When Generals and Ambassadors Feud

Take it from this former ambassador: Disagreements over the war in Afghanistan may do more long-term harm than short-term good.

BY JAMES DOBBINS | NOVEMBER 13, 2009

In 2007 in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus and Amb. Ryan Crocker set a model for civil-military collaboration: They never let daylight show between their positions -- not to outsiders, not to official Washington, not even to their own staffs. In providing differing advice to Washington over troop levels in Afghanistan, General McChrystal and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry have diverged from this model.

Ambassador Crocker wisely recognized that the U.S. president, the congress, and the American people were looking primarily to Gen. Petraeus and his 160,000 troops to secure Iraq, and only secondarily to Crocker and his 1,000 diplomats and aid workers. Crocker chose to fight his policy battles not in Washington, but in Iraq. Petraeus for his part, was very sensitive to the need to secure unity of effort with his civilian partner, and to harness the expertise of his large and competent staff.  McCrystal and Eikenberry don't seem to have established the same chemistry.

Ambassador Eikenberry's reported recommendation -- that troop reinforcements be withheld until Afghan President Hamid Karzai demonstrates unmistakable signs government reform -- has a clear logic, and an equally clear limitation. Of course, the United States and its allies want Karzai to crack down on corruption, to appoint competent officials, and then to back them up. But are they willing to put their own mission, and the lives of their own troops, at greater risk should Karzai remain recalcitrant?

The dilemma mirrors one that I saw play out as a young Foreign Service officer serving under Averell Harriman, who was then heading the American delegation to the Vietnam peace talks. At one point early on in that multi-year effort, several members of our delegation expressed frustration at the South Vietnamese government's resistance to a Washington proposal for the North. Why, they asked Harriman, couldn't the United States successfully pressure South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu to go along? 

FARZANA WAHIDY/AFP/Getty Images

 

James Dobbins, the Bush Administration's first envoy for Afghanistan, directs the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corporation. He is the author of After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan.

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MARK KIMMITT

12:05 PM ET

November 14, 2009

When Ambassadors and Generals Feud

This is a tempest in a teapot. While I have great respect for Jim Dobbins' opinions, this piece is a bit over the top. First, let's keep in mind that Ambassador Eikenberry's advice was in a classified cable and had the right to be kept within classified channels. Second, we should be encouraged that the Ambassador has an independent view to share with the President he serves. Rather than rubber stamp the views of General McChrystal, it says a lot that the Ambassador feels the freedom to express a dissenting view. Dissenting views are healthy to the decision-making process and ensures that the national security team hears a variety of opinions from a range of sources- It strengthens the credibility of the ultimate decision if the process is not seen as "The Bus to Abilene". Last, anyone famliar with the interagency process knows that a cable will be distributed widely (albeit, perhaps not this widely); as such, one can be certain that this cable was shared with General McChrystal well in advance. My guess is that the Ambassador and General McChrystal, while not agreeing on everything- and it would be dangerous if they did- still maintain a healthy working relationship and a strong personal relationship (despite the media frenzy suggesting otherwise), and we are well served by their mutual efforts.

 

JEFFERYTHAYER

12:49 PM ET

November 16, 2009

Cooperation

AF has to have a Whole of Government approach. The diplomatic corps and the military cannot win separately. If every agency gives way together and works collaboratively we can succeed.

 

RAHULGARG111

3:03 PM ET

November 16, 2009

there are always ways to pressurize

It seems ludicrous to me that the int'l keeps "appealing" to Karzai to mend his ways. They have a fair aount of credible knowledge about where the corruption is, esp. at the higher levels. To take Karzai out directly through some sort of coup won't work becoz' of the 'subversion of democracy' problem, but then, cant there be ways to directly target the illegitimate operations/ directly prosecute members of his go. that have a very well-known reputation for war crimes and corruption. NATO is the military, Karzai is the political gov. Look at Iran or Pakistan- the military there can control the political gov., w/o a coup, w/o targeting the top leader. Karzai can be pressurized by aggressively targeting the criminals he gives patronage to. NATO doesn't need to take his permission for that.