Briefing Book


Why U.S. bioterror research is more dangerous than bioterrorism.

In the months following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government set out with unprecedented haste and vehemence to root out terrorists or state agents plotting similar assaults anywhere in the world and to prepare the United States for the aftermath should any succeed. But despite the unprecedented devastation, aerial hijackings had occurred before and the kinds of measures needed to prevent their recurrence were generally understood. Although there were well-founded fears of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons, this was also nothing new. The United States had already lived with the threat of nuclear attack for more than half a century.

But the lethal anthrax-letter mailings that quickly followed 9/11 represented something new and potentially even more terrifying. The letters containing laboratory-grown anthrax spores mailed to U.S. Senate and media offices killed five people and left many more permanently injured. This was a small number compared with the World Trade Center casualties, but the so-called Amerithrax attacks foretold what true biowarfare might bring, a new threat with the awful prospect of mass deaths and unstoppable pandemics on a scale never before known and against which we would be defenseless.

The Bush administration's response was to hastily cobble together a massive, largely secret, biodefense program that has so far cost $50 billion to $60 billion. The number of high-biosecurity laboratories working on pathogens has multiplied to more than 1,000.

These labs dot the map in locations ranging from university campuses to hospitals to research institutes, from densely packed urban centers to quiet residential neighborhoods. The research juggernaut has received little public scrutiny and, as with other security programs launched in those tense days, it's worth asking if it has really made the United States any safer. We think that the race to develop countermeasures to biological weapons might have actually increased the probability of a bioterrorist attack and made it more difficult to achieve the kind of international cooperation that can truly reduce this threat.

What exactly are these labs working on? Some are attempting to develop countermeasures against weapons that might be devised using the deadliest disease-causing microorganisms known. Others -- probably most -- are researching the microorganisms' basic biology to understand why they are so deadly and to find clues to new countermeasures. Still others are testing the preparation and dissemination of the microbes as weapons.

We hedge on the actual number and remain vague on their activities and locations because even Congress does not know. On Sept. 22, U.S. Rep. Bart Stupak (D-Mich.) opened the oversight and investigations subcommittee he chairs by noting that two years after that information had been requested, it still had not been delivered.

And that is at the heart of the problem. As the United States has learned, often painfully, in recent years, haste and anger in the heat of disaster are not good shapers of policy for the most powerful country in the world. Virtually the entire national bioterrorism strategy has rested on the possibility that anyone with basic skills could weaponize deadly microbes -- rather than on the high probability that even skilled scientists could not actually do so -- and it is against these hypothetical scenarios that a substantial amount of federally funded biological research has been focused.

We certainly don't mean to suggest that the biological weapons threat isn't very real. The potential for future biowarfare is as awful as has been conjured. Achieving true security against such malevolent development and the parallel natural threats must be a major goal of every country, not just its policymakers but also its scientists and citizens.

However, the United States has attacked that essential goal by the wrong means, leaving the country less secure than it was $50 billion-plus ago. Americans are at greater risk from thieves targeting all those high-containment laboratories -- such as politically disaffected or mentally unbalanced lab workers -- and from the accidents that inevitably plague such facilities, than they are from an actual attack.

Let's consider a few accidents.

1. Three mice infected with plague bacteria disappeared from a high-security lab in Newark, N.J. Lab officials were certain it was an accounting error. Possibly, but if the mice in fact were on the loose, the surrounding low-income neighborhood escaped a potentially lethal plague outbreak.

2. Vials of "killed" anthrax bacteria were shipped from a Frederick, Md., laboratory to researchers in Oakland, Calif. Luckily, lab mice were the subjects being injected in hopes they might raise antibodies to the disease. They died. The anthrax had been live.

3. We must remember SARS. A coronavirus unknown until April 2003 spread out of China and through the world in weeks, killing 774 of 8,096 victims with severe acute respiratory syndrome. An unprecedented international effort halted it after just three months. However, subsequent, limited outbreaks began in high-security research labs in Asia, a fact underscored by World Health Organization expert Hitoshi Oshitani, who told the Associated Press that laboratories holding stocks of the human form of SARS were a more likely source of resurgence than the animals thought to originally harbor it.

We think such risks far outweigh the bioterrorism threat the United States faces.

To understand the scale of actual threat, it is worth considering the two categories of potential opponents against whom the burgeoning corps of scientists is working: terrorists and rogue nations, radically different in composition, aims, and abilities.

Bioterrorism occurred long before Amerithrax. In 1995, members of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo released the nerve gas sarin in a crowded Tokyo subway, leaving 12 dead and 50 seriously injured. Years earlier in Oregon, the Rajneeshee religious cult laced salad bars with salmonella bacteria, sickening more than 700 people -- but resulting in no deaths.

It is one step from those real-world events to a bioterrorist attack that would dwarf 9/11 -- rather, not a step but a leap of imagination. The probability of bioterrorists using botulin, anthrax, or another deadly agent is a realistic one, but to cause mass deaths the agents would have to be developed and weaponized, requiring considerable skill by well-trained scientists using classified methods.

A better bet would be to use the United States' own bioweapons research against it, just as the 9/11 hijackers managed to turn the American transportation infrastructure into a weapon. As biowarfare expert Richard Ebright of Rutgers University's Waksman Institute of Microbiology has argued, "If al Qaeda wished to carry out a bioweapons attack in the U.S., their simplest means of acquiring access to the materials and the knowledge would be to send individuals to train within programs involved in biodefense research."

What about enemy countries? Saddam Hussein killed thousands of Kurds using chemical weapons and had biological weapons at the ready. But how could such a massive assault be carried out against a well-defended country? It's extremely unlikely that a country could deliver bioweapons or toxins both weaponized and in sufficient quantity to cause large-scale deaths in countries already armed against conventional bombers and nuclear missiles.

On the other hand, if such a program were going full-bore in a rogue nation, couldn't its highly sophisticated weapons be stolen by terrorists? Certainly, just as the deadly microbes behind them could be stolen in the United States. That and similar scenarios at the national level should be major concerns, and there is only one way to secure any or all countries against them: through multilateral activities such as international treaties that would place everyone's cards on the table, and open, international cooperation on defenses against all infectious diseases, natural and hostile.

Here again, the steps taken in the wake of 9/11 and the anthrax attacks aren't helping. To many experts, the combination of massively funded experiments on dangerous pathogens and the obsessive secrecy in which they are cloaked gives the appearance, however false, that the United States is producing biological weapons. This would directly violate the terms of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the international treaty that is the world's best hope for containing man-made biological threats.

Three of the country's most respected biosecurity experts have warned, "The rapidity of elaboration of American biodefense programs, their ambition and administrative aggressiveness, and the degree to which they push against the prohibitions of the [BWC], are startling." James Leonard headed the U.S. delegation forging the BWC; Richard Spertzel is a former deputy director of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases; and Milton Leitenberg is senior research scholar at the University of Maryland's Center for International and Security Studies.

U.S. security against bioweapons can be won only by winning it globally. The United States has not been nearly active enough in this effort and at times has worked against it.

A protocol to the BWC proposed in 2001 would have moved the world toward greater oversight, transparency, and international cooperation on biological weapons -- the trinity of biosecurity. It would have provided for two categories of international on-site inspections: random visits to facilities whose peaceful processes could be turned to hostile ones, and focused inspections of facilities where hostile work was actually suspected.

The protocol was shot down by the Bush administration, which contended that malevolent activity would be missed, breeding a false sense of security; that the United States would be disclosing its vulnerabilities; and that industry secrets would be compromised. Suffice it to say that European countries with the same research and industries were uniformly strong supporters of the protocol, and U.S. vulnerabilities are on full display with every request for grant proposals to research countermeasures. Why not allow inspections?

Development of nuclear weaponry can be detected by satellite, that of bioweaponry cannot. But bioweapons are already banned, if they can be detected. Something like the protocol must be revived. Significant international transparency regarding BWC compliance requires allowing on-site visits to build confidence among countries that others are not developing biological weapons.

Without that confidence, the likelihood of a bioweapons arms race increases as countries seek to breed and package the world's deadliest microbes to outdo the havoc caused by natural disease alone. We can think of nothing deadlier to the world's future.

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Briefing Book

The New Asianism

Since the Democratic Party of Japan won in the country's August national election, Japan watchers have worried the new government might try to upset the status quo and ease away from the United States. The DPJ is implementing a new paradigm -- but not the one people think.

Even before the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took power, the defeated Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its American allies started running a media campaign in both countries describing the new administration as "anti-capitalist" and "anti-American."

Critics cited an essay by new Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama in which he criticized "U.S.-led market fundamentalism" and spoke of a world in which the United States struggles to retain its dominance as China strives to become a global power. Mourning the loss of a half-century of LDP rule, these doomsayers accused Hatoyama of wanting to dump free market economics, shift Japan's international economic center of gravity from the West to Asia, and adopt a security stance "equidistant" between the United States and China.

This characterization is as accurate as labeling U.S. President Barack Obama a socialist. Hatoyama is hardly unique in blaming excessive deregulation for the economic crisis. Far from wanting to disengage from the United States, the DPJ has endorsed a bilateral free trade agreement -- something the LDP never dared. And DPJ leaders are not naive advocates of abandoning the United States only to be left to the mercies of an ascendant China. Rather, the DPJ wants a paradigm shift in Japanese foreign policy, one which makes it a more equal partner to the United States and puts greater emphasis on Japan's ties to the rest of Asia, particularly China and South Korea.

Let's call it the New Asianism. This ideology was on full display this weekend at a Beijing summit for leaders from China, South Korea, and Japan. It was only the second time this group of three has met. And the meeting was far more substantive than in the past, covering everything from coordinating on North Korea and economic stimulus policy to taking initial steps toward the formation of an "East Asian Community," modeled on the European Union.

The New Asianism pushes back against, but does not entirely reject, Japan's prioritization of its alliance with the United States. Too often, the DPJ thinks, conservative governments lined up with Washington even when they believed its policies to be misguided. For instance, former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi dispatched troops to Iraq and refueled U.S. vessels in the Indian Ocean not out of support for U.S. policy, but to ensure the United States' favor in case tensions arose with China or North Korea.

When it comes to a rising China, the DPJ rejects containment, advocated by neoconservatives in both Tokyo and Washington, as doomed to failure. Given the United States and China's increasing economic interdependence and overlapping strategic interests, Washington will never form an anti-Beijing front, DPJ thinkers say. Nor can Tokyo rely solely on the U.S.-Japan security alliance to counter any Chinese bid for regional hegemony. On the contrary, the greater fear in Tokyo is that the United States will abandon Japan by forming a U.S.-China "Group of Two," relegating Japan to second-level status in the region. In the DPJ's view, Japan needs to draw China into broader regional engagement instead.

This paradigm shift -- articulated by Hatoyama and other DPJ heavyweights, in the Japanese press and in interviews with the authors -- has three broad elements.

First, as Hatoyama told Obama in September, the U.S.-Japan alliance will remain "the cornerstone" of Japanese foreign policy. It makes no sense for Tokyo to distance itself from Washington on security or economic grounds, even if a few Japanese wonks entertain such fantasies.

Realistically, Japan and the United States will need each other to counterbalance China, encouraging it to become a responsible world power in terms of trade, the environment, and other issues. Plus, it would be impossible for Japan to cope with a nuclear North Korea without a strong alliance with United States (and China). Some difficult bilateral security issues -- such as the long-standing problem of U.S. military bases on Okinawa -- remain. But DPJ leaders, stronger negotiators than their LDP counterparts, are seeking compromise on this issue and others ahead of Obama's November visit to Japan.

This realism has deep roots. For instance, Hatoyama and other DPJ party leaders supported expanding Japan's security role within the framework of a strong U.S. alliance from the days when they were still members of the LDP. In 1992, they spearheaded Japanese participation in overseas peacekeeping operations. Earlier this decade, they backed a dispatch of Japanese naval forces to the Indian Ocean in response to the September 11 attacks. And this week, an envoy from Tokyo visited Afghanistan and Pakistan, a clear sign that Tokyo will continue to provide assistance on that front (though via economic, not military, aid).

On the economic front, even if Japan under the DPJ did join an Asian bloc, it would not mean the end or even the weakening of economic ties with the United States. Put bluntly: Asian growth is intimately tied to prosperity in the United States. Although Japan today exports more goods to China than to the United States, China's prosperity is, in turn, tied to its own U.S.-bound exports. Anyone who doubts the reality of this dependence need only look at how hard the U.S. recession and its Chinese aftershock hit Japan.

The second element in the DPJ foreign-policy paradigm shift is a desire for Japan to play a regional leadership role in East Asia -- a desire which might result in an East Asian Community modeled on the early stages of the European Union.

At the United Nations in New York last month, Hatoyama shared his somewhat romantic desire that in the long term such a community might establish an Asian version of the euro. He made it clear that this will be a long process, "starting with fields in which we can cooperate -- free trade agreements, finance, currency, energy, environment, disaster relief, and more" and only later moving on to the common-currency question. He also stressed that the creation of an Asian currency would not hurt the dollar or strong economic ties with the United States. Rather, Hatoyama called for "sharing each others' economic dynamism based on the principle of open regionalism" -- the final term a code for informal U.S. inclusion.

Japanese government figures tentatively say that the East Asian Community might consist of the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (which includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Burma, Laos, and Cambodia), plus China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India. This grouping first gathered in 2005; at Japan's insistence, and with U.S. encouragement, the last three participants were added to undermine China's bid to lead it.

DPJ advisors advocate the pursuit of the East Asian Community as only one regional priority. Another is a regional security program that might grow out of the six-party talks on North Korea. They also embrace the idea of a Japan-U.S.-China strategic dialogue, based on some DPJ thinkers' belief that only Washington and Tokyo together can temper Beijing. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Jeffrey Bader, the National Security Council's senior director for Asian affairs, also support triangular talks; Bader promoted this dialogue at the Brookings Institution.

Obama administration officials such as Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific, have publicly embraced the goal of Japan improving its ties to China and the rest of Asia. Nonetheless, Obama officials are privately unsure of what Hatoyama really means when he talks about an East Asian Community. They harbor fears that this could drift into an exclusionary version of regional integration. Those fears are not entirely unfounded. But it is important to understand that this is still an amorphous concept in Tokyo.

Thus, the Obama administration needs to engage Tokyo on this issue. To do that, it needs to figure out its own policy on East Asian regionalism -- before the November Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, which Obama plans to attend. Then, Washington will know what questions to ask about the Asian version of the European Union. (For instance: How will it interact with overlapping structures, such as APEC?) And the United States can support Japan's taking a leadership role, which it has long advocated.

The third element in the DPJ's foreign-policy paradigm shift is a new focus on the history question: the resolution of lingering tensions between Japan and its Asian neighbors over Japanese aggression in the 1930s and 1940s. In 1995, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, a Socialist in coalition with the LDP, apologized for Japan's role as a wartime aggressor in Asia. The LDP paid lip service to the apology, but its leaders frequently repudiated it, rankling Seoul and Beijing.

But Hatoyama has gone out of his way to raise this issue in all his meetings with Asian leaders, personally reaffirming his government's adherence to the 1995 apology. The DPJ has said it wishes to remove war criminals from the Yasukuni shrine to Japan's war dead. And the foreign minister has proposed that Japan, South Korea, and China jointly prepare a history textbook, as European countries did to confront World War II and the Holocaust. This confronting of an uncomfortable legacy is intended not only to improve ties with China and South Korea, but also to foreclose the possibility of future backsliding.

With these dramatic foreign-policy changes -- this New Asianism -- the DPJ is leading a Japan ready, willing, and able to play a leadership role in East Asia. It is in the interests of both the United States and Japan for Tokyo to manage its historic rivalry with a powerful China through a broader regional structure. It will take time for Washington to get used to a less pliant partner and for the DPJ to learn the realities of governance. But rather than clinging to a Cold War mindset, Washington and the DPJ should seize this as an opportunity to reframe the alliance for today's new realities.

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