Rumble in the Junta

This year's elections in Myanmar won't be free and fair -- but they will be more significant than you think.

BY DREW THOMPSON | JANUARY 28, 2010

Walking through the streets of Yangon this January, I saw the futility of U.S. sanctions on every corner. Commerce thrives on steamy streets and markets, and billboards advertising Japanese, South Korean, and European brands are everywhere. Meanwhile, junta leaders targeted by sanctions that prevent their families' travel have contented themselves with retirement in splendid homes, while their grandchildren, denied visas to visit the United States, simply go to college in Europe and Australia. Sanctions have only served to isolate the United States. This is especially unfortunate at a time when the United States should be carefully watching, and even influencing, what might be the most important political year in Myanmar's recent history.

The date is not set, but the tiny handful of generals who have a monopoly on political power have declared elections will take place in 2010, and no one doubts they will happen before the year's end. Most Burmese citizens are nonplussed, and no one can blame them for assuming that the military junta that runs the country from the isolated capital of Naypyidaw has rigged the process.

But the truth is that the elections will bring change: perhaps not a sudden end to the military junta, but important and underappreciated change nonetheless. And the United States should be fully engaged.

This year's elections will be hotly contested by opposition politicians eager to gain a parliamentary seat. Although far from being a free and fair process, they might represent the start of a long and possibly tortuous road toward a relatively more democratic system. A new government is certain to emerge in Myanmar once the voting is over, one that is expected to include directly elected politicians representing a broader cross section of society than ever before. Rather than dismissing these elections out of hand and calling them a sham, the United States should carefully consider its options and assess this potentially historic opportunity to shape Myanmar's future.

The reason elections are expected soon is the ill health of the detested general known as "Number One," Than Shwe. A leader of the 1988 coup, Than Shwe became the chairman of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in 1992 (in 1997, the SLORC changed its name to the State Peace and Development Council) and has maintained a firm grip on power to this day. He and his family have amassed a fortune, and at nearly age 77 his health is failing and he is ready to retire. Like many dictators before him, however, he realizes that retiring in safety can be more complicated than maintaining an iron grip on power. As the saying goes, "Riding a tiger is easy; getting off is more difficult."

To ensure that he and his family do not face trial or a firing squad once he relinquishes power, Than Shwe has crafted an elaborate retirement plan that replaces his junta with a new government, made up of military personnel and civilians, that will not be powerful enough to exact retribution from him, his family, or his cronies. The only outcome that preserves his wealth and freedom is a relatively weak, inclusive civil-military government that self-balances and checks the power of any one faction or branch. Establishing a durable civil-military government requires elections that confer enough legitimacy to sustain it and bolster the authority of civilians vis-à-vis the more powerful military. Learning from the experiences of many other military dictators, Than Shwe fears an authoritarian successor might bend to populist sentiment and obliterate him.

NICOLAS ASFOURI/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

 SUBJECTS:
 

Drew Thompson is director of China studies and Starr senior fellow at the Washington-based Nixon Center.

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DEREK TONKIN

4:46 AM ET

January 31, 2010

Rumble in the Junta

A refreshing and perceptive analysis. You say that the army ignored the 1990 election results and threw her in jail, but later on you correctly say that she was under house arrest at the time. Whether the army ignored the results depends on which side you take in the controversy over the purpose of the elections, which Suu Kyi herself recognised back in July 1989 ("Freedom from Fear" Pages 224-225) as only the precursor to the adoption of a new Constitution which would mean that the transfer of power might, she said, have to wait "months, if not years". It has indeed been years. The three presidential candidates will be chosen, incidentally, not by the government, but one by the People's Assembly, one by the Nationalities Assembly and one by the army members meeting separately. The NLD have an exceptionally difficult decision to take. There is no likelihood at all that the regime will revise the 2008 Constitution to meet their concerns, and for the NLD to re-register as a party contesting seats is likely to require them to formally acknowledge in their application their support for the new Constitution. This could split the Party.

 

FREEDOM410

11:44 AM ET

January 31, 2010

A poorly researched article

I sympathize with the goal of paying attention to the elections, but this article is pretty sloppy. Here are a few things the author either got wrong or omitted:

1) The Burmese constitution isn't based on or resemble the U.S. constitution by any stretch of the imagination. Rather, it is patterned after the pre-1998 Indonesian New Order Constitution. Along these lines, there is nothing in the Burmese constitution suggesting the branches willl act as a "check or balance" on each other On the contrary, judicial independence is limited and the power of constitutional review is confined to a tribunal whose members serve only 5-year terms. The president doesn't have a veto power and in fact is elected by the legislature, not the public. Burma's constitutional drafters knew what they were doing, and setting up a U.S.-style democracy isn't it.

2) The plan to civilianize Myanmar's military rule wasn't "expedited" after the 1990 elections, but rather took 20 years. In fact, Myanmar's new constitution holds the record for the longest drafting time ever (17 years). That's important because a lot has changed since 1990, including Than Shwe's rise to power (which only took place afterward) and the diminution of the ethnic minority insurgents.

3) Myanmar's generals have a history of rigging polls and rejecting foreign election monitors. The May 2008 constitutional referendum is a case in point. There's certainly no guarantee that the elections will even approximate popular preferences or that any opposition members will be allowed to join the new legislature. While the government has not yet rejected international election monitors, it doesn't seem likely to accept them. Thus, the amount of space for political opponents is very unclear at this point.

For the record, I do believe the elections will be important for Myanmar's political future. However, I also think it's important to note these subtleties. In particular, the constitution does create several competing centers of power (president, speakers of the legislature, commander in chief, etc), making it possible that there could be a split amongst the military elite. I don't think there's much likelihood the current opposition will win a majority of the legislature or oust the military, but I do think it's possible that a reformist faction in the military could emerge and join with the opposition.

 

JIM-Y

7:36 PM ET

February 15, 2010

effect of sanctions

If the author did not observe any effect, he never tried to use a credit card.