Al Qaeda's Armies of One

Meet the next generation of jihadi pundits.

BY JARRET BRACHMAN | JANUARY 22, 2010

An al Qaeda propaganda image celebrating the prominent Internet pundit Abu Dujana al-Khorasani, who conducted a suicide attack in Afghanistan on Dec. 30, 2009.

When Humam Khalil al-Balawi exploded himself at a CIA base in Khost, Afghanistan, last month, killing seven CIA officers, his suicide attack did not just have repercussions for the NATO effort in Afghanistan -- it also represented a giant leap forward for al Qaeda's global Internet movement. In the minds of Web jihadists, Balawi was more than just another suicide operative. He was one of them, someone whose thinking they trusted, knew intimately, and had been reading for years.

Before he became a Jordanian "triple agent," Balawi was the jihadi online pundit Abu Dujana al-Khorasani. Under that moniker, Balawi had been anonymously feeding his online readers a steady stream of jihadi missives since early 2007. His climb from eager chat-room participant to elite jihadi Web forum administrator to revered Internet pundit to triumphant suicide bomber helped forge a path that Web jihadists could finally hope to emulate.

The number of Web jihadists who make the transition to real-world terrorists is growing. Terrorists who have been radicalized online include Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Badr al-Harbi -- the Kuwaiti who posted more than 1,000 times on an al Qaeda Internet forum before blowing himself up in Iraq -- and now Balawi. In doing so, they have taught other Web jihadists how to upgrade their keyboards into suicide vests. With his many screeds posted to forums lionizing those who carry al Qaeda's torch, Balawi helped narrow the distance separating the global jihadi movement's fighters and its online sympathizers.

Balawi had developed into what can usefully be termed a jihadi pundit, leveraging his writings to achieve a prominent position within the online jihadisphere. Most Americans have never heard of this genre of al Qaeda literature, nor has the U.S government made it a priority to read, analyze, or translate these writings, largely because they contain no operationally relevant information. Nonetheless, jihadi punditry has become a critical part of the online radicalization process for both its producers and consumers. One can only speculate whether Jordanian and American intelligence had given Balawi's essays the intellectual due diligence they required. If so, his handlers should have been familiar with the seething rage for Arab governments and the West that suffused Balawi's writings. They would have well understood that this material was perversely vile, even when compared with that of his fellow al Qaeda pundits.

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According to the pro-al Qaeda media outlet Al-Yaqin, Balawi actually had two online identities. The first moniker, which has not been revealed outside the jihadi Web world before this article, was "Malik al-Ashja'e," the name of one of the Prophet Mohammed's pious companions. Using that identity, Balawi served as a Web administrator for the most elite al Qaeda forum, al-Hesbah. Balawi was better known, however, as "Abu Dujana al-Khorasani," whose writings, along with those of a handful of other elite jihadi pundits, served to bridge the thinking of al Qaeda's senior leadership with its global Internet-based movement. Other senior Web pundits like "Abd al-Rahman al-Faqir," "Yaman Mukhaddab," "Abu Shadiyah," and "Asad al-Jihad2" also routinely post essays to al Qaeda forums that dissect, parse, interpret, analyze, and promulgate jihadi thinking.

Each pundit varies in terms of his style, sophistication, tone, and viewpoint. One of Balawi's contemporaries named "Asad al-Jihad2," for instance, relies on an absurdist cocktail of prediction and bravado in his writings. He once bragged, "I conducted a study on the condition of the United States and the plights which Almighty God decreed for it. I was, by the grace of God, the first ever to write and congratulate the leaders of jihad and the mujahideen, and all the Muslims, for the beginning of the collapse of the United States."

The first wave of contemporary jihadi Web punditry emerged in 2002 and lasted until 2005. It was dominated by anonymous al Qaeda strategists, some of the most prominent of whom used the pen names "Abu Bakr Naji," "Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi," and "Lewis Attiyatallah" to write articles for several online al Qaeda magazines including Al-Ansar and Sawt al-Jihad. These authors, many suspected of being Saudis, generated serious scholarly thinking about al Qaeda's military strategy and international politics, and their work continues to be read widely. Also during this time, the jihadi Internet community was feverishly compiling and sharing the tactical know-how for implementing this strategic counsel.

The leading voices of this first wave eventually grew silent, likely due to aggressive Saudi counterterrorism efforts. In 2006, the next wave of pundits began to coalesce. This second cadre of e-jihadists focused less on strategy and more on interpreting, defending, and heralding the messages of al Qaeda's senior leaders. Pundits like "Husayn bin Mahmud," "Yaman Mukhaddab," and "Shaykh Attiyatallah" helped shore up al Qaeda's credibility, both politically and religiously, at a time of great transition and controversy for the organization, as it faced widespread anger among many Muslims due to its indiscriminate campaign of terrorism across Iraq.

 

Jarret Brachman is on the faculty at North Dakota State University and is a senior consultant to the U.S. government on al Qaeda issues.

SIR_MIXXALOT

11:18 AM ET

January 25, 2010

duh.

did you stop to wonder WHY we are the targets of terrorism?

Well, the ex-CIA head of the Osama division has -- fyi:

When troops and CIA officers die for a fantasy
By Michael Scheuer - 01/12/10 05:25 PM ET

The men and women of the U.S. military and intelligence services are the most important part of America’s defense capital. When they enter the service of their choice they are well aware of the implicit contract between the nation and themselves. In return for their career, America has the right to call on them to go into harm’s way, very often at the risk of their lives. I have never known a Marine, a soldier or a CIA officer who did not accept this reality, and I have never known one who balked when called on to deploy. That said, each I have known — and I suppose all — hope that if defending America costs his or her life, the cause for which it is spent is clear and worthwhile. It is precisely on this point that the U.S. government’s executive and legislative branches are lethally failing these men and women.

The events of the past three weeks throw into sharp relief that we are sending our young men and women overseas to fight an enemy that does not exist. Among the first thoughts expressed by President Obama after the near-miss al Qaeda attack on Christmas — and then echoed by his lieutenants, various members of both parties in Congress, and numerous pundits — was that the young Nigerian bomber hated our way of life. And since seven CIA officers in Afghanistan were killed by al Qaeda on Dec. 30, the same thought has been expressed by the same people.

This central thought has been accompanied by additional assertions, among which are the attackers were nihilistic Muslim fanatics and the attackers’ motivation has nothing to do with Islam. The sum and substance of the U.S. bipartisan political elite’s response to recent events has been — as it has been since 1996 when Osama bin Laden declared war on America — that the Islamist terrorists hate us for who we are and how we live, not for what we do.

This contention is a fantasy. It is fair to say that all the U.S. Marines, soldiers and CIA officers who have died in Afghanistan since 9/11 and in Iraq since Saddam’s removal have died fighting an enemy that does not exist. In numbers now approaching 6,000, these men and women have bravely fought and died in combat against an enemy whose main motivation U.S. political leaders have consistently denied. No U.S. soldier, Marine, or CIA officer has been killed by an Islamist fighter who took the field because America has women in the workplace, beer is available in ample supply, and there are early presidential primaries in Iowa every fourth year. Indeed, Islamists motivated by such issues would not rise to the level of a lethal nuisance; they certainly could not stymie the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The young Nigerian in Detroit and the Jordanian bomber in Khost and his wife have told America’s Marines, soldiers, and CIA officers what they already surely sense, but what their political leaders deny. Both attackers cited motivations that pivot on U.S. support for Israel against the Palestinians; U.S. occupation of Muslim lands; and U.S. attacks on their fellow Muslims. The three individuals’ words echo the components of U.S. foreign policy named by bin Laden in 1996 as the causes of war — which also include U.S. support for Arab tyrants and exploitation of Muslim energy resources — and which polls show 80 percent of the world’s Muslims identify as attacks on their faith.

While it is hard for Americans to hear, we are at war with a steadily growing number of young men and women in the Muslim world because of what the U.S. government has done in that arena since 1945. The current slate of U.S. foreign policies toward the Islamic world generates the basic and most compelling and uniting motivation for our Islamist enemies.

Should some of these policies be changed? I surely think so, but that is a discussion for another time and broad public debate, perhaps during the 2010 midterm elections. For now, the discussion must focus on our enemies’ motivation and the knowing failure of U.S. leaders in both parties to be honest with our fighting forces. If we fail to understand that motivation, America cannot shape a war-fighting strategy to either defend those policies or defeat the tenacious, talented, religiously motivated, and growing foe our soldiers, Marines, and CIA officers are now losing to in the field. Those men and women — and their parents, spouses and children — deserve to know they are risking their lives to defeat a skilled and enduring enemy, one who is motivated by the impact of U.S. policies, and one that genuinely threatens America. They are not fighting the cartoon-like foe described by their political leaders for the past 15 years.

Scheuer is a former senior CIA officer and adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University.

Source:
http://thehill.com/special-reports/homeland-security-january-2010/75531-when-troops-and-cia-officers-die-for-a-fantasy

 

F1FAN

12:39 PM ET

January 25, 2010

Michael Scheuer

Really? The CIA and Michael Scheuer are the root of the problem, the only answers he has are the ones that cover his rear end and help further his political neo-conservative agenda. Michael Scheuer should be on that list of most dangerous Jihad pundits, he is a bigger enemy to America than any of them.

 

GRANT

1:27 PM ET

January 25, 2010

To both previous

To both previous commentators, this really doesn't have much to do with the article itself.

As for the topic at hand, in my opinion we're in for a time of varying threats. Obviously it's difficult to detect and stop such hydra-like attacks, but at the same time the would-be 'pundit bombers' face two problems. The first is that they have mixed access to resources necessary for an attack, training for them, human support to carry out the attack, and ability to reach a high priority target. The second problem is that if they are too successful in what they preach they could face a dearth of skilled writers, though I admit this is far less likely than the first point I made.

 

SIR_MIXXALOT

5:56 PM ET

January 29, 2010

Yes, why we have terrorism

Yes, why we have terrorism does not have much to do with the article.

Brilliant.

 

SIR_MIXXALOT

5:59 PM ET

January 29, 2010

While it is hard for

While it is hard for Americans to hear, we are at war with a steadily growing number of young men and women in the Muslim world because of what the U.S. government has done in that arena since 1945. The current slate of U.S. foreign policies toward the Islamic world generates the basic and most compelling and uniting motivation for our Islamist enemies.