Lessons from America's Other Counterinsurgency

The United States and Colombia have been testing out COIN strategies for years. But the major lesson for Afghanistan is a tough one: there are no clean answers in messy wars.

BY ADAM ISACSON | DECEMBER 16, 2009

Barack Obama is expanding more than just the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. He is expanding the mission. The goal now is to weaken the Taliban not just through force of arms, but by helping Kabul govern, filling Afghanistan's enormous vacuums of stateless territory. The U.S. president's counterinsurgency strategy is more than military. Once the armed forces "clear" territory, the rest of the government must move in quickly to "hold" it.

On the other side of the globe, the U.S. government has been doing something similar for a few years now, if with a much smaller footprint. In Colombia, whose government has been fighting leftist insurgencies since the mid-1960s, the strategy is called "Integrated Action."

The Afghan and Colombian conflicts share some similarities. In both, a brutal insurgency --unpopular nationally but with support in marginal areas -- remains active with funding from the drug trade. It has safe havens in neighboring countries. A weak central government, widely viewed as corrupt, is barely present in the countryside, where generations have known nothing but statelessness or governance by thugs. In each case, a mostly military approach, neglecting civilian governance, has yielded frustrating results.

Colombia has been the top U.S. aid destination outside the Middle East since 2000, when Bill Clinton's administration launched "Plan Colombia," a big and mostly military aid package. Integrated Action came about later, after evidence showed that Plan Colombia wasn't reducing cultivation of coca, the plant used to make cocaine. At the time, the government had weakened FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia rebel group, but it proved resilient in the most stateless parts of the country -- the vast jungles and plains encompassing more than half of Colombia's territory, but less than a quarter of its population.

Launched most ambitiously in the La Macarena region south of Bogotá in 2007, Integrated Action now operates in 13 conflict zones throughout Colombia. The Center for the Coordination of Integrated Action, an agency in the Colombian presidency, oversees troops' entry to clear these zones of guerrillas and then monitors the phased and highly coordinated arrival of nation-building forces: police, judges, road-builders, and land-titlers. At least, that's how the plan is presented in the PowerPoint slides.

In La Macarena, one of FARC's most important rearguards, Integrated Action scored some important initial successes. By mid-2008, the Army had quickly cleared guerrillas from most town centers. A massive eradication campaign sharply reduced the zone's coca crop. The region's small town centers saw quick-impact projects such as road-building, school repairs, and military "health brigades." Delegations of U.S. officials were able to visit towns that had been the virtual capitals of an independent FARC republic, leading some to hail Integrated Action as a counterinsurgency model for Afghanistan and elsewhere.

But 2009 has proven more complicated in La Macarena. Although FARC is still weaker than when the program began, a counteroffensive in the zone's rural areas has made road travel unadvisable, leaving the relatively secure towns as islands in a sea of guerrilla influence. Ambushes, bombings, land-mine deaths, and forced recruitment (especially of minors) have increased.

JUAN MANUEL BARRERO/AFP/Getty Images

 

Adam Isacson directs the Center for International Policy's Latin America Security Program, which has just published "After Plan Colombia," a study of Colombia's Integrated Action programs.

JAMES C. JONES

12:27 PM ET

December 17, 2009

Counterinsurgency in Colombia and in Afghanistan

Having worked on the ground in both Colombia and Afghanistan, I more than concur with Mr. Isacson. I could give several reasons why “success” is highly improbable in Colombia, not to mention Afghanistan, where the situation is so totally different as to render comparisons between the two settings as mostly trivial as regards their usefulness in designing programs or strategy in South Asia.

The US is now assessing its experience in Colombia and coming up with “lessons learned.” Many of those lessons, which derive for a US involvement spanning a period of 10 years, point to fundamental mistakes that should not have been made in the first place. Having qualified people—people who know the setting on the ground—both at a technical and policy level would have allowed the US to avoid those mistakes.

Mostly for political reasons relating to US domestic politics as well as to US foreign policy, Colombia allowed the US a wide margin of error over this 10-year period. The human suffering in Colombia, including the massive and continuing violation of human rights—not to mention the economic costs to the US—went largely ignored by those in power in Washington and Bogota. The US will not enjoy this margin in Afghanistan.

If there’s any one lesson that I would recommend to the US in Afghanistan, it would be to think locally—(and so many different localities, each different from the other in human and geographical ways!)—but also to think regionally. I strongly doubt that the US—neither its people nor its Congress—are prepared to stay the course in Afghanistan in order to achieve stated US objectives. That course will likely prove to be long, bloody, and very costly.
Australian counterinsurgency specialist David Kilcullen (who has advised the US) advocates a new lexicon for meeting post 9/11 threats. He argues for abandonment of the concept of a “war on terrorism.” Kilcullen’s approach to counterinsurgency is very anthropological. As he puts it, “Since the new threats are not state based, the basis for our approach should not be international relations (the study of how nation-states interact in elite state-based frameworks) but rather anthropology (the study of social roles, groups, status, institutions, and relations within human population groups, often in nonelite, non-state-based frameworks).”

One has to understand the “local.” (Americans are not very good at that.) And true, “integrated action” is important. But let’s not be naïve: In Afghanistan, that “integration” will have to be valley by valley, district by district, even village by village. And, of course, it will have to be sustainable. And a different sort of integration will be required at the regional level. And that, too, must also be sustainable.

 
 

MARK84

6:04 AM ET

January 13, 2010

Lesson from America's Other Counterinsurgency

For me,america's just waste their time,money and energy.America's mission totally fails in Afghans War.Until now,Taliban and Al-Qaeda still exist.

 

AZUAN

11:16 AM ET

January 14, 2010

lessons_from_americas_other_counterinsurgency

You state that for the US in Iraq and Afghanistan “there are no ambitions of expanding an empire, gaining access to natural resources, or spreading an ideology.” I am not sure History will find your assumption substantiated. Regards; Azuan from Bachelor business administration