A Crash Course in Democracy

Afghanistan's runoff election must be delayed -- or another debacle is a virtual certainty.

The decision by both Afghan President Hamid Karzai and his main rival, former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, to accept a runoff election is a welcome development that provides the Afghan government with an opportunity to restore its damaged credibility. The runoff election now faces two main challenges: making the process more credible and ensuring the election actually contributes to security. Setting Nov. 7 as the date for the election makes both impossible.

Nationwide elections in any country are logistically difficult. In Afghanistan, they're a nightmare. Funds need to be mobilized (the last elections cost more than $500 million), new poll workers need to be hired (or fired), observers have to be recruited, voters reassured, and security forces redeployed. Because ballots are often transported by donkey, it could take weeks to distribute them to Afghanistan's remotest areas. A mad rush will be the only way to get all of this done, and such haste will not contribute to a credible process.

The first step in ensuring a credible election, therefore, is to postpone the date for the runoff. Only by allowing sufficient time to organize it properly can Afghans be assured that their government's interest in holding the runoff goes beyond theatrics. Given the threats the Taliban are likely to make, this point is critical. The international community cannot expect Afghans to risk their lives to participate in a sham election.

Whenever the runoff takes place, improved election-day monitoring will prove decisive to avoiding the debacle which occurred in the first round. Three elements are paramount: expanded local monitoring, a parallel vote tabulation, and international observation. Of the three, local monitoring is the most important.

On the whole, Afghanistan's election officials performed admirably on the day of the election, as I saw myself in Jalalabad. Every election official I spoke with was well trained, dedicated and efficient. As I witnessed, the dual checks -- inked fingers and punched registration cards -- were sufficient to ensure voters only voted once. The counting of the ballots, while time consuming, was done professionally.  The main difference between polling stations that reported credible results, therefore, and those that did not, was the presence of rival party observers.

Where security was present, huge crowds of these observers thronged polling centers, their healthy mistrust of one another guaranteeing that fraud was kept to a minimum. However, at "ghost polling sites," election stations in the insecure regions of Afghanistan which were often not even opened by poll workers, no party observers were present. This gave the local staff free reign to report fraudulent vote tallies to the advantage of whatever power broker they were aligned with - usually President Karzai. If the second round is to yield legitimate results, ways must be found to ensure that each polling center has adequate rival candidate observers present throughout the entire process.

To further safeguard the second round, the international community should fund something called an independent parallel vote tabulation (PVT). Put simply, a PVT places a neutral observer in each of the estimated 7,000 polling centers to record the final results in each polling site after the count. The information is then communicated to a central location, either a media outlet or an international organization that runs the PVT, and announced to the country as a whole. The fact that a PVT is being conducted encourages poll workers to be more diligent in their work. There are numerous contractors the U.S. Embassy could turn to for conducting a PVT; efforts should be made immediately to start the process. 

The U.S. failure to do so in the first round was too deliberate to be incompetent. In my view, U.S. officials assumed the process would be flawed but believed, like most Afghans did, that in any case Karzai would be easily re-elected. Contrary to their assumptions, a properly conducted PVT would have gone a long way to avoiding the mess that ultimately took place.

Finally, international observers should return for the second round. However, no credible effort can be mounted in two weeks. Unless more time and sufficient resources are made available, international observers are unlikely to be present, which will only add to concerns of the election's legitimacy.

Adequately safeguarding the credibility of the runoff is a necessary but insufficient condition for securing a legitimate partner in Afghanistan. If, for instance, turnout falls below the already anemic 30 percent of the first round, will Afghans believe Karzai to be any more "legitimate?" Although a lot of time has already been wasted, an election that contributes to improving security in Afghanistan might still be possible. The key will be undermining the Taliban's perceived political victory in the first round.

The Taliban's credibility should have taken a huge hit on election day. They had promised to completely disrupt the process and to cut off the fingers of anyone who voted. They did neither. Yes, a few egregious incidents of the Taliban's brutality have been reported, but clearly the Taliban threw what they had at the process and failed to disrupt it altogether.

Lamentably, this victory was achieved in part by overzealous Karzai supporters who presumably stuffed ballot boxes simply to demonstrate their loyalty and guarantee political payoff when patronage was doled out. As polls clearly indicate, however, the vast majority of Afghans do not support the Taliban. A decision not to vote, therefore, was not a vote for the Taliban, as its leadership claims. A credibly run second round could still produce a strategic defeat for the insurgency.

If, for instance, Karzai and Abdullah campaigned together occasionally and made joint public service announcements making clear a vote for either of them was a vote against the Taliban, the true choice of the election might be clarified and turnout boosted. Clear signals from the international community would also be required. Most Afghans have their finger to the wind and are unsure which way it is blowing. Is NATO committed to defeating the Taliban, or not? If not, Afghans are going to hedge their bets and stay home rather than risk the Taliban's retribution.

Ironically, therefore, the most important action Obama can take to ensure delayed elections are credibly run and produce a legitimate partner is to make the decision now, not after the results are in, to send additional troops to Afghanistan. The president's perceived indecision sends unfortunate signals of weakness to the Afghan electorate, only adding to the population's trepidation and insecurity. The administration should recognize that it is a critical political player in Afghanistan and cannot merely sit on the sidelines. Committing America's power now to the preservation of Afghan democracy is the best way to ensure the runoff produces the results the president claims to want.


Whatever Bibi Wants, Bibi Gets

Will the real Barack Obama please stand up to Israel?

Barack Obama is a rookie. At least, this is what the Israeli prime minister seems to think. So far, Benjamin Netanyahu has been able to maximize his gains at the expense of the U.S. president and the Palestinians while solidifying his own position in the process.

Consider last month's trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly. After months of tough and very public statements by top U.S. officials, Netanyahu was able to get the leader of the free world to concede on a settlement freeze and gave nothing in return. For Israeli hawks and their allies in the United States, this was a victory. But it did not come without costs, even leaving aside the effect on Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas's domestic popularity. Heads of state around the world paid attention, and surely some of them thought of Obama: This man is a pushover.

It would be a mistake to think that this was the first instance in which Netanyahu was able to manipulate a political situation in his favor. In fact, Netanyahu has been playing Obama and the Palestinians like a fiddle because he understands an important axiom of international relations: domestic politics matter.

After his election, Netanyahu formed an Israeli coalition opposed to a two-state solution and supporting the expansion of colonial settlements. This brought him into open confrontation with Obama, who said he did not recognize the legitimacy of further Israeli settlements.

At their spring meeting in Washington, it became clear that the two men were already at loggerheads. When Obama again pressed him on halting settlement expansion, Netanyahu diverted the discussion by highlighting the Iranian threat and Palestinian "incitement" against Israel.

Shortly thereafter, Obama met with Abbas and seems to have sent the Palestinian leader back to Ramallah with two contradictory messages. First, he must have impressed upon Abbas the need to quell the "incitement" that Netanyahu was talking about. Second, he must have urged Abbas to cooperate with U.S.-supported Egyptian efforts to broker reconciliation between rival factions Hamas and Abbas's Fatah.

When Abbas returned to Ramallah, his U.S.-supported security services stepped up a campaign of arrests of Hamas affiliates in the West Bank, while negotiators in Cairo attempted to bring the sides together. An agreement to end the stalemate that should have been signed in June has been delayed repeatedly.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu was taking a page from the playbook of colonialists of old by seeking to divide and rule. Once Abbas was done flexing muscle in the West Bank and some Hamas affiliates were released from Palestinian Authority prisons, it was time once again to tip the scales, this time in Hamas's favor.

Not only did Netanyahu get Obama to back down on a settlement freeze as a precondition to talks, but he also got Abbas to agree to quash the Goldstone report that alleged war crimes against Israel for its attacks on Gaza.

Why would Netanyahu care whether such a report moved forward in the U.N. system? Israel has never paid attention to the United Nations, and any meaningful condemnation of Israel in the international organization has consistently met a U.S. veto.

Netanyahu knew that if Abbas's representative in Geneva didn't put forward the Goldstone report, this decision could be exploited to expand the gap between Hamas and Fatah at a critical juncture. He is well aware of each Palestinian party's distrust for the other and of their ongoing struggle to solidify their positions as rulers of their respective fiefdoms in the West Bank and Gaza.

At the same time, in an unprecedented move, Netanyahu approved the release of 20 female Palestinian political prisoners in exchange for a videotape of one captured Israeli soldier. It may have seemed like a lousy deal, but not if you understand Netanyahu's intention: strengthening Hamas's hand against Fatah.

Indeed, Netanyahu has successfully played Fatah against Hamas, and vice versa, over the past few months, all while knowing that his U.S. counterpart is far too consumed with domestic politics to get involved in the Palestinian question beyond a photo opportunity.

Meanwhile, he has been able to hold together his right-wing coalition and keep his constituency happy by delaying meaningful negotiations. Despite the harshest words to come from a U.S. president on the issue of settlements in recent history, Netanyahu continues their expansion and allows the ethnic cleansing of Arab East Jerusalem through home demolition to continue.

The question that remains is this: Will Obama continue to allow Netanyahu to dictate the future of the Palestinians, or will the U.S. president put his foot down and be the leader most of the world is hoping he will be?