuade Iran to change course. The U.S. has had some success this decade with security assistance -- training constabulary foot soldiers. The confrontation with Iran would occur, or at least begin, in the aerospace realm. U.S. security assistance needs to be successful there, too.
On the first part of the U.S and a buildup of Sunni nations, that could easily work either way. It could convince Iran that producing nuclear weapons is a bad idea that just encourages the United States to look to bolster other nations, or it could convince Iran that the United States is about to launch attacks with Gulf armies and U.S planes and that the best defense is to speed up production. This is one of those areas where only in hindsight do we know what path should have been taken (and possibly high level spying).
As for Afghanistan, that seems to possibly be Pakistan's biggest concern. If Karzai does turn to India I assume that the Taliban will become that best friends of Pakistan again, the insurgency in Baluchistan will grow from Indian support, the insurgents in Kashmir will receive more support, and the Great Game will become increasingly more dangerous. I'm not going to say that it would be bad for Karzai to do this, only that it makes things more dangerous for South and Central Asia.
Lastly on Sri Lanka, that link does nicely sum up the actions of the Sri Lankan government. However it forgets one detail, that Sri Lanka will almost definitely see the insurgency again in ten years time. While it is theoretically possible that the Sinhalese will reunite with the Tamils and provide opportunities for the Tamils as part of Sri Lanka, I suggest that the reader note these problems.
1. Given the character of the Sri Lankan government, namely that it is Sinhalese and accustomed to doing whatever it wants to stay in power
2. The nonexistence of the rule of law for journalists and political parties (the murders of both are well documented)
3. And last but definitely not least the hatred Sinhalese people and the Tamil people have from nearly thirty years of warfare and massacres before the war started...
I think that we can safely assume that matters will not improve, and the insurgency will resume sooner or later.
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