I Built an African Army

In May 2004, I was hired for an unusual job: The U.S. State Department contracted DynCorp International, a private military company, to build Liberia's army. I was tapped as an architect of this new force. Previously I had worked for both the U.S. military and Amnesty International. I was a rare bird -- an ex-paratrooper and human rights defender -- and thus a good fit for this unprecedented task.

When I arrived in Liberia in 2004, the country's army was, at best, a mess. After decades of civil war, soldiers' hands were as bloodied as any rebels'. The troops were undisciplined, unpaid, and undertrained. They were a motley crew that protected no one in a country where pretty much everyone was vulnerable to violence. And it was our job to turn them into a professional military.

Today, just five years later, Liberia's soldiers are among the best in the region. They have been vetted, trained, paid, and readied for action. The difference was the impact of that little-known U.S. initiative -- the first of its kind -- that literally rebuilt the Liberian army from scratch. Our goal was for the Liberian army to fill the role of U.N. peacekeepers as the latter were slowly phased out, and it worked astonishingly well.

Now that model might be of use again. President Barack Obama's strategy for Afghanistan is predicated on creating Afghan security forces to replace coalition soldiers. The idea of training local troops to replace U.S. or international ones is not a new one; the United States famously tried to do it and failed in Vietnam. More recently, in 2005, then-President George W. Bush outlined his plan for Iraq and the aim that "as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." Yet the United States' ability to raise foreign forces has been paltry. This is because raising an army is difficult and dangerous: Do it too well and it might turn into a Praetorian Guard or a vehicle for a coup d'état. Do the job poorly and it could terrorize the citizens it is sworn to protect and much worse.

Today the stage is Afghanistan -- a near-failed state controlled by a weak central government, essentially devoid of basic infrastructure. The lessons of Liberia may help. Both countries are relatively underdeveloped and have a war-ravaged modern history. What's more, Afghans and Liberians both lack a sense of national identity as such and often identify first by ethnic group and second as Afghan or Liberian. These factors are challenges for creating a national army in a place where the majority of the population is illiterate, tribal or local loyalties trump patriotic allegiance, and ethnic blood feuds are ancient and deep.

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NORMAN ROGERS

3:31 PM ET

January 7, 2010

Mr. McFate

Given this tidbit:

"Sean McFate is the son of Mary Lou Sapone (a.k.a. Mary McFate), the NRA-connected private spy who infiltrated the gun control movement for about 15 years. Her tale was first disclosed by Mother Jones last week. That article noted that Sean, a Brown- and Harvard-educated paratrooper, and his wife, Montgomery McFate, a controversial Pentagon adviser, had once both worked for Mary Lou Sapone's business, which specialized, according to an old version of Montgomery's resume, in "domestic and internal opposition research" and "special investigations." Sean and Montgomery McFate might also have been involved in Mary Lou Sapone's penetration of the gun control community.

"More recently, Sean McFate was program director of the national security initiative at the Bipartisan Policy Center, a Washington think tank boasting an advisory board composed of four former Senate majority leaders: Howard Baker, Bob Dole, George Mitchell, and Tom Daschle. That is, he was until the appearance of the Mother Jones story on his mother."

http://motherjones.com/mojo/2008/08/did-son-nra-connected-private-spy-lose-his-job-because-mom

I don't think you really have the credibility to boast about building an Army out of what is left of the armed forces of Liberia, nor does it make any sense to compare that effort to building the Afghan military. When you say in your article that you "vetted" your recruits, does it sort of not strike you as being ridiculous to think that vetting a Liberian for service in the military with flyers at bus stops is a little easier than vetting an Afghan to serve in the Afghan army, given the known infiltration of the ranks of the Afghan military by the Taliban? In order to propel Taliban recruits into the Afghan military, all one would have to do is compel a handful of people to say positive things to the "vetting" team about a recruit, and kill anyone who might say something negative. How on Earth did you keep a straight face comparing Liberian society to Afghan society?

I also think that you need to acknowledge that Lieutenant Colonel Chris Wyatt was the military officer in charge of the training, and that he was forced to defend the notion of using contractors back in 2008. If you have mentioned him in your article, it must be in the part that didn't make it to publication.

Now, was he actually in charge or did he answer to you? Who really built the LIberian Army, now the shining example of military prowess in all of West Africa?

SEAN D

6:41 PM ET

January 8, 2010

nice ad hominem

Speaking of grudges... that is a nice irrelevant ad hominem attack Norman.
His FP bio says that he helped raise security forces, not that he commanded the entire operation nor that he did it single-handedly. He used a little hyperbole in his title, give him a break.
What are your suggestions for the afghan security forces? Don't make any attempts to vet them because the system may not be fool-proof? A lot of anger, a lot of attacks, no suggestions. Poor show.

In other news, Afghanistan is not identical to Liberia!!! Hot off the presses! Surely the author, Sean McFate thinks they are the exact same countries. There is no way he realizes the two countries are different and thinks some strategies might still be relevant considering they are both failed, impoverished states with a recent history of violence.
McFate says "Here are a few lessons learned from Liberia that might help in Afghanistan..."
Not that these are sure-fire lessons that can be applied everywhere in the exact same way.

A good article by Mcfate, several bad rebuttals by hapless wannabe Afghanistan historians. Afghanistan is different from Liberia, yet Afghanistan today isn't different from "the Afghanistan that was the one of the two regions that managed to best Alexandre the Great, after the conquest of the then-much vaunted Persian Empire? Was it the Afghanistan that eliminated the influence of the British Empire, during the heydays of the Great Game"?

6:53 PM ET

ad hominem

means I call him names and don't do anything to back it up.

Actual criticism is where I question his credibility, given that he has a past association with a known fraud perpetrated on the people who make up one of the more credible "gun control" lobbies in this country (I am pro-gun, but I do notice such things).

It (the incident with McFate's mother) really is a fascinating look at "ethics" and I question whether anyone would acknowledge that it was a situation where McFate's mother lied her way into the trust of an organization solely for profit. Who else will these people sell their services and their loyalty to? Why would the United States government trust such people?

Actual criticism is where I show that LTC Chris Wyatt was, in fact, in charge of the operation (According to the Voice of America) and that he didn't merit mentioning in McFate's article.

But, by all means--look past the fraud, the ethics, and the insanity of it and have a nice day. Perhaps you can lecture us on how Afghan tribal chieftains always trust fliers they find at bus stops when it comes to picking their own security partners.

FREETRADER

9:40 AM ET

January 9, 2010

Actually, your post is pretty much the definition of ad hominem. You take a swipe at the guy for being related to a woman who was apparently the target of a Mother Jones attack piece, and speculate that he 'may' have been involved. You then ramble on about a few unrelated issues. I don't know whether Mr. McFate's experience in Liberia is helpful or not, but this type of guilt by association is rather disturbing.

BARONCOYUCO1

3:58 AM ET

Afghanistan and Liberia, a fallacious comparison?

First and foremost, how in the world can we compare between Afghanistan and Liberia? Was the article referring to the Afghanistan with a long and rich history that stretched for more than 3,000 or so years, give or take a few centuries? Did it refer to the Afghanistan that was the one of the two regions that managed to best Alexandre the Great, after the conquest of the then-much vaunted Persian Empire? Was it the Afghanistan that eliminated the influence of the British Empire, during the heydays of the Great Game? Or was it the Afghanistan that broke the illusory strength of steel of the Red Army?
Afghanistan is a nation that was neither conquered nor pacified for any length of time. It was a nation of peoples that fought not only for its sovereignty, but for its right to exist as they have always been.
And what of Liberia? No pun intended, but Liberia does not have the same illustrious history as Afghanistan. It is a nation that has the right of self-determination and self-betterment. But in the end of the day, Liberia is not Afghanistan, and it will never be.
To put things in the proper context, culturally, sociologically, geographically, economically and historically, the two countries cannot any be more different from each other. And to actually implement some of the so-called 'points' indicated in the article is sheer lunacy in an operational-point-of-view.

I agree with the first comment for this article. The person who wrote this article lacks the credibility and authority to comment such fallacies.

TSHELTON44

4:53 PM ET

January 10, 2010

Some Simularities, but Many Differences

One significant difference between conducting an SSR in Liberia and Afghanistan is the security environment. When the SSR begun in Liberia, there was no active insurgency or active attempts from neighboring countries to subvert the NTGL and the subsequent Sirleaf-Johnson administration. Yes, other security threats existed (crime, disgruntled ex-military and security personnel, land disputes, and control of Guthrie Rubber Plantation, to name a few), but these pale in comparison to the threats facing Afghanistan. In Liberia, the SSR was conducted under the umbrella of relative peace, as all warring parties signed and complied with the 2003 CPA, UNMIL stood up in late 2003 and the DDRR (though not executed perfectly) began to gain traction in 2004. Though a fragile peace existed in Liberia, there was peace nonetheless. In Afghanistan, there is an active insurgency waged by the Taliban (and others) operating out of neighboring countries, and the intelligence agencies of both Iran and Pakistan have worked to achieve their own ends in Afghanistan. This difference, along with many others, will make SSR in Afghanistan a daunting task indeed. Indeed, the lessons learned from the Liberian SSR should not be ignored, on the contrary, they should be examined by the organizers of the Afghanistan SSR for applicability and adopted as necessary.

OMARALI50

1:54 PM ET

Good job, but not necessarily relevant

Great job in Liberia and I am sure many Liberians will thank Mr McFate for years and even decades (though it seems his mom has seriously upset some people in the United States...).
But I can see some obvious differences when it comes to Afghanistan (which doesnt mean SOME lessons wont apply):

1. Interested neighbours with the ability to make trouble. Afghanistan is not Liberia. Pakistan, Iran, India, Russia, China, all have much more capable secret services and ambitions than Sierra Leone.
2. The average Afghan village can probably fight off a company of the new Liberian army without too much difficulty. They are already armed, trained, organized, etc.
3. Well developed insurgency, with foreign support.
4. Relatively more developed motivational software. Taliban Islam may or may not be able to overthrow the modern world, but its well beyond the West African level in terms of cultural capability to organize populations, impose laws, imagine nations and conquer others.

I think the biggest lesson is that good old American ingenuity is not dead. This country can still find people who can go and do a job with imagination and ability. But the size of the job is very different in Afghanistan..

3:45 PM ET

The thing that is upsetting

is that Mr. McFate forgets his own history is an open book, read by many, and he comes from an unfortunate confluence of government procurement and questionable ethical practices.

No one gets it. We used to send Green Berets to do this kind of thing. Now we send private contractors, answering to no one, and they're allowed to go out and tout this in public as the way forward in Afghanistan?

Too bad no one pays attention to these kinds of things nowadays. You'd think we had money and contractors and special forces groups to throw around like Monopoly money.

MICHAEL VREDENBURG

1:04 AM ET

Special Forces Uninterested in FID

The reason we have to hire mercenaries to do this is because the typical Special Forces soldier is entirely uninterested in conducting FID missions anymore. Rather, everyone wants to be a door-kicker and only do CT and DA. That's how we get SEALs climbing mountain peaks several hundred kilometers away from the nearest ocean. There is a looming battle between SOCOM, "Big Army", JSOC (SFOD-D), the Marines, NSW and AFSOC over who gets to do what and who will be in charge.

Perhaps also we can blame the Rumsfeld DoD for marginalizing the traditional nation-building roles of State and USAID in favor of the bring-a-gun diplomacy of the Bush presidency.

10:13 PM ET

To Early To Crow Success

Serving twice with UNMIL (2004 & 2008) provided me first hand knowledge of the on-going Security Sector Reform (SSR), and it is far too early to crow complete success in the rebuilding of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL).
There is no doubt much progress has been made from where the AFL stood in late 2003, but time will be the ultimate litmus test if this progress will continue.

The author implies that children will run toward the AFL and Liberian National Police (LNP) for protection, rather than run away from them in fear. If this is true, I wonder when the last time the author visited Liberia, where mob violence continues due to ineffective policing and justice system that, like the military, are in various stages of reform.

It is misleading for the author to say "our goal was for the Liberian army to fill the role of the UN peacekeepers", and that "it worked astonishingly well". First, the 2,000 manned AFL is mainly confined to barracks around Monrovia and Tubmanburg. They have not backfilled for any of the 15,000 (at hit's height) UNMIL troops, nor will they.

Second, the AFL's primary mission is for the external defense of Liberia, with a secondary mission of supporting internal security forces against insurgencies. However, it is the LNP and their armed Emergency Response Unit (ERU) who have the primary mission to provide for internal security; which is really what the UNMIL troops have provided since late 2003. For example, was it the AFL or ERU that recently deployed to the Sinoe Rubber Plantation to provide security, a mission that previously was carried out primarily by UNMIL troops and UN police?

Finally, before I left country in 2008, we had received several reports of fights between AFL and LNP officers, and other incidents that reflected a lack of professionalism on the part of some AFL soldiers, as well as a sense of entitlement that caused concern among some Government of Liberian officials I knew. These incidents harked of the prior habits ingrained from a culture steeped in corruption and impunity.

Again, no doubt there has been a drastic improvement in the AFL from 2003 to today, thanks largely to the efforts of Liberians and direct foreign assistance from multiple countries, with the U.S. being a key player; but it is still too early to proclaim victory in the SSR of Liberia. Only time will truly tell.

WMWCHRIS

9:43 AM ET

Too Early? Indeed it is -- take it from the guy was there

Folks,
This discussion has a lot to do with why I have been reticent to publish any articles or even begin a manuscript of my experience rebuilding the military in Liberia thus far. Yes this article does seem to have a lot self-promotion, but the theme is nonetheless of great value.

As Mr. McFate points out, there are indeed lessons here for Afghanistan. The simple dismissal of his points is premature. If you have not done this, one should be cautious to dismiss the relevance of SSR in Liberia to Afghanistan. Rebuilding a 2,000 soldier force or a 100,000 soldier force entails the same level of effort in designing, planning and implementing the effort. That said, the tile is indeed shameless. I do not (or at least do not recall Mr. McFate) from my 14 months leading the SSR for National Defense program. At my arrival the nearly three year SSR for National Defense effort had accomplished a great deal under my predecessor and through the stunning, steady leadership of the American Ambassador, Donald Booth. In spite of the many success (none of which I'll elaborate on here), on my arrival it was all in jeopardy as the funding streams were woefully inadequate and all concerned (USG, Government of Liberia and Liberian civil society) were very unhappy. The only tangible thing the uninformed could point to after nearly a three year effort was an AFL with just 102 soldiers.

I departed over 14 months later when we had reached 2,137 soldiers (the mission called for 2,000), over 80% of originally construction completed, more than 500 graduates of the non-commissioned officer program, 87 second lieutenants commissioned (the mission was about 65), ECOWAS officers filling company grade leadership positions and half the requisite military equipment procured. Bear in mind that success in one area came at the cost or delay of progress in another as we never had the level of funding necessary to do this all at once. Lest I too be accused of shameless self-promotion, I hardly did this alone. We had assistance from a number of external actors, NGOs, civil society and a team of USG uniformed and civilians, private contractors, Liberian and third country nationals, ECOWAS and the Government of Liberia who all played helpful roles. At the same time I spent a great deal of time short circuiting attempts by many players interested in their own agendas, their own egos, personal gain and some who seemed intent or misrepresenting things solely for the guilty pleasure of undermining the effort, not matter its outcome.

But it is too soon to call this a success. Liberia is a work in progress, under threat by increasing corruption, an ineffectual police force and outsize expectations. At this point I would guardedly use the term "qualified success" as time will tell if what we have done serves the Liberian people and the region well. Regarding the gentleman's comment about AFL and LNP "fights." Sadly these things did occur. But I was there and intimately involved in investigating and resolving many of these so called incidents. UNMIL, while unusual in being a UN mission that actually does something useful and helpful, did little to become in involved in or resolve those incidents. Nearly every one of the half dozen or so "incidents" involved jealous, underpaid LNP acting inappropriately towards off duty soldiers in civilian clothing (something they would NEVER have attempted with soldiers in uniform). Given the pay disparity ($90 for an ALF private; $60 for an LNP officer) and the cursory vetting done on LNP applicants. it is easy to see who tension can develop. This is not to say that the intensive vetting process (incorrectly dismissed above) weeded out all bad actors. The AFL had / has its share of bad behavior. Fortunately this was rare during my tenure.

Having done this I can say without reservation that the complexity of SSR and the path taken by the Liberia and the US, as well as that by the Brits next door in Sierra Leone both offer invaluable insights for other efforts, including Afghanistan.

Regards,

Chris Wyatt
Gaborone, Botswana

11:05 AM ET

That is a humbling commentary

and I'll defer to Mr. Wyatt.

Thank you for your service, sir.

"That said, the tile (title?) is indeed shameless. I do not (or at least do not recall Mr. McFate) from my 14 months leading the SSR for National Defense program.

FP editor, please take note--your contributor's credibility has been eviscerated in one fell swoop.

Wow. QED.

12:20 PM ET

Not seeking to attack the author

Folks,

My response was not intended to be an attack on the author's credibility regarding participation in Liberian SSR. Rather I was just pointing out that I do not know the author. There were a number of actors on the government side and for both contractors. Mr. McFate must have worked for DynCorps prior to my arrival. My goal in responding was to point out that, contrary to a few comments, the Liberian SSR experience is relevant and is of value as a point of reference for current and future security sector reform efforts.

I do however agree with Norman about the title appearing on the FP site. There were a lot of "I's" involved in this process -- hundreds to more exact. Also I should note that, sadly, we were forced to remove much of the wonderful civics, rule of law, human rights and Liberian history instruction after the initial cohort of recruits. We tried to reincorporate it after the completion of initial entry training but our success was limited.

As far as my service, you are most welcome. It always has been and remains a distinct honor and privilege to wear the uniform and serve our national interests. It is even more rewarding when those interests allow one to do things like aid in restoring confidence and stability to those most in need -- like the Liberian SSR effort.

Vr,

9:07 PM ET

This is a better country

with good people like yourself out in the field, doing what you do.

Thank you.

11:11 AM ET

Thank You

Sir, thank you for your service to the U.S. and Liberia. Concur w/all you posted. The author brings up good points to consider with any SSR effort, even though one model does not fit all cases. I hope ECOWAS will consider the lessons learned from the Liberia SSR as they formulate a framework and action plan for sub-regional SSR and strategies. However, the author could have addressed the short comings and challenges in more detail instead of leaving the reader with an overall sense of final success. The road to recovery in Liberia is long and challenging, and the majority of the water will be carried by the Liberian people and their leaders. Time will tell where they will take their country. Warm Regards.

HONKEND

8:54 PM ET

January 18, 2010

Liberian SSR

All,

Chris, I'm glad to see someone come on-line that had been on the ground in Liberia. To all, I'm Chris' predecessor and was the ODC chief from Aug 2005 to Jul 2007. When I arrived in Liberia the SSR program had stalled due to lack of money to fund the de-mobilization of the old AFL. In the nearly two years I was on the ground we de-mobilized the old AFL and Taylor's war recruits, established recruiting/vetting for the new AFL, rebuilt three bases and graduated the first class of recruits. I was the US Embassy lead for SSR in Liberia. Under the leadership of Ambassador Booth and with the help of Susan McCarty (State Dept in DC) and LtCol Ellington (OSD) we laid the ground work for the SSR program.

This is the first time I have ever responded on an article forum, but felt the record needed to be straightened. For the most part the accounts in the article are correct, unfortunately Sean was not part of the "team" that did these things. Sean was part of a team with Andy Michaels that did initial assessments and wrote up the Dyn Corp response to a US State department request for proposal for the SSR program in Liberia. Andy Michaels was the lead in DC with a project manager on the ground in Liberia. Within my first six months we re-wrote the statement of work for the contract, which fundamentally changed the whole program. Sean was never on the ground in Liberia during the time I was there and not part of most of the stories he re-tells.

To address another point that was made. The Dyn Corp and PAE contractors were 90% US military retirees. The use of the term mercenary is extremely inappropriate. They were contractors hired to fulfill a US State Dept. contract. I was their direct oversight and I reported directly to Emb Booth. All the contractors were unarmed except during range training. I worked with several Dyn Corp and PAE PMs but the two that stand out are Glenn Iacovetta and Jeff Rodriguez. Without their dedication in keeping the ball moving forward the program would have stalled.

Finally, the program would have failed if it weren't for the countless hours put in by Susan McCarty back in DC. Her dedication keep the money flowing to the program, which at times was a Herculean task.

We learned many lessons in Liberia that could possibly apply to Afghanistan but I haven't been there and don't feel I'm knowledgeable enough to comment. But, I'm heading that way this year so we'll see after that.

In my response you can pull out the real team that laid the foundation for the SSR program in Liberia.

V/r,
Dan Honken

DANIEL

4:54 PM ET

Interesting take on

Interesting take on Afghanistan. I think part of the problem there and in Iraq is we are giving the local troops no incentive to perform their duties well. We need get them to step up the plate soon or western digital my book 3.0 get out.

C ROBINSON

10:48 PM ET

A clarification and a question

Hi all,
I should clarify here that Sean McFate was among the four first DynCorp personnel to enter Liberia to establish the demobilisation and then army re-creation programme in early 2004. Thus he alongside Andy Michaels and others were in before most of the DynCorp and PAE personnel that administered the 'Security Sector Reform' programme.

Mr McFate raises an interesting issue here. He says that in some circumstances, it is better to start from scratch. This is not what Anthony Cordesman says in the appendix to his recent December 10, 2009, paper on the rebuilding of the Afghan National Army. (The paper is at 'Afghan Security Forces: What it will take to implement Obama's Plan,' though I may not have the title exact. The annex is titled 'Doing it wrong: Host Country Force Development Lessons from Vietnam, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Iraq.'

Mr Cordesman says: '..creating new forces virtually from scratch is very different from improving or expanding an effective force structure in being and has posed critical problems that the US has to relearn how to deal with every time they have arisen.' Cordesman goes on to hi-light the difficulty of building up forces from a very limited or zero base, and 'find ways to create battalions from scratch in ways the manual does not touch upon,' and 'the various planning and coordinating groups lack effectiveness and instruction and took years to function with moderate effectiveness - when they did.'

I would be very interested to hear peoples' thoughts on whether starting fom scratch or working with the force one has is better. Especially, Lt. Col. Wyatt, I'd be very interested in your thoughts on the matter.

Regards to all,

Colin Robinson
PhD Student
Wellington, New Zealand

6:19 AM ET

Strart from scratch or restructure.... the $64,000 question

Colin asks one of the most pertinent questions regarding the entire Liberia SSR effort. This has always been a question that leaves dissenters on both sides of the decision. The Brits kept the existing structure and went from there in Sierra Leone. There are a lot of problems associated with this approach. Chief among them is that retaining undesirable retreads undermines all your efforts building a professional, democratically accountable force, especially as they begin to reassert their "own" military culture after waiting out the reformers (if they even wait that long). We can argue all day about whose approach was more sound and I got plenty of great "advice" from Brits and others about how much better their approach in Sierra Leone was (at least when I arrived in Liberia) to ours in Monrovia.

In the interest of intellectual honesty (and I freely admitted this from the very beginning of my tenure and continue to do so today), while the Sierra Leone model has its problems, it has one significant advantage which proved to be a very serious drawback to the US approach in Liberia: retaining company and field grade officers.

We had immense challenges, with the absence of experienced leadership undermining our efforts being a chief contributing factor. The MOD and I worked out a deal that brought ECOWAS officers to serve as company commanders but that was only a stopgap measure and did nothing to resolve the most important issue: seasoned, proper, professional Liberians directing and leading Liberians. Additionally it did not resolve the issue of manning the battalion and brigade staffs. We made a plan (based on the existing constraints) and got the junior officers and NCO exposure to the staff process and mentors to show them the way (as it were). The MOD even brought back some old AFL officers but this in itself created additional problems since it was done nearly 4 years into the program and irritated many of the new soldiers who wanted nothing to do with the previous culture of failure and corruption.

All of this said, the architects (Liberian and American) were aware of this problem from the outset and made --- in my own opinion --- the correct call by demobilizing the entire force and starting from scratch. When I departed less than 5% of the new AFL were previous AFL, LURD or other rebel veterans. That figure is nto all that important except that it points out the reality that very few old AFL vets hd the interest or could surivive the vetting process. So it realy was a new force.

Despite the absence of Liberian leadership in the key positions (company commanders, 1SGs, battalion staff officers), the program was successful up to the point when it was time to begin preparing for an external evaluation and training to get there. The Africa Command made a concerted effort after my departure to resolve the perpetual shortfall of uniformed mentors. If we would have had these folks all along and a commitment for sustained engagement on the program, the AFL would be a far stronger force today and the approach of starting from scratch would be the most obvious "right way."

Oh -- and I do know Andy Michaels.
Vr,

GMARTIN

1:41 PM ET

January 11, 2010

Afghanistan applicability and SF-FID points

I would agree with two points already raised:

- there are tremendous differences between Liberia and Afghanistan and therefore what was used in one will have limited usefulness in the other
- Having said that, it wouldn't be smart to discard all the lessons learned from Liberia. Some districts in Afghanistan may be closer to the Liberian example- and therefore be useful. Additionally, one day Afghanistan may be closer to the Liberian example and preparing for that eventuality now could be beneficial.

One huge difference not mentioned is what is driving our presence in Afghanistan: the threat from AQ. Because that is an internal-U.S. interest (and arguably the highest priority in the short-term), what we are willing to do and can do politically in terms of training and deploying the Afghan Security forces is limited. In Liberia it seems the highest priorities were to set up the security forces and make life better for Liberians- only indirectly related to U.S. interests. If one does not understand what drives the train (resources, goals, focus, etc.), then coming up with comparisons is easy (and dangerous).

As far as SF goes- I think the usual "FID vs. DA" argument is both valid and over-simplified. The main problem with comparing SF with using State Department contractors is that SF is beholden to the DoD and policies that have been crafted at the NCA level. Very rarely do they take a part in molding the overall-strategy and objectives. They receive a mission from a combatant command that has either crafted the policy almost wholly without SF input or is just passing the mission on from the JCS with little to no input itself.

In contrast- a contracted company would not only bid on the contract (voluntarily), but also would most likely submit a proposal on how to best accomplish U.S. strategic interests in the target country. This greatly flattens the mission analysis process and puts the "doers" much closer to the "dreamers". State- in my experience- many times takes the contractor's plans as their own or modifies their own objectives as needed based on what the contractors propose (seeing as how State doesn't have the massive planning capability that DoD has).

Therefore, using SF to do FID is not only very limited in terms of short-term strategic gain, but it isn't really an efficient use of U.S. special operations forces (SF doing FID outside of denied and politically sensitive areas is a waste of resources unless there is nothing else going on). The current love-affair of all things Direct Action is arguably a mixture of a misunderstanding by conventional forces of the use of SF and the historical focus of SOCOM on kinetic activities.

Grant Martin
MAJ, US Army
-the opinions expressed are the author's own and do not reflect the position of anyone or any organization in the U.S. government-

Foreign Policy Magazine

Inside National Security

Now here's what it will take to build Afghanistan's.

BY SEAN MCFATE | JANUARY 7, 2010

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