This Week at War: Where is Jones?

What the four-stars are reading -- a weekly column from Small Wars Journal.

BY ROBERT HADDICK | OCTOBER 8, 2009

Blame James Jones for fraying civil-military relations

A series of articles in the Washington Post this past week has revealed more than just a contentious White House debate over Afghanistan strategy. These reports have also exposed confusion and misunderstandings among top policymakers which have led to fraying relations between civilian and military officials. These misunderstandings, are symptomatic of inadequate staff work within the White House. And that staff work is the responsibility of James Jones, the national security adviser.

In the Oct. 8 Post, Rajiv Chandrasekaran chronicled the history of the Obama team's deliberations on Afghan strategy, starting from last winter. According to Chandrasekaran, Gen. Stanley McChrystal's call for up to 40,000 additional U.S. soldiers inflicted "sticker shock" on some at the White House. This quote from Chandrasekaran's piece sums up the feeling:

"It was easy to say, 'Hey, I support COIN,' because nobody had done the assessment of what it would really take, and nobody had thought through whether we want to do what it takes," said one senior civilian administration official who participated in the review, using the shorthand for counterinsurgency.

According to the article, McChrystal and his staff prepared their assessment with the assumption that President Barack Obama and his team at the White House had agreed to a counterinsurgency campaign. The "sticker shock" felt by the Obama team resulted in at least one anonymous verbal attack in the Washington Post on McChrystal's "assumptions - and I don't want to say myths ..." This then led Army officers gathered at a convention in Washington to rally to the general's defense.

Chandrasekaran's account of the White House staff's Afghanistan policy reviews portrays senior officials seemingly unaware of the costs, implications, and risks of the policy choices under consideration. The White House staff and McChrystal's staff then compounded this error when they apparently failed to confirm with each other the assumptions under which McChrystal would prepare his assessment. If many at the White House suffered from "sticker shock," it is only because they didn't first understand some basics about counterinsurgency and didn't establish adequate communications with McChrystal from the start.

Who is to blame for this string of foul-ups? The official responsible for national security staff work in the White House is the national security advisor. Jones and his staff should have ensured that all participants were well briefed on the options and that communications between civilian and military officials were clear. As a former NATO commander, commandant of the Marine Corps, and political liaison officer in Washington, it is hard to imagine someone more qualified for organizing the policy reviews.

It's possible that Jones and his staff did actually prepare the briefing books and establish communications with the field only to find those efforts unused. If Jones and his staff ever start feeling the heat for Afghanistan, I'm sure we'll read an anonymous defense someday in the Washington Post.

DAVID FURST/AFP/Getty Images

 SUBJECTS: MILITARY, SECURITY
 

Robert Haddick is managing editor of Small Wars Journal.

FARHANSK

9:41 AM ET

October 9, 2009

Mak Khan's suggestion

I cannot agree more with Maj Khan suggestion. In the western concept of Nation state, Afghanistan is a big cluster of 100+ nations / countries. However i would add that again in selection of district, artificial administrative boundaries of government should not be adhered but some territories based on one sub clan or caste should be treated as one district. e.g. Ahmadzai's may be spread in three districts in administrative division but this model district should comprise of all areas settled by Ahmadzais. Enter into an agreement with tribal elders, make their area a model district and attract Afghans from surrounding districts for jobs and economic prospects and let the word spread.

 

GRANT

11:45 PM ET

October 10, 2009

I will say that the theory of

I will say that the theory of Mr. Khan is interesting though dangerous. However, even if it would work I can certainly say that the United States government would be unable to convince the voters of the validity of the system.
As a counterpoint for his theory so that we don't instantly grasp onto it; may I remind the readers of geography and counterinsurgency history. The areas the most prosperous are often the most urban areas, whereas the least prosperous ones are generally rural. Though the data is far more muddied than it might appear, forces that focus on the urban areas at the expense of the rural ones don't do very well against insurgencies*.

*Of course it is a different matter when the insurgents are foolish enough to try to focus their insurgency in an urban environment as in Iraq.

 

MARTIN SULLIVAN

3:09 PM ET

October 12, 2009

What about LTG Doug Lute's role in coordinating IA actions?

LTG Lute was held in place at the NSC to provide continuity on the Iraq and Afghanistan portfolios as the Bush Administration transitioned responsibility for the conduct of those wars to the Obama Administration. No one at the NSC today ought to have, based on time in place and direct experience, a better understanding of the challenges of coordinating reviews on policy goals and implementation of strategy for Afghanistan than LTG Lute.

Granted Gen Jones, as a former Marine officer, should have had the presence of mind to ensure the assumptions made in February and March on pursuing a COIN strategy in Afghanistan were valid. I believe, nevertheless, it was also LTG Lute's responsibility to inform his superiors of the errors in their understanding of the security environment in Afghanistan and what might be the likely costs in time and resources the US would have allow for if a low-risk COIN strategy was to be implemented.