How War Will End in Afghanistan -- Even if Conflict Does Not

If war has not addressed threats in Afghanistan, then the United States needs to address threats without war.

BY DAN REITER | OCTOBER 6, 2009

Here's the problem. How do you deal with an untrustworthy dictatorship threatening U.S. national interests?

The 20th-century solution was security through total victory: destroy the enemy's military and replace the dictator with democracy. When the defeat of Germany in World War I failed to prevent World War II, American leadership learned that lasting peace required both military victory and political transformation. As U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's aide Breckinridge Long put it in 1942, "We are fighting this war because we did not have an unconditional surrender at the end of the last one." The failure of 1919 -- embodied in the looming White House portrait of President Woodrow Wilson, an architect of the Treaty of Versailles -- shadowed FDR. This time, Roosevelt declared, allied forces "must not allow the seeds of the evils we shall have crushed to germinate and reproduce themselves in the future."

It worked. Total victory over Germany, Italy, and Japan in 1945 transformed them into peaceful, prosperous, democratic allies of the United States, in what was the greatest foreign-policy accomplishment in U.S. history. Winning war went hand in hand with eliminating threats.

Fast-forward to 2001. As in 1941, the United States faced an untrustworthy, threatening dictatorship, this time a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. The only solution seemed to be total military victory, an overthrow of the Taliban, and the installation of a democratic government. Two years later, the same approach was employed against Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

Now, to the present. What happened to the formula? Defeat of military forces, check. Attempted installation of democratic institutions, check. Achievement of peace, prosperity, and democratic maturity -- hold on. Eight years later, Afghanistan has neither stability nor democracy, much less prosperity. The Barack Obama administration is in the throes of a major debate about how to right the sinking ship of its Afghanistan strategy, with no clearly attractive options. Six years later, Iraqi violence is finally down to a dull roar, allowing U.S. forces to begin withdrawal. But Iraq still faces major hurdles, including designing institutions for provincial elections and allocating oil resources. Iraq in 2009 does not look much like Germany or Japan in 1951, six years after military defeat. Clearly, the United States took a wrong turn somewhere.

What lessons should Washington policymakers draw from the Afghanistan and Iraq experiences? An obvious lesson is that winning the war is the easy part, and the hard part comes after. The United States has become very, very good at dominating conventional army-against-army battles. But it's not so good at successfully installing democracy and defeating an insurgency when it erupts.

Less obvious, perhaps, is that failing to install democracy or avoid insurgency actually undermines the original goal: eliminating threats to U.S. national security. Military resources have been sucked into the two long conflicts. Counterinsurgency operations in Iraq have especially made the United States appear as a brutal occupier, fueling anti-Americanism and support for terrorist groups worldwide. And, the festering sore of Afghanistan has spilled over into Pakistan, threatening to destabilize a nuclear-armed state ruling a restive and increasingly radical Muslim population.

Where does that leave the United States? If war does not eliminate threats, then perhaps those threats need to be addressed without war.

Take, for example, two more states ruled by threatening, anti-American, nuclear-aspirant dictators: North Korea and Iran. Indisputably, the World War II option of invasion followed by imposed democratization is off the table. Iran is much larger and more difficult to conquer than Iraq or Afghanistan, and North Korea can defend itself with nuclear weapons it already possesses.

Some might suggest limited airstrikes against Iranian or North Korean nuclear facilities, echoing the 1981 Israeli attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor. However, the success rate of such attacks, including the 1981 strike, is not encouraging. Future airstrikes are likely to be even less successful than past efforts, as new nuclear states now go to great lengths to disperse, conceal, and harden their nuclear facilities. The recent disclosure of Iran's Qom uranium enrichment facility probably does not provide a complete account of Iranian nuclear locations. Additional secret facilities likely exist, as Nima Gerami and James Acton recently argued on ForeignPolicy.com.

DAVID FURST/AFP/Getty Images

 

Dan Reiter is a professor in and the chair of the political science department at Emory University and the author of How Wars End, published last month by Princeton University Press. 

GRANT

6:29 PM ET

October 6, 2009

While somewhat correct about

While somewhat correct about how the process worked in Japan, Italy, and Germany this does forget several vital advantages we had then that we do not have now. In 1945 the idea of insurgencies had just begun to take hold and be applied in China, much less three advanced nations that bet everything on conventional warfare. In Japan the U.S had the support of Emperor Hirohito in ordering the Japanese to cooperate. In all three we had hundreds of thousands of soldiers to occupy and hold the countries. In Germany and Japan we had only two major ethnic/religious groups to deal with, while in Italy even though there were (and are still) many different groups they did not challenge the Allies. Lastly, in all three cases the populace went through a period of brilliant victories that led to dismal defeat with the military power of all three smashed beyond redemption. After the war, Nazism, Fascism, and military-dominated nationalism (which shared quite a bit of doctrine with Fascism) were completely discredited in the eyes of the people. To say that we did not have anything like that in 2001 or 2003 is a behemoth of an understatement.

 

GENE44

8:51 AM ET

October 7, 2009

Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan

What I call three peas in a pod. I would suggest that they not be allowed to travel beyond their own borders. Thus they could not spread their hatred toward the west.

As for Kalids point I think he is drinking too much kool-aid as the women and children in Iran want to throw out the dictatorship they currently have as it has been shown to be nothing but corrupt down to the core.

 

EXOTTOYUHR

1:32 PM ET

October 7, 2009

Popularity of the mullahs

Another important point for Khalid to remember is that the Iranian government is not very popular anymore. I've heard that something like ninety percent of the Persian clergy think that clerical rule is a bad idea -- and, not coincidentially, that ninety percent of the Persian clergy live under house arrest.

As to Germany and Japan being nations of cowards... the only possible reason I can think of for Khalid saying this is that they lost the war. For more on that way of thinking, see The Arab Mind by Raphael Pattai.

 

JOE IN ATLANTA

11:51 AM ET

October 7, 2009

additional comments re while somewhat correct...

I agree with everything pointed out by Grant and mail33006-- the victories over the Axis powers in WW2 were entirely different than the so-called "victories" in Iraq and Afghanistan. The former were not merely "military" victories, but total victories in the most horrific sense of the term: the Allies incinerated and butchered both the military AND CIVILIAN sectors of the Axis nations, killing millions of people in and out of uniform, and sacrificing hundreds of thousands (the US) and even millions (USSR) of their own people to do so. What we learned (I hope) from the defeat of Japan was that in a nuclear world, total victory comes at too high a cost to be contemplated ever again. Even in Vietnam, where a scaled-down version of total war was attempted, the US did not rain terror on the population to the same degree it did in Dresden, Berlin, Tokyo and Hiroshima. So comparing "victories" in WW2 to those in the conflicts in which we are currently involved is rather like comparing apples and oranges.

As for deterrence, I agree that GOVERNMENTS can be deterred. Sadly, I am not sure that RELIGIOUS EXTREMISTS can be. Installing stable democratic governments in Iraq and Afghanistan, even ignoring the impossibility of such Quixotic goals, would not eliminate Muslim extremism of the sort that drives Al Queda, nor the ignorant and immoral optimism of Christian radicals such as GW Bush or the corporate board of Blackwater, who envisioned a "Crusade" against the radical Islamic world.

I do not know what the best option is, but am sure that attempting total victory is NOT one of them.

 

ZACHARY KECK

5:08 PM ET

October 7, 2009

Pretty good article one comment

Overall I agree with you and its a pretty well written article. I have to take point with your comment that policies such as deterrence and sanctions don't spur anti-Americanism. Saddam spent the 1990's trying to paint himself as a victim. He would provoke us; we'd tighten sanctions, he'd say they were only hurting Iraqi people. This had some (increasingly more) success with France, Russia, and China. It certainly had a lot of success in the Araq world as did deterrence. (see bin Laden's 1998 fatwa) I'm not saying these aren't the best policies to follow in the situation, but we can't ignore their effects.

Gene 44, good thought on closing off the borders for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. I'm pretty sure if we could close off the Afghan-Pakistan border we would've done so already. Also, where did you type that from? Certainly didn't need to come to my house for me to get your message. In case you were wondering yes, terrorists and extremists do have access to computers and technology.

CourtneyMe, good thoughts on the we will be hailed as liberators. Glad to see someone is thinking originally. On October 1, the Iranian dissent told the NYT's they didn't even want added sanctions. No better way to gather support for the regime than attacking them. This isn't a unique characteristic in Iran. Think 2000 election and widespread belief that Bush stole election. After 9/11 that talk stopped and even his opposition supported him wholeheartedly; look at 93% approval ratings.