The COINdinistas

Who knows everthing there is to know and more about counterinsurgency and its current role in U.S. military strategy? These guys.

BY THOMAS E. RICKS | DECEMBER 2009

David Kilcullen

Pushed and prodded by a wonky group of Ph.D.s, the U.S. military has in the last year decisively embraced a Big Idea: counterinsurgency. Not everyone in uniform is a fan, but David Petraeus and the other generals in charge of America's wars are solidly behind it. Here are the brains behind counterinsurgency's rise from forgotten doctrine to the centerpiece of the world's most powerful military:

Related

The FP Top 100 Global Thinkers

They had the big ideas that shaped our world in 2009.

1. Gen. David Petraeus

The face of the 2007-08 "surge" in Iraq and  now chief of Central Command. Gen. Stanley McChrystal is gonna try the same in Afghanistan, but "King David" rules this roost. 'Nuff said?

2. John Nagl

Writer on Petraeus's counterinsurgency manual, now beats the coin drum from the outside as president of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). But it wouldn't be surprising to see him in a top Pentagon slot within a year or two.

3. David Kilcullen

The Crocodile Dundee of counterinsurgency. Former Australian infantryman with a Ph.D. in anthropology, and one of the most quotable people on the planet. His book The Accidental Guerrilla helped shape the year's debates; he worked to steer the former Bush administration toward coin from the inside.

4. Janine Davidson

The Pentagon insider in this crowd. Former Air Force pilot now sitting at the adult table in the policy shop of the secretary of defense.

5. Dave Dilegge

Editor of Small Wars Journal. This is the town square of counterinsurgency, avidly read by everyone from four-star generals to captains on the ground in Iraq.

6. Andrew Exum

Abu Muqawama blogger; with Nagl, another colleague of mine at CNAS; and co-author of "Triage," an influential policy paper on Afghanistan. A former Army Ranger who is doing a Ph.D. on Lebanese militias, and in his spare time has been known to play paintball against Hezbollah -- no joke.

7. Stephen Biddle

Council on Foreign Relations. A latecomer to the coin debate who has written insightfully about both Iraq and Afghanistan. Like Exum, advised McChrystal on Afghanistan strategy.

8. Andrew Krepinevich

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Penned the classic The Army and Vietnam, about the failure of the Army to apply counterinsurgency in Iraq; wrote an influential Foreign Affairs article on the Iraq war and counterinsurgency.

9. Kalev "Gunner" Sepp

Assistant professor, Naval Postgraduate School. Like Krepinevich, an Army officer who ruined his career by getting a Ph.D. at Harvard. Fought in El Salvador and kept his COIN powder dry for years until someone was ready to listen.

10. Col. Gian Gentile

West Point professor who commanded a unit in Iraq. The skunk at the coin party who constantly points out flaws in the groupthink. Paints with a broad brush, but absolutely necessary to the debate.

CHRISTOPHER LEAMAN

 SUBJECTS: MILITARY, AFGHANISTAN
 

Thomas E. Ricks writes the Best Defense blog on ForeignPolicy.com and is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

Facebook|Twitter|Reddit

F1FAN

10:02 AM ET

December 1, 2009

Can these men save Obama's war?

Ha,ha,ha,ha,ha,ha,ha, no.

You can't save a country by occupying it. It's amazing that in all of human history with no counterinsurgency policy has ever worked, and yet we keep trying.

 

EXOTTOYUHR

1:55 PM ET

December 1, 2009

Ever heard of the Philippine Insurgency?

It was a COIN campaign, and it worked. The Malaysian Emergency is another example.

 

FNORD

3:23 PM ET

December 1, 2009

Oh ye gods and little fishes

The problem with COIN in Afghanistan is that it comes aproximately 6 years too late. So the big question is: To what extent is it possible to change the momentuum of the campaign? I think, unfortunately, that its too late for a proper job, and at most what we will leave behind is an excuse for getting out, a skeleton state. The real problem is that the west cant even get out: A withdrawal now would lead to one year of increasing Taleb victories as the south would gradualy fall. Its a beartrap allright, and the really sad part is that Donald Rumsfeld through his crazyass strategy of inaction created it himself. In the first three years we had every opportunity of winning. Instead, we handed ObL a major victory.

 

FNORD

3:23 PM ET

December 1, 2009

Oh ye gods and little fishes

The problem with COIN in Afghanistan is that it comes aproximately 6 years too late. So the big question is: To what extent is it possible to change the momentuum of the campaign? I think, unfortunately, that its too late for a proper job, and at most what we will leave behind is an excuse for getting out, a skeleton state. The real problem is that the west cant even get out: A withdrawal now would lead to one year of increasing Taleb victories as the south would gradualy fall. Its a beartrap allright, and the really sad part is that Donald Rumsfeld through his crazyass strategy of inaction created it himself. In the first three years we had every opportunity of winning. Instead, we handed ObL a major victory.

 

REUBEN HINTZ

5:35 AM ET

December 2, 2009

You can't name them all, but still...

Brigadier General H. R. McMaster?