Don't Waste the Afghan Election Crisis

Last month's presidential vote in Afghanistan has become a royal mess -- but it's also a great opportunity to do much-needed political clean-up.

BY DANIEL MARKEY | SEPTEMBER 15, 2009

The election that was supposed to move Afghanistan one step closer to democracy has instead become nothing less than a full-blown political crisis. Initial results from August's presidential election show a win for the incumbent, Hamid Karzai. But widespread allegations of ballot-rigging and wider government corruption have already discredited the vote. The U.N.-backed Electoral Complaints Commission has thrown out results from 83 polling stations, "quarantined" those of 600 others, and called for a recount from another 10 percent. Karzai's election opponents are crying foul; runner-up Abdullah Abdullah has demanded a complete revote and warned that, if Karzai returns to office on the basis of this deeply flawed process, there will be a "vacuum of power, security and stability." Tensions are high and the threat of broader unrest is looming.

Luckily, we have in the White House an administration that should understand how to handle such a moment: "Never let a serious crisis go to waste," White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel noted last November, "it's an opportunity to do things you couldn't do before." Although Emanuel was referring to U.S. economic woes, if the Obama administration is serious about turning the corner in the war against the Taliban, it ought to consider extending his philosophy to the current crisis, rather than just putting a good face on an ugly situation and muddling through.

The stakes couldn't be higher. Casualties are mounting, the Taliban show no sign of exhaustion, and the U.S., NATO, and Afghan troops can hardly be expected to fight and die in defense of a regime widely perceived as corrupt, ineffective and now blatantly illegitimate.

Washington's officials and pundits have a tendency to underestimate the importance of politics in Afghanistan, focusing instead on troop levels and budgetary expenditures as the primary measures of progress or failure. This is a mistake; a lasting victory in this war can only be won in partnership with Afghans, and victory over the Taliban will require a combination of state capacity and popular legitimacy. Since Afghan state capacity is likely to be in short supply for the foreseeable future, legitimacy will be all the more necessary to achieve success. It's now clear that the massively rigged presidential election will neither confer legitimacy on the victor, nor turn the unpopular incumbent out of office-a double failure.

Its options dwindling, it appears that Washington is pressing Afghanistan's presidential contenders to unify, regardless of whether or not a second round election proves necessary. That logic has superficial appeal: a unity government that combines the strengths of Karzai, Abdullah, and others including the technocrat Ashraf Ghani might seem like a sensible way to overcome electoral fraud and improve prospects for good governance in the future. As a short term patch-up, a unity government might also be the path of least resistance, even though this option is, at least for now, deeply unpopular among the contenders and their respective backers.

Yet even Americans with short memories will recall that, not long ago, Abdullah and Ghani were members of Karzai's government. Both left disgruntled and disillusioned with the political system in Kabul. It is hard to see how a national unity government under President Karzai's aegis would today offer fertile ground for constructive reform.

Instead of tinkering at the margins, Washington and its international partners should seize this opportunity to press Kabul to organize a second constitutional convention, or loya jirga. Like the last convention in 2003, it would bring together elected and traditional leaders from throughout Afghanistan to ratify a new structure for democratic governance. A second loya jirga offers at least three potential benefits.

Paula Bronstein/Getty Images

 

Daniel Markey is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

 

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January/February 2010