How to Help Pakistan Win This Fight

The Pakistani Army is determined to defeat al Qaeda-linked militants in South Waziristan. So why is the United States still withholding the military equipment Pakistan urgently needs?

BY SHUJA NAWAZ | OCTOBER 20, 2009

The battle for Pakistan has finally started in earnest along the northwest frontier. After months of warning of an impending attack, the Pakistani military moved into South Waziristan this weekend to stamp out the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), which is allied with al Qaeda and allows the terrorist group to operate from the region. The Army bulked up the division entrusted with the task, supplementing it with troops and helicopters from North Waziristan, and local regiments from the Frontier Corps. The aim was to encircle and destroy the TTP in the southeastern third of Waziristan, where some 10,000 well-armed and battle-hardened militants are hiding.

But despite the reinforcements, the force trying to root out the entrenched militants is still not fully equipped or ready for mobile warfare. After more than eight years of involvement in the U.S.-led war against militants in Afghanistan, Pakistan still does not have all the weapons or assistance that it needs to do the job right.

The Pakistani forces are facing a more desperate and dangerous TTP. Since the powerful TTP chieftain Baitullah Mehsud was killed by a U.S. drone strike in August, the movement's new leaders have endeavored to establish their own credentials. Their attacks -- such as those on the general headquarters of the Army in Rawalpindi and on police offices in different cities in the Pakistani heartland -- have become more audacious and open.

The TTP-al Qaeda militancy has also become more dangerous due to the active participation of Punjabi terrorist groups. In years past, these Islamist extremists operated under the auspices of Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan's powerful military spy agency, fighting against Indians in Kashmir. Now, following Pakistan's attempt at reconciliation with India over Kashmir, they have gone rogue. The Army lacks the capacity and willingness to open a new front in Punjab, where the militants are based in small towns and some cities. But it can do much damage to the Taliban-al Qaeda nexus in South Waziristan.

The Army has attempted to stop the anti-TTP operation from becoming an all-out tribal feud, though. Following the pattern of the offensives into Swat and Malakand earlier this summer, it encouraged neutral Mehsud tribesmen to leave the battle area. Thousands of internal refugees moved south last week, as the Pakistan Air Force pounded targets with F-16s and other aircraft to prepare the ground for the Army assault. Given the complex terrain, it is not clear how successful those bomb runs have been. If the ground offensive slows down over the next few days, it will signal that the militants have dug deep into the mountains and will exact a heavy toll on advancing forces. Some of them, including al Qaeda elements, might even head into Afghanistan to regroup, buying off the area's Wazir and Bhittani tribesmen along the way. If the going is easier, then it is likely that the al Qadea and the TTP leadership has slipped away to seek refuge in northeastern Afghanistan, leaving behind booby traps and mines and a rearguard to fight against the invading Army.

Co-opting some of the Mehsud was a smart move, but it meant the Army lost the element of surprise. It will have to decide this war by sheer force of will and firepower, enduring heavy losses. And even if it wins the ground battle and occupies TTP territory, it might end up being a short-lived win. The Army is not trained or equipped to "hold" the area. There is no civilian force to police the territory, nor is there a judiciary to provide good governance; indeed, over the past eight years, Pakistan's government has failed to provide itself with anything other than military solutions to such problems. Both ousted autocrat Gen. Pervez Musharraf and the current government (which has retained the general's centralized powers) have entirely failed to strengthen their civilian capacity.

DAVID FURST/AFP/Getty Images

 

Shuja Nawaz is director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington, and author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, now out in paperback, and FATA: A Most Dangerous Place.

KXB

12:44 PM ET

October 20, 2009

Clean your room, then you get your toys

Pakistan's inability to get control of Waziristan and other tribal areas has little to do with its lack of military hardware, and more to do with its leaderhships willingness to cut short term deals with tribal leaders.

If Pakistani troops are running around in sandals, it has little to do with how much aid it gets from the U.S., and more with the misplaced spending priorities of the brass at Rawalpindi. As Fareed Zakaria pointed out, India is an ideal enemy for the Pakistani military. It seems large, and so they need those fancy weapons - but the likelihood of war is small, so the weapons will never have to be used. Plus, they can always get bigger kickbacks on fighter jets than only night vision goggles.

It is not America's responsibility to underwrite Pakistani reform.

 

TELMEWA

8:45 AM ET

October 21, 2009

Toying with your own toys?

It's a typical imperialistic approach which often works and the powers also afford to maintain it, but here it would be a mistake, for it's not the question of Pakistan's survival but more of a western fight that it is fighting. US can't afford to leave Pakistan in lurch as she did on various occasions; they did the same with Mujahideen of cold war too and the result is before you.

The reasoning of Fareed Zakaria on the question of Pak Military's ability (as quoted above) is also one sided. Don't forget the same military has actively helped to defeat the rival super power of US without letting its single soldier die. It has learnt the art of fighting in proxy, who is more acclimatised to this battlefield than Pakistani agencies.

 

SHAHID

8:04 AM ET

October 21, 2009

Desparately seeking deal with the same"perpetrators"

The writer has made a realistic and incisive analysis of the situation on ground, and since he authored a book on Pakistan Army, he is in better position, academically, to assess the capabilities and needs of the Army.
The comment 'clean your room, the you get your toys' only reflects a preconceived bias and hubris.
As far as the deals and comparative performance is concerned the Pakistan Army has fared much better in Swat than the Americans in Afghanistan--where it is humbled to draw distinction between Taliban and Al-Qaeda. And now desperately seeking a "long term" political deal with the former.

 

KXB

9:24 AM ET

October 21, 2009

It is a bit much to talk

It is a bit much to talk about what a great job the Pakistani Army did in Swat, considering that they did not even want to do it in the first place. They were content to leave the Taliban there until the Obama Administration leaned heavily on Pakistan to get them out. Secondly, given that the Pakistani Army shows little regard for civilian casualties, it was able to engage in aerial bombardment of Swat to a degree that American forces in Afghanistan cannot.

 

RAJA

1:58 PM ET

October 21, 2009

This is typical approach used

This is typical approach used in the US media which is very biased and narrow in approach. The Pakistani media is reporting lack of coordination even among NATO forces plus Pakistan. The minute Pakistan army entered Waziristan, NATO forces left their check posts along the Afghan border. On one hand they always blame Pakistani army for their failure on the other hand there is no serious effort to help Pakistan forces and infant civilian govt. who inherited the problematic Pakistan from the "blue eyed" general Musharraf. The war against terrorism cannot be effectively fought and won with out the involvement of Pakistani people. Such a biased approach can harm the efforts to restore peace in the region and world. I appreciate the article has been written in time and wish the advice is taken seriously.

 

SHAHID

11:19 AM ET

October 21, 2009

Strange advocay!!!

Actually, imperial hubris doesn't allow Americans to understand how their "leaning heavily on others" also complicates things for others.

American's regard for civilian causalities is historically vindicated, as it is the only country on the globe that "tested" the nuclear device on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even the ratio of civilian killings in recent-months Drones attacks is 10:1.

How strange it is that traditional non-aligned, anti-imperialists are advocating the US?

 

MHCLAXTON

2:48 PM ET

October 21, 2009

Wrong

Those killed by the drones are not civilians. If they are close enough to the terrorist Islamists to be killed, then they are terrorists themselves for associating with the Taliban and they deserve death.

 

ITONLYSTANDSTOREASON

2:46 PM ET

October 21, 2009

Not Sense

Anyone familiar with procurement operations would realize that it is absolutely too late to get new equipment of even the simplest kinds - boots, for example, into the S Waziristan fight before winter comes around. Anyone familiar with the past 8 years of the US/Pakistan relationship also know that if the troops lack basics, it is not for lack of US funding and support.

The reluctance to supply the latest helicopter gunships is characterized as "hand-wringing". To me it sounds like common sense. These aren't weapons, like a AK47 or a grenade. These are weapons systems, and will fail quickly if the gunships are supplied without the support infrastructure, which takes time to build, including the training of the personnel. There may also be political issues which the author fails to mention. Neither is concern for politics mere hand-wringing; in this region politics kills, on a daily basis.

This is a fight the administration wants Pakistan to win. Until I hear otherwise, on the basis of solid information, I'll presume the US is giving Pakistan all the support that is possible and prudent.

 

JPWREL

12:37 PM ET

October 22, 2009

The fact is that Pakistan

The fact is that Pakistan does not have the logistic, maintenance and operational infrastructure to use or service AH-64 Apaches. To build such a capability would require years even with American assistance. It is difficult enough even for sophisticated British and U. S. forces to keep their attack rotary assets in good order in Afghanistan. There is no reason to think that attack helicopters would add any decisive punch to the Pakistani military that could not come from fielding better equipped, trained and officered infantry. This could be done more quickly and less expensively than trying to mimic the complex and costly rotary attack doctrine of top tier NATO forces.