When Generals and Ambassadors Feud

This is a tempest in a teapot. While I have great respect for Jim Dobbins' opinions, this piece is a bit over the top. First, let's keep in mind that Ambassador Eikenberry's advice was in a classified cable and had the right to be kept within classified channels. Second, we should be encouraged that the Ambassador has an independent view to share with the President he serves. Rather than rubber stamp the views of General McChrystal, it says a lot that the Ambassador feels the freedom to express a dissenting view. Dissenting views are healthy to the decision-making process and ensures that the national security team hears a variety of opinions from a range of sources- It strengthens the credibility of the ultimate decision if the process is not seen as "The Bus to Abilene". Last, anyone famliar with the interagency process knows that a cable will be distributed widely (albeit, perhaps not this widely); as such, one can be certain that this cable was shared with General McChrystal well in advance. My guess is that the Ambassador and General McChrystal, while not agreeing on everything- and it would be dangerous if they did- still maintain a healthy working relationship and a strong personal relationship (despite the media frenzy suggesting otherwise), and we are well served by their mutual efforts.

AF has to have a Whole of Government approach. The diplomatic corps and the military cannot win separately. If every agency gives way together and works collaboratively we can succeed.

It seems ludicrous to me that the int'l keeps "appealing" to Karzai to mend his ways. They have a fair aount of credible knowledge about where the corruption is, esp. at the higher levels. To take Karzai out directly through some sort of coup won't work becoz' of the 'subversion of democracy' problem, but then, cant there be ways to directly target the illegitimate operations/ directly prosecute members of his go. that have a very well-known reputation for war crimes and corruption. NATO is the military, Karzai is the political gov. Look at Iran or Pakistan- the military there can control the political gov., w/o a coup, w/o targeting the top leader. Karzai can be pressurized by aggressively targeting the criminals he gives patronage to. NATO doesn't need to take his permission for that.

The usual rules about diplomatic and governmental decorum were thrown on the scrapheap by whoever leaked the McChrystal demand for 40,000 more troops in Afghanistan, and McChrystal's later scandalous performances -- leaking confidential matters during a public (and news-recorded) address to the IISS in London, England, and confronting the president of the United States in the peace and quiet of president's office while wearing active-warrior (i.e, GI Joe) battle clothing -- made it pretty clear that even if McChrystal didn't personally leak that demand, or order its leak, he approves of it completely.

This was scandalous conduct, and supported by a flurry of unreliable reports from Afghanistan of exactly what the US military faces there. The general intent seems to have been an end run round the commander in chief if he chose to do anything other than comply immediately with the McChrystal demand -- or, by inference, any other damn thing the military were to demand thereafter. The nett effect seems to be of the Pentagon or perhaps just a lone general engaged in war against the government of the United States, and being cheered on by former presidential candidate McCain and a whole raft of right-wing commentators..

While I admire the blithe hope expressed above by JefferyThayer that "if every [US} agency gives way and works collaboratively we can succeed"" this seems baseless optimism. So far as we all know, all US government agencies were working collaboratively until, say, March or April this year, and it was in June that Petraeus and McChrystal started telling The Wall Street Journal and other interested parties that the Taliban was winning at that time, and growing in strength daily. Were these statements true? Who knows?

Underlying the whole current situation is considerable evidence suggesting that the central issues here are not Pentagon versus White House, but internal and unsuccessfully papered-over disputes within the Pentagon. The McJKiernan term of command expired in a strikingly unusual way earlier this year, with McKiernan, a trusted officer of high moral standing, claiming he was meeting or exceeding all Pentagon mission statements. No official ever replied to this defense, so far as I'm aware. It was a strong defense. McChrystal supplanted him in a most unusual way, and the public statement of why he got the job was that he would supply "new eyes". Huh..

Nobody seems to be looking at this possible Pentagon disarray much, but now a diversionary questioning of how Eikenberry got his diplomatic posting seems to be muddying the waters at present -- as was clearly its intent. Meanwhile the nation's $50 billion-a-year national security apparatus seems little interested in tracking down who leaked the McChrystal demand for the 40,000. If it's the military leaking military secrets, No official seems to care.

Whatever's going on in Afghanistan at present ain't Eikenberry's fault, and if he stepped over the line by officially suggesting that the McChrystal demand was not necessarily the best future course, it's quite clear that he wasn't the first across that line. The current hooha about divisions in our Afghanistan thinkers is wrong if it implies -- as it seems to -- that things started going wrong there in the past seven or eight months. The evidence is clear: they went wrong a long time ago. Has anybody ever published a list of the generals who held command in Afghanistan since 2001, complete with the dates of their (brief) terms? it's a pretty frightening record. And if Petraeus and McChrystal are right in claiming the Taliban is winning, a damning one. Is the MChrystal successor yet packing his bags?