
Iranian negotiator Saeed Jali in Geneva.
Tehran’s initial oral response to International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei’s proposal to send most of Iran’s current stockpile of low enriched uranium (LEU) abroad for processing into fuel rods for its reactor in Tehran, indicates three important things about the Islamic Republic’s strategic perspective. First, Iran is interested in establishing a framework for international cooperation to develop its civil nuclear program. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made this clear in an important speech on Oct. 29.
Second, Iran remains profoundly interested in creating a framework for broader strategic cooperation, especially with the United States. This has been a consistent objective in Iran’s interactions with the United States for several years, across ideologically diverse Iranian administrations, including the current Ahmadinejad administration.
Third, Iran might be willing to address international concerns about its nuclear program by sending portions of its LEU stockpile out of the country for futher, value-adding processing, in the process, making the management of the stockpile more transparent to the international community. However, Tehran will only do this if it is confident that other international parties will follow through on their commitments and that cooperation with those parties will not leave the Islamic Republic more vulnerable to international pressure.
It is important to keep in mind that Iran had originally proposed to refuel the Tehran research reactor through purchasing fuel assemblies from international providers, including the United States -- in fact, involving the United States was Iran’s idea of a confidence-building measure. There was a clear consensus within the Iranian leadership in support of this proposal, with President Ahmadinejad speaking about it publicly.
The United States responded with interest to Iran’s initiative but proposed, instead, that Iran ship most of Iran’s low enriched uranium stockpile outside the country for fabrication into fuel rods for the reactor in question. From an Iranian perspective, there are two potential flaws with this approach. First, Iran’s experience of prior cooperation with international actors on its nuclear program has been disappointing. During the 1970s, Iran invested more than $1 billion to build a French reactor which was contractually supposed to guarantee Iran access to that reactor’s fuel. But, when the Islamic Republic was established, France reneged. Now Iran is being called on to trust France, again, to return its fuel.
Second, at Iran’s current production rate for low enriched uranium, it would take Tehran nine to 12 months to replenish the uranium that would be sent out of the country under this deal, if it were sent out in a single batch. For serious national security planners in Tehran, whether they like Ahmadinejad or not, this is potentially problematic as it leaves almost a year’s window of increased vulnerability to an Israeli or U.S. military attack.
In Tehran, views are split, and it has nothing to do with reformists vs. hardliners, or the pro-Ahmadinejad camp vs. the anti-Ahmadinejad camp. It has to do with lack of confidence about U.S. and Israeli intentions toward the Islamic Republic as it is constituted, rather than as we wish it to be. In this regard, action by two Congressional committees this week to pass legislation authorizing additional U.S. unilateral sanctions against Iran and non-U.S. companies doing business there will only do further damage to Iranian perceptions of American intentions and President Obama’s seriousness about engaging Tehran.




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