• NOVEMBER 20, 2009
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Evaluating Progress in Afghanistan-Pakistan

The Obama administration's draft metrics for Afghanistan and Pakistan, as obtained by Foreign Policy.

SEPTEMBER 16, 2009

The goal of the United States is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa'ida in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.

Background: During his March 27, 2009 speech announcing our new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, President Obama said "going forward, we will not blindly stay the course. Instead, we will set clear metrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable." This paper outlines a process to fulfill that directive. The intent is to use this assessment process to highlight both positive and negative trends and issues that may call for policy adjustments over time.

Agreed Metrics:  The supporting objectives of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy form the framework for evaluating progress. The indicators within each of the objectives represent a mix of quantitative and qualitative measures, intended to capture objective and subjective assessments.

Common Baseline: The ODNI provided a baseline assessment of the metrics on July 17, 2009 from which progress will be measured; this is our common start point.

Process: By March 30, 2010 and on regular intervals thereafter, the interagency will draft an assessment of progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a check and balance on the interagency, a separate assessment will also be produced by a Red Team, led by the National Intelligence Council.

Objective 1. Disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.

Metrics: Please see the attached classified annex.

Objective 2a. Assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan.

Metrics:

  1. Progress towards Pakistan's civilian government and judicial system becoming stable and free of military involvement
  2. Pakistan's actions to take necessary steps to ensure economic and financial stability, job creation, and growth
  3. Support for human rights
  4. Development of an enduring, strategic partnership between the U.S. and Pakistan
  5. Pakistani public opinion of government performance
  6. Demonstrable action by government against corruption, resulting in incrwased trust and confidence of the Pakistani public

Objective 2b. Develop Pakistan's counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities; continue to support Pakistan's efforts to defeat terrorist and insurgent groups.

Metrics:

  1. Effectiveness of Pakistani civilian, intelligence and military in conducting counterinsurgency operations across the clear-hold-build phases to defeat insurgent groups
  2. Level of militant-initiated violence
  3. Extent of militant-controlled areas in Pakistan
  4. Effectiveness of Pakistani border security efforts

Objective 2c. Involve the international community more actively to forge an international consensus to stabilize Pakistan.

Metrics:

  1. Effectiveness of security, governance, and development assistance
  2. Support from allies, international organizations, and other key players, including China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and UAE
  3. Coordination of international efforts by the U.N.
  4. Status of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan
  5. Pakistani policies and resources committed to maintaining international support

Objective 3a. Defeat the extremist insurgency, secure the Afghan populace, and develop increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.

Metrics:

  1. Degree to which security operations are integrated into the overall COIN campaign
  2. Level of insurgent-related violence
  3. Public perceptions of security
  4. Percent of population living in districts/areas under insurgent control
  5. Percent of population living in districts/areas undergoing clearing operations
  6. Percent of populations living in districts/areas "held" by coalition and/or ANSF and where "build" activities are ongoing
  7. Percent of key lines of communication under government control
  8. Effectiveness of Afghan border security efforts
  9. Level of trust and confidence by the Afghan people in the ANSF's (Army and Police) ability to provide sustained security
  10. Capability, to include size, of the ANA and ANP
  11. Effectiveness of ANSF-ISAF partnered counterinsurgency operations
  12. Ability of the ANSF to assume lead security responsibility
  13. Level of corruption within the ANSF
  14. Ability of the ANSF to handle their own logistics needs

Objective 3b. Promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.

Metrics:

  1. Afghan Government's institutions at the national, provincial, and local level, including ability to hold credible elections in 2009 and 2010
  2. Effectiveness of the Afghan Government in collecting revenues (both in absolute terms and as a percentage of budget requirements) and executing its budget at the national, provincial, and local levels
  3. Public perception of Afghanistan's justice sector and commitment to providing the rule of law at the national, provincial, and local levels
  4. Demonstrable action by the government against corruption, resulting in increased trust and confidence of the Afghan public
  5. Support for human rights
  6. Public perception at the district level of the Afghan Government's effectiveness and sustained ability to provide services
  7. Afghanistan's economic stability and development with emphasis on agriculture
  8. Volume and value of narcotics
  9. Successful interdiction and prosecution of high-profile narco-traffickers
  10. Afghan Government's efforts to develop and execute reconciliation programs at the national, provincial, and local levels with U.S. and international support

Objective 3c. Involve the international community more actively to forge an international consensus to stabilize Afghanistan.

Metrics:

  1. Support from allies, international organizations, and other key regional countries in providing resources to Afghanistan
  2. Prospects for the Afghan Government and international community to fund the development, operations, and sustainment of the ANSF
  3. Effectiveness of international security, governance, and development assistance
  4. Establishment of accounting and management controls for UN coordination of international efforts
  5. Ability of NGOs to operate independently and freely
  6. Status of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan
  7. Status of relations between Afghanistan and its other neighbors
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 (4)

HIDE COMMENTS LOGIN OR REGISTER REPORT ABUSE

MOONOFA

3:06 PM ET

September 16, 2009

Dope

Someone smoked a lot of dope before writing those fantasies ...

 

WILLYT19

9:12 PM ET

September 17, 2009

Insurgency report

Odd, I understood the report without any chemical or herbal assistance. In sum, it says we don't have a prayer unless we concentrate only on very limited goals, and that history supports that thesis.

 

WILLYT19

9:06 PM ET

September 17, 2009

Afghanistan-Pakistan imbroglio

Quote from article lede:

"The goal of the United States is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa'ida in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future."

We have no justifiable, servicable or viable national interest in regime change or king making or in establishing a form of government (democratic republicanism or other) in either of these countries.

To the extent that the Taliban is found to be cooperating with al-Qa'ida, their elimination, submission or assimilation is probably a permissible USA goal.

These organizations are doubtless a security threat to the US, which may exercise certain extraordinary powers to eliminate them and/or their threat. We can exercise those powers without significantly and bruisingly compromising other nations' sovreignty--of course, we have to discuss these things with those sovreign nations, instead of just invading them as if we were the Cruaders. It is long past time for us to abandon our version of imperialism. We can make a genuine start by limiting our definitions of our internal security to those that are honest and that make sense to an increasingly sceptical world.

 

CHAMBLEE54

11:28 PM ET

September 17, 2009

the metrics

What if these metrics were applied to the United States? See here for one speculative answer.

 
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