Life After Kim

As North Korea's Dear Leader celebrates his 69th birthday, it's worth asking what plans the United States has for Pyongyang once he's gone. Turns out, Washington doesn't have much.

BY SUNG-YOON LEE | FEBRUARY 16, 2010

In North Korea, where death is far more certain than taxes, Kim Jong Il's eventual departure from this world carries secular consequences. As the ailing dictator celebrates his 69th birthday (or 68th, his age is disputed) -- Feb. 16 is one of the country's two biggest national festivals -- the ghosts of the famine years are once again descending upon his impoverished nation, only this time with noise. For the first time, reports of ordinary North Koreans boldly showing discontent at authorities in different localities are seeping through. Frustrated at the regime's redoubled crackdown on private wealth and market activity, and haunted by the collective memory of mass starvation in the mid-1990s, men, women, peddlers, traders, and even Korean War veterans -- who are among the favored class -- have been protesting on the streets.

The regime may very well continue to maintain control over the population through the distribution of extra grain, ideological indoctrination, manufactured scapegoats -- and of course, brute force. But the end of Kim Jong Il's regime, one way or another, is inevitable. Although Kim's exit will certainly be cause to celebrate, it won't inevitably lead to a happy result; in fact, it could usher in a period of instability that triggers a regime collapse culminating in the unification of the two Koreas, a possibility that will require far more U.S. involvement than President Barack Obama and his advisors may realize.

Most casual observers understand that the differences between North and South Korea are vast. The Kim family regime's attempts at securing an immortal legacy and executing its own brand of economic policy have created a nation of oppressed people surviving in extremis -- a system in which cruel and unusual deaths are often the grim punctuation mark to a life of grinding poverty and "tax-free" bondage to the state. In contrast, beyond North Korea's southern border lies a free and affluent Korea, one that claims sovereignty over the entire peninsula and to which millions of Northerners would move if given the choice. By its mere existence, Seoul poses an omnipresent existential threat to Pyongyang.

What's less commonly known is that the United States has done little to prepare for life after Kim Jong Il. It's true that U.S. and South Korean officials have been quietly discussing a contingency plan for a drastic change in North Korea, dubbed OPLAN 5029 by the Pentagon. But beyond short-term emergency response measures such as securing the North's stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, maintaining public safety, controlling borders, and providing humanitarian aid to displaced North Koreans, making plans for dealing with an alternative post-Kim Korea over the long term is critical to protecting U.S. strategic interests in that vital region of the world. In view of America's political, economic, and human investment in South Korea and Northeast Asia over the past 65 years, it is also a moral imperative.

A power vacuum in Pyongyang will require the immediate dispatch of South Korean and U.S. troops. Next will come other regional powers -- Chinese peacekeeping forces securing the northern areas, followed by the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force transporting people and supplies along the Korean coastlines. In the short term, a multiparty international presence north of the 38th parallel under the nominal banner of the United Nations will enforce order and provide aid. But even when the dust from the flurry of human activity and balance-of-power politics settles, the task will not be done.

 

Sung-Yoon Lee teaches North Korean state and society at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

BUFFALODAVE

8:29 PM ET

February 16, 2010

Life After Kim

No matter what happens with the power structure in N. Korea after he eventually passes, it is unlikely that the next person to take charge will be quite as much of a little tyrant as this guy has been.

Then we can welcome North Korea into the modern world.

 

ANDY764383

9:45 PM ET

February 16, 2010

Not so fast

You're assuming quite a bit here. The Dear Leaders departure from the scene in no way is automatically followed by reunification.

 

SCOTT MONJE

10:26 AM ET

February 17, 2010

Reinventing North Korea

The United States, of course, was the sole occupier of Japan and therefore had a pretty free hand in deciding how it should be reformed. Assuming that North Korea collapses, that the United States and South Korea occupy it, and that the United States and South Korea agree on how North Korea should be reinvented, how likely are the Chinese--who you foresee occupying northern regions--to agree with the arrangement?

 

ASGOLD25

3:49 PM ET

February 17, 2010

Likelihood?

I'd be interested in knowing what the actual likelihood of regime collapse in North Korea will be after Kim dies. Is there the possibility of a power struggle between Kim's chosen successor and the more established military brass? Wouldn't the government that succeeds Kim be similarly as oppressive (North Korea certainly can't become more oppressive and closed off)? What makes you so sure that the regime would be quick to collapse?

 

GAUSTIN42

11:20 PM ET

February 17, 2010

Life after Kim

It will stay the same with a new "Leader"

The people have been conditioned from birth to have great leader and an orwellian mindset - think of the terror that would would engulf them without continuation of the same government philosophy. Any attempt to change the structure of the country is far more difficult than that of an Iraq or Afghanistan. I use these because any appearance of non North Asian faces is bound to be treated as an invasion thanks to complete indoctrination from cradle to grave. And remember that they think they are personally well off compared to us. So we need to invade to get what they have and we don't.

That leaves China and South Korea.

Will South Korea upset China? No way.

China will ensure perpetuation of the current structures with greater dependance on China- it drains US recources and it does the same to Sth Korea ( a commercial competitor) ; and most importantly it reminds the world that China is the rising boss.

So whilst the US should be castigated for not having a post Kim strategy, to assume that the US is the major player assumes that China and the Nth Koreans care.

 

SUNGYOONLEE

10:30 AM ET

February 18, 2010

Post-Kim Jong Il world

Thank you for your comments and criticism. It is indeed presumptuous of me to state what the US "should" do, etc. in the event of a regime collapse. Should the US be content with a northern Korea dominated by China, so be it. But, if not, it would be best to make both short and long term plans on quid pro quo with China. Such give-and-take negotiations will take place when "events" take over, as in 1945 with the Soviet Union. And in the past, US "abandonment" of Korea have led to events that have called for US reentry into the region, at considerable cost.

I am not arguing that Kim's death would certainly lead to regime collapse. I admit that North Korea's political system has proven far more stable than its economic system, and a smooth transition of power is surely a possibility. The current stakeholders in the system will seek to retain their privileged status under the next leader. That's why finding allies within the current system is so crucial. In this regard, China enjoys a tremendous advantage over the US, with its personal ties to North Koreans in high positions.

At the same time, in view of the inherent challenges to hereditary regime preservation (the three-generation rule on both the dissipation of individual family wealth and dissolution of dynasties come to mind), the grinding poverty and hunger pervasive throughout North Korea and that universal impulse toward material comfort and wealth (ie, South Korea), a regime collapse in the wake of Kim's demise is a plausible scenario. And it is the duty of any government--both civilian and military--to be prepared.

All this is, needless to say, very different from preparing for a possible "collapse" of Japan or the US. North Korea is an unstable system dependent on foreign aid, lying right next to a far more attractive system composed of people of the same ethnic stock, to which nearly 20,000 have already fled at great personal risk and cost.

 

JOHNM

2:32 AM ET

February 19, 2010

Question to SUNG-YOON LEE

Dear Professor Lee:
If planning for a Post-Kim Jong Il world means getting to work as soon as possible on helping the N. Korean people achieve a better life, shouldn't one of the first steps be the removal of a half-decade of debilitating economic and financial sanctions? As most of these sanctions are US unilateral or US-enforced or driven multilateral sanctions, shouldn't US planning involve a rapid drawdown of polices that block aid, investment and N. Korea's development of a normal trading economy? The success story of S. Korea and other East Asian tigers is well known. Unlike these countries, the only E. Asia country that has been denied access to international commerce and finance is N. Korea.
As you say, a "moral imperative" is involved. Oddly, you neglect to mention that a part of that imperative is to give the people of N. Korea the sanctions-free external economic freedom enjoyed by most of the rest of Asia.

 

JOHNM

12:46 AM ET

February 25, 2010

Still waiting for a reply from SUNG-YOON LEE

Professor Lee recently took the time to write a message of thanks to an anti-North Korea website for linking to his articles at Foreign Policy. Does he plan to make any time to respond to critical comments on his article above?

 

SUNGYOONLEE

8:43 AM ET

February 26, 2010

Target Pyongyang's Palace Economy

Thank you for your patience. I've not been checking this comments section, assuming there would be no new ones after the first day or two.

As for the impact of sanctions on the North Korean regime, as apart from the North Korean people, may I recommend a short piece I wrote for another publication under the title above. The regime is vulnerable to sanctions because it's so heavily reliant on the generation of funds from illicit activities. And the reason the public has been suffering for so long is not due to external sanctions but the domestic politics of discriminatory distribution of food and goods and the gross misallocation of funds toward the military and cult worship. Further, to call off UN sanctions (UNSC Resolutions 1718 & 1874) passed in the wake of North Korea's nuclear tests, which target the regime and not not the people, is to call into question the raison d'etre of the UN itself. I recommend Stephan Haggard & Marcus Noland, FAMINE IN NORTH KOREA.

It's important to draw a distinction between the North Korean regime and the people. The "anti-North Korea site" you mentioned, One Free Korea, is the most informed, analytical, and compassionate "pro-North Korea" site in the world. Joshua Stanton, a brilliant North Korea observer, has done ground-breaking work on the unconscionable crimes committed by the North Korean regime oagaint its people. Stanton's work on the political prisoner concentration camps has been featured on the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal, among others. I heartily recommend One Free Korea to all readers.

I thanked Mr. Stanton for linking a CNN Int'l AMANPOUR podcast (Feb 22), on which I address some of the points raised in this FP article.

 

JOSHUA STANTON

7:18 PM ET

February 26, 2010

Don't forget the yachts, John -- every starving kid needs one.

Since the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874 last year -- 1874 is the first international sanctions resolution against North Korea that's been seriously enforced -- various nations have intercepted no North Korean purchases of corn, rice, or infant formula, but they did prevent Kim Jong Il from importing a couple of sweet Azimut Benetti yachts and 420 bottles of expensive Italian booze. Shortly before the sanctions were passed, he was able to import at least five $80,000 luxury sedans.

Since the passage of UNSCR 1874, various nations have also intercepted North Korean exports of man-portable surface-to-air missiles and rocket-propelled grenades on their way to Tehran, and most recently, tank parts to the Congo.

Given that UNSCR 1874 specifically exempts "humanitarian and developmental purposes directly addressing the needs of the civilian population," John, you're either trying to mislead someone or just aren't very well informed. I'll be charitable and presume the latter.

 

JOHNM

9:17 AM ET

March 1, 2010

Reply to SUNG-YOONLEE / N. Korea's economy

Thank you for your reply.
A few comments:
1. "The regime is vulnerable to sanctions because it's so heavily reliant on the generation of funds from illicit activities." Are you referring to the BDA case (mentioned in your July 20, 2009 FEER piece), which involved US Treasury Dept. allegations of money laundering and counterfeiting? If yes, please tell me where N. Korea's illicit activities tied to BDA have been documented (nothing cited in your FEER piece and nothing is publicly available from Treasury or its FinCEN subunit). If you have something other than BDA in mind please explain, including 1 or 2 sources of evidence of illicit gains and, if possible, the actual or estimated amounts.
2. "the public has been suffering for so long is not due to external sanctions but the domestic politics of discriminatory distribution of food and goods and the gross misallocation of funds toward the military and cult worship"
I mentioned "US unilateral or US-enforced or driven multilateral sanctions," such as:
-- Export Administration Regulations (EAR), Executive Order 13222, the Export Administration Act
-- Foreign Assets Control Regulations
-- International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)
-- Executive Order 13466
-- Trading with the Enemy Act
-- Section 40 (Transactions with Countries Supporting Acts of International Terrorism) and Section 40A30 (“not fully cooperating”) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA)
-- North Korea Nonproliferation Act (2006)
-- Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act
-- Section 620 (Prohibitions Against Further Assistance) and Section 607 (Prohibition Against Direct Funding for Certain Countries) of the Foreign Assistance Act
-- Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (1996)
-- Patriot Act financial sanctions,
which together represent a thicket of barriers that makes it difficult for N. Korea to conduct normal trade and commerce with the US and other major economies around the world or receive funding assistance from international aid organizations, such as the IMF, whose aid funding decisions can be vetoed by the US.
We know from Edward Miller's recent excellent book Bankrupting the Enemy that Treasury that the Federal Reserve and other US agencies did detail analysis, starting in the 1920s, of Japan's ability to pay its way in the world and manage a viable economy. There's a long history in Washington of sophisticated financial/economic analysis of states under stress or duress. We know today, based on a GAO report, that Treasury is maintaining intelligence on the economic impact of modern day sanctions, but we don't know the content of that intelligence.
Shouldn't we be curious about the impact of these sanctions, along with UN sanctions, on the welfare of 23 million N. Koreans, on their ability to work for a living and survive when their country is essentially cut off from the global economy? We also know reasonably well that N. Koreans are having a tough time trying to live on handouts (if they can get them) from Pyongyang or international aid agencies.
3. "unconscionable crimes committed by the North Korean regime against its people."
Shouldn't we try to quantify whether the unilateral and multilateral sanctions mentioned above compound the already seriously troubled N. Korean economy and make it that much harder for people to scrape by? And if that's the case, is that too unconscionable?

 

JOHNM

9:35 AM ET

March 1, 2010

Reply to Josh Stanton

On the extent of sanctions against N. Korea please read my initial message more carefully and also point #2 of my March 1 reply to Professor Lee.

As to your joke about starving N. Korean kids, question: Do UN aid agencies like the WFP say that the "humanitarian . . . needs of the [N. Korean] civilian population" are being met? Quite the opposite last time I checked, despite official appeals to the international community.

 

JOSHUA STANTON

9:03 PM ET

March 1, 2010

No, because North Korea itself excludes humanitarian aid

"Needs being met?" I guess not, if I'm limited to responding according to your deceptive passive-voice phrasing. But their needs are not being met *because*Kim Jong Il severely restricts the distribution of World Food Program aid, and because last year, he kicked out American food aid workers and canceled an agreement with the U.S. government that would have delivered 500,000 tons of food to hungry North Koreans.

Did I mention that America has been North Korea's largest food aid donor since the onset of the food crisis, the regime's acceptance permitting?

 

JOHNM

4:04 AM ET

March 3, 2010

Reply #2 to Joshua Stanton

Thank you for your continued comments.
1. "But their needs are not being met *because*Kim Jong Il severely restricts the distribution of World Food Program aid"
The current World Food Programme (WFP) statement on N. Korea has a different reason for restricted distribution:
N. Korea "continues to suffer widespread food shortages due to economic problems, limited arable land, lack of agricultural machinery and energy shortages."
"In response to a government request for relief assistance and confirmed new food needs, WFP launched an emergency operation in September 2008. The US$504 million operation set out to target 6.2 million of the most vulnerable groups, mainly young children, pregnant and lactating women and the elderly, addressing immediate humanitarian needs of the population while simultaneously improving the nutritional quality over the medium-term."
"Due to the low levels of resources received for the emergency operation, WFP was requested by the DPRK Government to reduce the humanitarian food programme and adjust the operating conditions agreed to in a Letter of Understanding concluded with the DPRK government in June 2008. Starting in June 2009, WFP is therefore refocusing its programme in 62 counties in six provinces instead of the 131 counties (eight provinces) originally targeted under the emergency operation."
"Despite the reduced programme, WFP continues the important work in DPRK and will work closely with the DPRK Government to guarantee that food assistance still reaches many of the hungriest and most vulnerable North Koreans. The long-standing principle of 'no access-no food' will still be strictly enforced."
(http://www.wfp.org/countries/korea-democratic-peoples-republic-dprk)
Also, U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe recently told CNN's Christiane Amanpour: "Our problem is we don't have enough money coming in now to sustain some of those programs. ... But the truth of the matter is, we need to do more because these are people" and "Our people believe they have a very clear idea of who's using the food, where it's going, and it's really for the good of the people who need it most."
(http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2010/02/23/u-n-official-north-korea-should-get-food-aid/)
What do you know about the WFP work's in N. Korea the WFP or UN officials are not telling us?
Meanwhile, the work of United Nations Children's Fund continues. At one point this agency was quite worried about sanctions disrupting aid to N. Korea. (http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/korea_36275.html)
2. "[Kim Jong Il] kicked out American food aid workers and canceled an agreement with the U.S. government that would have delivered 500,000 tons of food to hungry North Koreans."
The 5-NGO consortium delivered some 70% of their allotment of 100,000 metric tonnes of food aid (out of a total of 500,000 m. tonnes) before program was terminated.
A US-N. Korea agreement that included terms of distribution was announced in May 2008. Unless there's an explanation somewhere I've missed, questions remain about why the agreement broke down in March 2009.
According to the March 17, 2009 Financial Times "a senior US official said the WFP had only been permitted to include three Korean speakers in its 59-member team even though the agreement called for numbers to be unlimited. North Korea rejected a US proposal to allow 12 Korean speakers to join the WFP mission. He added that Pyongyang had also blocked random checks on several occasions, which contravened the terms of the agreement." However, on the same day, the US State Department said in its daily press briefing that it didn't have any information on a N. Korean violation of the agreement. I don't see anything in the public record on the agreed number of Korean speakers. As for US concerns about a check or assessment not up to March 08 agreement standards, more info. is needed. Note that the FAO/WFP released a crop and food security assessment in the latter half of 2008. Also, I know that at least one of the 5 NGOs was quite happy with the terms of distribution up to March 2009.
3. "America has been North Korea's largest food aid donor since the onset of the food crisis."
Through WFP, yes? Congressional Research Service reports mention the possibility of greater amounts of aid from China and, in US low or zero-aid years, from S. Korea.
4. Professor Lee: Any idea of whether he plans to return?

 

UDDANB

10:57 AM ET

February 18, 2010

NK will look more like Burma than anything else

The first factor to consider is how long the current Kim lives. Hanging on another 15 or 20 years, impossible as that sounds given his current health, means that his son has enough time to buid his own power base, and things could possibly continue as they have been.

But if Kim dies soon, NK's generals are faced with a dilemma. Do they bow to the kid Kim, risking a purge of their ranks but (possibly) ensuring the regime remains stable? Or do they just laugh and shoot him and his brothers the day of the elder Kim's funeral, establishing a Burma-like council of generals regime? The latter has more risks than you might think- there is always the danger that a move away from the Kim name is all it will take to cause total collapse.

Even a Burma-type system would be an improvement (Burma is pretty closed off but its not COMPLETELY terra incognita, unlike NK), and maybe that could eventually lead to something better. But I think its the best we can hope for, although the author is correct that we should plan for collapse.

 

JAYDEE001

12:00 PM ET

February 18, 2010

That is a very large presumption...

"But reorienting North Korean society and culture toward a lifestyle marked by individual freedom and capitalism will take decades and require the sustained help of various international organizations and financial institutions. That means continued U.S. commitment to Korea and U.S. leadership in maintaining stability in the region, even in the face of mounting domestic and international pressure to withdraw or redeploy U.S. troops."

Right there is the sticky wicket. Why should it always be the USA that has to put its military and its national treasury on the front lines? You make the same mistake that so many neo-cons have make in continuing to assume in American Exceptionalism, and that the US will have the will, and the unlimited treasury to support any and all foreign adventures that may be justified by an expanded view of our national security interests.

South Korea has been a stable political and economic entity for decades, with a formidable military fully capable of defending its own borders. The presence of American troops in that country almost 6 decades after the Korean civil war ended in 1953, and after the myth of a unified international communism was shattered shows only the lack of vision of our political leaders.

When and if North Korea implodes, it would seem that it would be a problem for the Koreans themselves to solve, perhaps with the nations immediately in the region - China and Japan. Maybe we can supply some aid - food and medicines, etc. It may be of academic interest to watch the gradual dissolution (or sudden collapse) of the corrupt North Korean regime, but such an event does not automatically call for US intervention, let alone the long-term occupation of that nation that you seem to assume would be in the US interests. The deaths of 54,246 Americans and 103,284 wounded, plus over 8,000 MIAs show that we as a country have already paid a significant price to ensure South Korea's independence. Why should we sacrifice more to remedy the failure of the North?

 

SCOTT MONJE

4:37 PM ET

February 18, 2010

Reinvention vs. Abandonment vs. ???

I, for one, never meant to suggest that Korea should be abandoned or that no one should prepare for contingencies, but any unilateral US attempt to occupy North Korea and make it over in our own image is likely to be viewed by the Chinese as a hostile act. It would surely have major implications for relations with China and probably for relations with South Korea and Japan as well. A plan that assumed such an operation would be comparable to the occupation of Japan, I fear, would lead to further problems down the road. Any planning should take those circumstances into account.

 

ELI

7:22 PM ET

March 9, 2010

Life After Kim? Who cares

Does anyone care "Life After Kim"? As one commented, no matter what happens with the power structure in N. Korea after he eventually passes it is unlikely that the next person to take charge will be quite as much of a little tyrant as this guy has been. Completely agreed. That's how N.Korea rules for next many more years. Find more
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