This Week at War: What Will Obama's Afghanistan Look Like?

What the four-stars are reading -- a weekly column from Small Wars Journal.

BY ROBERT HADDICK | DECEMBER 4, 2009

Obama hasn't told us how this ends

During his Dec. 1 speech on Afghanistan, President Barack Obama promised to begin withdrawing U.S. combat forces from the country in July 2011. What condition does he expect Afghanistan to be in at that time? Or in 2012, when he will presumably be campaigning for a second term? U.S. officials seem to anticipate a chaotic backdrop to the pullout of U.S. forces. Indeed, parts of Obama's plan promote improvised -- and likely messy -- governance solutions in Afghanistan. In 2012, Obama may find it difficult to explain why Afghan chaos should be considered a policy success.

Obama's speech, and Defense Secretary Robert Gates's testimony the next day to the Senate Armed Services Committee, offered only a vague description of the future they expect. Obama discussed "handing over responsibility to Afghan forces" and providing support for "Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people." Gates made clear that, "This approach is not open-ended ‘nation building.' It is neither necessary nor feasible to create a modern, centralized, Western-style Afghan nation-state -- the likes of which has never been seen in that country." Gates also recommended "achieving a better balance between national and local forces" and "engaging communities to enlist more local security forces to protect their own territory."

Based on Obama's and Gates's remarks it appears that the U.S. government is giving up on the goal of building a strong central government in Kabul. Obama seems to be encouraging U.S. officials to bypass President Hamid Karzai and his circle, along with those ministries in Kabul that U.S. officials deem to be corrupt or ineffective, when they find other leaders in Afghanistan who can do a better job delivering for the Afghan people and for U.S. interests. Under this vision, U.S. officials will empower an opportunistic mix of tribal, local, provincial, and some central government actors to provide for Afghan governance and security.

It is not hard to see why the United States wants to shift to this approach. U.S. officials are barely on speaking terms with Karzai and much of his government. Top Afghan officials have used their positions to divert international assistance to their bank accounts and to their friends. Worst of all for U.S. troops in the field, Afghan government officials, senior military leaders, and local officials appointed by the Karzai government have in many cases achieved their positions due to their connections and not based on merit, competence, or integrity. In many cases this has left U.S. soldiers with poor partners to work with.

The resulting political mosaic  will be messy and contentious. Karzai, ostensibly Afghanistan's head of government, will not take kindly to the Americans bypassing and undermining his authority. He will respond by being even more assertive in protecting his interests and diverging even farther from U.S. objectives. In addition, U.S. officials should expect the local leaders they support to squabble with each other and with Kabul.

By 2012 Afghanistan's development and governance will be even messier. Against this backdrop, Obama will have to explain why his policy, with its dramatic up-and-down shifts in U.S. troop levels, is helping the situation in the region. Obama will not be able to cancel the troop withdrawals scheduled for July 2011; that date is still early enough in the U.S. campaign calendar for an anti-war candidate to enter the race if he were to renege. Much of the U.S. electorate will feel some relief that the United States is getting out of still-chaotic Afghanistan. But for many that relief will be offset by fear of what is to come and by questions about Obama's national security judgment.

Does he foresee any problems reassuring the American electorate that all is going well in Afghanistan in 2012? With his new policy, Obama is attempting mighty political feats both in Afghanistan and at home.

JIM WATSON/AFP/Getty Images

 SUBJECTS:
 

Robert Haddick is managing editor of Small Wars Journal.

 

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PERKUNIS

11:42 AM ET

December 5, 2009

Government of Afghanistan...end state

GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN
A Proposition
A constitutional parliamentary monarchy governing a decentralized federal cantonal system is, in my opinion, the best form of government for Afghanistan.
HEAD OF STATE: Shah (KING)
The ‘Shah of Afghanistan’ would be initially elected by a Grand Loya Jurga sitting as the nation’s parliament. They would decide if the office was to be hereditary or if it rotated among the tribes. His position as head of state would be non-political and symbolic much like the Queen of England. The former King, Zahir Shah has a large family and his children would provide historical continuity for Afghanis.
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Head of Government: Prime Minister
The prime Minister would be the head of the leading party in elections for Parliament and would form the government in the name of the monarch. The Prime Minister would be subject to a no-confidence vote from Parliament, and may then be asked to form a new government by the king. Because of the decentralized nature of the state, the central government only carries abridged portfolios, with strong dominant areas being foreign relations and national defense.
LEGISLATURE
The legislature is unicameral. Parliament: (called: ‘Loya Jurga’) A permanent seated version of the Loya Jurga forms the parliament. Each tribal canton sends representatives to this body, based upon their population, but elected or appointed by cantons according to their own laws. Legislation passes by a simple majority. The Loya Jurga also would have the added power of convening a formal Grand Loya Jurga made up of the chief executives of all the cantons. This would be the equivalent of a constitutional convention. Only the Loya Jurga can declare war or initiate new taxes/expenditures.
JUDICIARY
The judiciary of Afghanistan recognizes the Islamic identity of nearly all Afghans, and as such it requires an Ulema of respected Islamic scholars be appointed by the King to serve as his religious advisers on legal and other matters relating to the spiritual health of the nation. The Ulema serve at the pleasure of the king and is advisory only. The king addresses the Legislature annually and may pass on concerns of the Ulema at that time. Additionally, the Afghan Supreme Court is composed of seven Chief Justices serving for life, and good behavior, as well as a Tribal Court for each of the cantons and lower courts as determined needed.
TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS: Tribal 'cantons' are free to make their own laws according to their own traditions, and choose their own leaders and representatives. The nations’ military forces are composed of militia, led, trained and equipped centrally according to a national standard uniform policy but under the regional commands of their cantonal tribes, called up by the Loya Jurga in an emergency.

 

F1FAN

10:28 AM ET

December 7, 2009

Too Simple, Too Straight forward

It would never work, that plan makes it fairly impossible for the central government to control nepotism and allow it's cronies the latitude they need for opium trafficking.

 

GOEDEL

6:47 PM ET

December 7, 2009

Who are we to propose what is best?

Who are we to propose what is best for Afghans or others? Our Constitution has given us a bad government. Do you need proof?
Wars every few years.
Enormous foreign debt.
Federal budget deficits that grow each year.
Financial institutions that commit fraud, speculate wildly
and refuse to be regulated.
Consumers whose wages do not keep pace with productivity
and live on short-term credit from month to month.
Citizens who die because we treat health-care as a profit-center.
Schools whose students cannot compete with foreigners.
Elections with two parties and no real choice.
Media that do not expose candidates' views before election.
. . .
We do not govern ourselves but are governed by a wealth, corrupted,
corrupted corporate elite. We are not the ones to be instructing others.

Like most politicians, what Pres. Obama knows is politics. Otherwise, he is a shallow person, a person who had no basis for committing to war in Afghanistan, as he did as an Illinois senator. He did so, because he thought it would sound good. He did not have any basis for so doing and does not now. He will go back to Chicago in 2013 as did LBJ to Texas.

 

ITONLYSTANDSTOREASON

9:14 PM ET

December 12, 2009

Hedging Bets is not Giving Up

"Based on Obama's and Gates's remarks it appears that the U.S. government is giving up on the goal of building a strong central government in Kabul"

That's a mighty powerful set of tea leaves you're reading there - or is this insight from a fresh-killed calf's liver?

Read the COIN field manual, read McChrystal's confidential report. The strategy is predicated on the existence of an alternative to the insurgents, which they immagine as a legitimate central government capable of delivering services to the population. Do you see one of those sitting around in Afghanistan waiting for our call? No?

Then we have to work with the materials available, which are to be found in the patchwork as cited.

This doesn't mean you've given up the goal - but you've hedged your bet and found an interim solution that gives more time to work toward the ultimate goal.

So this buys time for us and for Karzai. At the same time, alternative dispersed centers of power prevent the national government from attaining a monopoly, and increase pressure to deliver the goods if the national government want to maintain whatever influence it has. How it will work out depends a lot on how its presented and how it is managed - it's no cake walk. It's simply the best of several bad alternatives.

What is revealing in reading press commentary is who understands what Obama presented and who gets only a part of the picture and therefore gets it wrong. We have here a multi-facetted situation requiring complex solutions. Some get that - others try to collapse it into either/or alternatives. Either we're supporting Karzai or we're abandoning him. Either we are committed to success, which means heavy fighting for unlimited years, or we're looking to cover our tracks as we exit. Either Obama supports the generals without question or he is weak/ a traitor.

It's not easy to convey complex concepts to simple minds. Obama needs to work on it.