Six decades after the People's Republic of China was founded in the wake of Mao Zedong's victory over the nationalists, relations between the mainland and Taiwan are less contentious now than they have been in years. The May 2008 inauguration of Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan's president put an end to Chen Shui-bian's tumultuous eight years in office, precipitating a thaw in what had been frosty relations between Taipei and Beijing.
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But observers shouldn't assume that the ostensible rapprochement means that all problems are solved. As long as the stalemate at the heart of the problem across the Taiwan Strait -- how the island's status will ultimately be determined -- remains unresolved, China and Taiwan's relationship will remain unresolved as well. And nothing so far suggests that this impasse is any nearer to being settled today than when Chen was in power. With the strait continuing to be a potential flashpoint for crisis, then, maintaining a military balance between China and Taiwan thus remains vital for stability. But over the last decade, this balance has been tilting in Beijing's favor -- a development that could have serious implications not just for the China-Taiwan relationship, but for all of China's neighbors in the region, including the United States.
A key part of China's arsenal is a large force of conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). The U.S. Department of Defense reported in this year's assessment of China's military that Beijing had deployed between 1,050 and 1,150 of these missiles and is adding to the stockpile at the rate of about 100 per year. The DoD report also says that the newer missiles offer "greater ranges, improved accuracy, and a wider variety of conventional payloads, including unitary and submunition warheads." These improvements change China's SRBMs from theoretical into actual threats.
A recent report that I coauthored with my RAND colleagues closely examines how China's new SRBMs could be used against Taiwan's air bases, assessing how many missiles of a given accuracy, carrying appropriate submunition warheads, would be needed to temporarily close every runway at each of Taiwan's 10 primary fighter bases.
Accuracy is measured by a missile's circular error probable (CEP), which is the radius of a circle around the target where 50 percent of the missiles fired will fall. Missiles with CEPs of 700-1,000ft (200-300m), accuracies characteristic of China's older SRBMs, are practically useless for attacking runways; they simply aren't sufficiently precise.
With smaller CEPs, however, such as the ones China is believed to be stockpiling, the job starts looking doable. With an accuracy of 130ft (40m), 200 SRBMs are needed. With very accurate missiles -- with CEPs of 16ft (5m) -- only 60 are required.
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