The U.S. military should keep a low profile in Haiti
The U.S. military is now carrying out a wide-ranging relief mission in Haiti in response to the dreadful Jan. 12 earthquake that virtually destroyed Port-au-Prince and other built-up areas in the country. Because it has the manpower, ships, airplanes, organization, and the budget to rapidly move equipment, supplies, and people to anywhere in the world, it is no surprise that the Pentagon's is the first phone that rings whenever such a natural disaster strikes. Recent large-scale relief missions after the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia and the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan brought acclaim to the U.S. military and the U.S. government. U.S. policy officials struggling for the moral high ground were happy to pocket the "soft power" benefits of these relief missions.
[[SHARE}}The disaster in Haiti provides another opportunity for the Pentagon to show the world the humanitarian advantages of its logistical power. All five of the military services are contributing to the effort and the Pentagon has created a webpage to collect all of its Haiti stories, photos, and links. But be careful, counsels Gary Anderson, a retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel and veteran of relief missions in Bangladesh and Somalia. In two essays written for Small Wars Journal, Anderson advises the U.S. military in Haiti to work only in support of the host government, to let the United Nations and non-governmental aid groups take the lead, and to generally take as low a profile as possible. Try to do too much, he warns, and the military relief effort will risk squandering any goodwill it might gain.
Based on its previous experiences with disaster relief, the U.S. military now has written doctrine on how to establish a headquarters staff for coordinating a relief effort. In his first essay, Anderson recommends tossing this plan into the bin. He argues that it is essential that the United States be seen supporting the existing Haitian government and ministries, no matter how feeble they may be. Anderson believes that standing up a large by-the-book civil-military operations center would appear to many outsiders as a de facto U.S. takeover of the country. Some foreign officials have already accused the United States of planning just that. Instead, the U.S. should adapt to the Haiti's circumstances and improvise staffing solutions that support the Haitian government.
In his second essay, Anderson continues to recommend a supporting role for the U.S. military. The U.S. should use sea-basing in order to keep the number of U.S. military personnel ashore as low as possible. The U.S. should let the Haitian police and U.N. peacekeepers take responsibility for security. To the greatest extent possible, NGO personnel, and not U.S. soldiers, should handle aid distribution to the victims.
Is the U.S. government following Anderson's advice? For the most part, the answer seems yes. The U.S. is sea-basing its operations on an aircraft carrier, an amphibious assault ship, and a hospital ship and is using helicopters and landing craft for movement. The U.S. Agency for International Development's recent press briefings and fact sheets stress the lead roles of the Haitian government, the United Nations and NGOs in the relief effort.
After a fitful start, the U.S. military's relief operations in Haiti are still far short of what the disaster requires. But they are gaining momentum and will appear more successful every day. Just don't get carried away by that success, warns Anderson.
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