Think Again: China's Military

It's not time to panic. Yet.

BY DREW THOMPSON | MARCH/APRIL 2010

"China's Military Is a Growing Threat."

Not yet. After two decades of massive military spending to modernize its armed forces, amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars, China increasingly has the ability to challenge the United States in its region, if not yet outside it. But the ability to project force tells us very little about China's willingness to use it.

Certainly, China has made moves over the last few years that have stoked the China-is-a-dangerous-threat crowd in Washington. In 2007, for instance, Beijing launched a missile that obliterated a communications satellite -- a dramatic and unexpected display of capability -- and then kept mum for 12 days before a Foreign Ministry spokesperson finally admitted it took place, stating: "This test was not directed at any country and does not constitute a threat to any country." In May 2008, satellite imagery revealed that China had constructed a massive subterranean naval base on the southern island of Hainan, presumably a staging point to launch naval operations into the Pacific. This January, China conducted another anti-missile test, shortly after the United States announced arms sales to Taiwan.

Similar developments have reliably shown up in annual Pentagon reports on China's military expansion, not to mention in articles such as Robert Kaplan's alarmist 2005 essay: "How We Would Fight China." Even Robert Gates, the mild-mannered U.S. defense secretary, warned last year that China's military modernization "could threaten America's primary means of projecting power and helping allies in the Pacific: our bases, air and sea assets, and the networks that support them." Last fall, Adm. Robert Willard, the new head of the U.S. Pacific Command, noted that "in the past decade or so, China has exceeded most of our intelligence estimates of their military capability," implying that maybe the alarmists are onto something.

At the same time, China's leaders vehemently denounce any suggestion that they are embarked on anything other than what they have referred to as a "peaceful rise" and haven't engaged in major external hostilities since the 1979 war with Vietnam. But they also don't explain why they are investing so heavily in this new arms race. Beijing's official line is that it wants to be able to defend itself against foreign aggression and catch up with the West, as it was famously unable to do in the 19th century.

When the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping began the process of reform and opening in 1979, he decided that bolstering the civilian economy would take precedence over military investments. But a dozen years later, the first Gulf War served as a wake-up call in Beijing, raising concerns about how quickly an inferior army could be demolished by better-equipped Western forces. In 1991, the Pentagon unleashed some of its most advanced weapons -- including stealth technology and precision-guided munitions -- against the Iraqi Army, the world's fourth largest at the time. U.S. and allied forces made short work of Iraq's Warsaw Pact military hardware, and the Chinese were duly shocked and awed.

It became immediately clear that Mao Zedong's doctrine of "human wave attacks" -- having more soldiers than your enemy has bullets -- would not meet China's defense needs in the 21st century. From the early 1990s, China's defense planners began intensively studying doctrine and sought to acquire superior foreign technologies for their People's Liberation Army (PLA). They also made a major strategic shift by cutting the size of their force to emphasize new technologies that would enable them to catch up with the United States and other possible foes.

Should the rest of the world be worried? Taiwan, long claimed as Chinese territory and well within range of Chinese ballistic missiles and conventional forces, certainly has cause to feel threatened. Even as cross-strait relations have warmed in recent years, Beijing has positioned more medium-range missiles facing Taiwan than ever. When asked why, Beijing demurs. India, Asia's other would-be superpower, also seems increasingly on edge. Last September, Indian analysts and media loudly worried over the publication of an article by Chinese analyst Li Qiulin in a prominent Communist Party organ that urged the PLA to bolster its ability to project force in South Asia.

But it's probably too soon for Americans to panic. Many experts who've looked closely at the matter agree that China today simply does not have the military capability to challenge the United States in the Pacific, though its modernization program has increased its ability to engage the United States close to Chinese shores. And the U.S. military is still, for all its troubles in Iraq and Afghanistan, the most capable fighting force on the planet. 

STR/AFP/Getty Images

 

Drew Thompson is director of China studies and Starr senior fellow at the Nixon Center.

GRANT

2:25 AM ET

February 22, 2010

As a minor note, the exact

As a minor note, the exact amounts of defense spending spent by a nation don't matter. It's what percentage of the GDP the defense spending makes up that matters. For the U.S, it currently makes up about 3%-4% I think, a percent or two above the global norm.

 

KRYPTER

11:27 AM ET

February 22, 2010

China's defence dollars

It always amazes me when otherwise-sophisticated defence commentators reduce defence expenditure comparisons to straight nominal currency-exchange values without taking purchasing power into account. China's defence spending may be "only" $150B but China doesn't pay its soldiers $40,000-$80,000 per year. Nor do they pay their contractors, food & weapon suppliers or technicians the huge (often inflated) amounts paid by the Pentagon. Producing the simpler defence items such as APCs, food supplies, ammunition, etc. in China is vastly cheaper and the results are almost the same, if not equal.

So if you're comparing defence expenditures by PPP, a factor of at least 2.5 should be applied. Thus China's actual PPP-adjusted defence budget would be $450B, not too far off the American number, and growing much faster.

 

TYPO

10:07 AM ET

March 1, 2010

How the hell did you get the

How the hell did you get the figure for triple the highest estimate for China's defense budget by arbitarily multiplying 2.5? This post is almost balantly Sinophobic.

 

TYPO

10:14 AM ET

March 1, 2010

Where does the 150billion

Where does the 150billion base spending even come from?

 

KRYPTER

12:09 PM ET

March 2, 2010

A PPP inflator factor of 2 to

A PPP inflator factor of 2 to 4 for China has been common in the economic literature for the last several years, as can be seen in the World Bank's ICP database, the CIA factbook and at the EIU. I simply chose one number from that range, 2.5 being a number I had calculated a while back from GDP data. See here: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/ICPEXT/0,,contentMDK:22438220~menuPK:6748067~pagePK:60002244~piPK:62002388~theSitePK:270065,00.html

The $150b comes from the upper bound of a range given in this article and in the US military report on China. Given that a huge number of military assets and programs such as the space program (run by the military), foreign hardware purchases, pension and heath care costs for soldiers, etc. are outside of the Chinese defence budget, it's not farfetched to assume the worst.

Your last comment has neither fact nor reason behind it and deserves no response.

 

KRYPTER

12:18 PM ET

March 2, 2010

To Freeda2

1. A lot of the foreign hardware purchases of the PLA are made from hard currency reserves in supplemental budgets and hence aren't part of the core military budget as published by the CCP.

2. The deals usually involve production in China, paid in local currency and hence much being much cheaper per marginal unit to produce. The initial upfront cost may be at exchange rates, but each marginal production unit will be at local PPP. In a war with China it's only the marginal cost that will matter.

3. Most of those Russian purchases were made in the 1990s, when China needed foreign tech. They have now mastered most of it and can produce it on their own without Russian help. Only a few pieces of the puzzle remain until China is a full-spectrum power and then the foreign purchases will be finished.

4. Foreign purchases accounted for only a tiny sliver of Chinese military expenses. So if you're calculating a total budget only a tiny fraction would be at market exchange rates, the rest would be PPP.

However, in general your point is valid...until the Chinese stop buying foreign.

 

CKWEBBIT

3:59 PM ET

March 9, 2010

Questionable

Its always nice to hear people simply pulling out random numbers off the top of their heads to prove a point: It tells me that no sense was made and to skip to the next comment

 

RAIDER_101

5:43 PM ET

February 23, 2010

Mao's strategy outdated?

"Mao Zedong's doctrine of "human wave attacks" -- having more soldiers than your enemy has bullets -- would not meet China's defense needs in the 21st century."

Way to simplify PLA and Mao...US Army Center for Military History would disagree.

First of all, "human wave attack", in the words of Colonel Roy Appleman of the US Army Historical Detachment, is a "myth". Second of all, PLA rush machine gun nests in waves only when intels are bad or the enemy had already disintergerated. Thrid of all, when Mao said "man over weapon", he meant endurance of the soldiers can overcome PLA deficiencies in mobility, logistics and firepower, not that PLA grunts should be shot in a line. Finally, Mao never thought of the idea of "human wave attacks", his idea is the "mobile warefare", in which the PLA to infiltrate the gaps of the enemy formations and then elinmate them piecemeal.

Just because PLA abondoned the Maoist thinking of "man over weapon" and started to improve mobility, logistics and firepower, don't just assume he has no influnce in modern PLA thinking. On the individual level, the Maoist focus on endurance still makes regular PLA infantry a lot lighter than the US counterpart. On a tactical level, PLA still uses the maneuver smiliar to the concept of "mobile warefare". Finally, Mao's work on "protracted war" is still one of the best works on insurgency and asymmetric warfare. PLA maybe broke free from the the Maoist political dogma, but Mao's influence on Chinese warfighting is not something to be discounted.

 

JOSHUASHJD

9:02 AM ET

March 1, 2010

just some replensh

you have some very closed ideas,in fact,I am a chinese,18,freshman in shanghai.I just want to point out that the origin idea about tactic is a ancient man in chinese history,called sun zi.he wrote a book,sun zi art of war.almost all the stangpoint of mao theory is from there.What's more, can you tell me some famous and objective,that is impartial web site americans often visits,thanks a lot.

 

TYRTAIOS

4:50 PM ET

March 16, 2010

Maybe?

Though dated, at the urging of their Chinese advisors, the Viet Minh under Ho Chi Minh (Uncle Ho to me) and Gen. Giap, launched human wave attacks against French positions early on in the First Indo China War, but soon realized how mindless and counter-productive they were - they fired their Chinese fellow revolutionaries.

In addition, if you are interested and have the time, delve into the teachings of Sun Tzu; see how they correspond to Taoist teaching. I think you'll find a dichotomy there. : )

 

PETER1998

8:20 PM ET

February 23, 2010

we need right and correct chinese policy

the paper is one of best chinese policy assays. i agree with most of it. however, the "human wave attack" is major misunderstand of mao's strategy and reflects a negative view of chinese and china as whole. sunzi said, if you want to win your enemy, you have to understand it first, and understand yourself as well. the so called "human wave attack" is actually "people's war" and it has profound meanings in warfare. it is this factor, people, that this paper is failed to address.

 

TYRTAIOS

5:20 PM ET

March 16, 2010

Keeping it perspective

Umm, the paper did touch on the people: the young have a traditional obligation to support their elders - a Taoist conscept which if you look into it clashes with some of what the old general, Sun Tzu put forward - "The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger."

Sounds controversial, since Beijing has decided on an enlistement policy that bleads-out experience every two years, in the old Soviet model, which impacts readiness and developing a professional NCO corps.

Anecdottaly, the statement that China has only a handful of PLA personnel stationed abroad in embassies, on fellowships, and in U.N. peacekeeping operations isn't quite accurate, though I understand the context it's meant to convey.

In Africa, I personally ran into more than one or two Chinese PLA that were wearing civilian clothing - of course, as was also pointed out, some in the PLA also fulfill contractor work - these guys were not. : |

 

PETER1998

8:20 PM ET

February 23, 2010

we need right and correct chinese policy

the paper is one of best chinese policy assays. i agree with most of it. however, the "human wave attack" is major misunderstand of mao's strategy and reflects a negative view of chinese and china as whole. sunzi said, if you want to win your enemy, you have to understand it first, and understand yourself as well. the so called "human wave attack" is actually "people's war" and it has profound meanings in warfare. it is this factor, people, that this paper is failed to address.

 

AHENEEN

10:42 PM ET

February 23, 2010

"Official Chinese military

"Official Chinese military writings now pay increasing attention to a greater range of military missions, focusing not only on China's territorial integrity, but on its global interests. From oil rigs in Nigeria to a crude-oil pipeline under construction that will connect Yunnan's capital city to Burma's port of Sittwe on the Bay of Bengal, Beijing thinks it must be able to defend its people, infrastructure, and investments in some of the world's most volatile places -- much as the British did in the 1800s."

This is certainly something which is overlooked. China's investment in rogue and/or volatile states (especially in Africa) is significant in some of Africa's most feeble states (Chad, CAR, both Congos) and most notorious dictatorships (Sudan, Angola). China is building billions of dollars of infrastructure and supplies arms in exchange for (considered a 'loan' in exchange for) an equal amount of minerals and metals in return. What would China's response be when a coup occurs and the new leader(s) (resenting China's support of the previous regime) cease to let China or Chinese companies mine for free or confiscate the mining operations of Chinese companies? Could China's military intervene in a Desert Storm-like manner? What lengths will China go to in supporting friendly regimes in countries rich in natural resources?

 

GRANT

10:39 PM ET

February 24, 2010

The coup leaders these days

The coup leaders these days are most likely to be soldiers eager to experience the good life of their predecessors. The ethnic conflicts rarely are able to result in successful coups, and the ideological insurgencies of the Cold War are simply gone. Most leaders are interested in nihilistic power these days*. In all likelihood the coup leaders wouldn't be a threat to Chinese interests, it would be local riots and terrorist groups holding workers hostage.

* I couldn't stand those leaders either, but at least they had a cause.

 

NORBOOSE

8:13 PM ET

February 28, 2010

Mass Armies are no threat to us

We will never fight China in a massive ground war. We both have apocalyptic WMD arsenals. The masses of tanks and mediocre infantry are more of an internal police force and a threat against neighbors. Our concerns should be the deterence forces (WMD's), any developments of a smaller, more efficient fighting force (Something roughly equivalent to US soldiers and special forces) and force projectors (Warships, long range airplanes) The deterence related forces are the only ones that would come into play if we ever fought China. A smaller more efficient branch in the Chinese military along with the force projectors would be an indirect threat to us, being easily deployable to conflict zones to promote Chinese interests, probably against ours. The huge numbers of AK wielding grunts arent equipped or trained to deal with any opponent tougher than unarmed monks.

 

TYRTAIOS

5:56 PM ET

March 16, 2010

You are correct and the

You are correct and the Chinese are addressing their blue water force projection capability which includes naval air cover - can you say amphibious?

They like us, understand any clash will come in the littorals - those common areas that we both deem strategically economic to them. We certainly will never fight another land-locked war in Asia . . . would we? : )

 

AMERICAN DREAMER

10:32 PM ET

February 28, 2010

Drew Thompson's Hypocrisy is amazing.

...So the US can invade, ILLEGALLY, whatever country it so desires (Iraq 2003, on fake intelligence), and it's leaders face NO consequences...

And yet Drew Thompson speculates on China's military when China has economic interests (ports, shipping lanes, investments) in other countries...

China has the right to defend itself and the right to NOT relinquish its defence to ANOTHER country (such as the US)!!

Why is FP so hypocritical??

Why is the US so hypocritical??

 

FREETRADER

12:55 AM ET

March 2, 2010

What the Hell are you talking about?

There is nothing in the article, or in FP more generally, that asserts that China does not have its own interests ot that it has the right to have a military to protect those interests. Maybe you should stop dreaming and actually read an article once in awhile.

 

KIYAE

1:44 PM ET

March 1, 2010

Cyber Warfare

This doesn't cover the issue of cyber warfare at all. There have been several cyber attacks from somewhere or someone in China (probably the PLA) against the United States, including some government websites. The pentagon even admits that the US is most vulnerable in its cyber-defense.

This article would have been better if it had engaged that issue.

 

CKWEBBIT

4:14 PM ET

March 9, 2010

cyberwarefare

Americans are too self-centered. They think that when in their country they paint China as a "evil doer" and treat them with insincerity and suspicion, that Chinese people actually think the same way back to Americans. I am sure this is true for some minority, but that is just as there are so many Swift Boaters and Birthers in the US.

Look, I am sure some of you are in their 30s and had been at the forefront of IT when internet first came out. Everyone just wants to kick the baddest boys in the yard when they hack. People in the US used to try to hack into their own military. wherever I am from, Nigeria, Chile, New Zealand, Turkey, Phillipines, if I was a hacker trying to make a name for myself or if I just got pissed off at some US news, I'd probably hack a US server too.

Don't contribute to the fundamental attribution error.

BTW, everybody who wants good resources to play probably needs some government connection. Doesn't mean the government is driving the decision. Just means that the kid's got means. Remember that Taiwanese US Nuclear scientist who's account was used unauthorized by family members? Thye thought it was some Chinese spy story. Didn't it ended up just kids playing around with dad's account?

Regardless if that's true, you know the drill - innocent until proven guilty, an american way.

 

OSKAR

6:06 AM ET

March 2, 2010

China & Aggression

With US Forces stationed in Korea, Japan, Guam, and Afghanistan, with massive weapons support of Taiwan, with globally projected and operating US naval forces it is China who should feel threatened.

And it is not that the US is a benevolent global operator, for most countries in the world, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was an act of unprovoked aggression based on lies. With the US Air Force controlling the skies of Iraq from the first Golf war up to the 2003 invasion (remember the "no-fly zones!), Hussein was never a threat to the USA.

China has shown considerable restraint in its activities outside of the mainland, centering almost exclusively on economic matters. With a rapidly growing wealthy middle class China will be reluctant to embark on any aggressive "foreign adventure". Wish that could be said of the USA.

By the way, I am a 20 year veteran of the "Cold War", which I supported vigorously.

 

FG42

9:41 AM ET

March 3, 2010

self-fulfilling prophecy

About 15 years ago, I attended a summer course put on by the National Defense University for reserve officers. One session was about national strategy, and I clearly remember the faculty member (defense intellectual?) saying that the two greatest strategic threats to the US in the foreseeable future were Mexico and China. Mexico because of drugs and uncontrolled cross-border immigration. China because, obviously, it was big and growing in power. It occurred to me then, and it seems clear now, that the Pentagon needs a major enemy. It was the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and post-Cold War it had to be China, as the National Defense University predicted 15 years ago, before China even began its spectacular economic growth. So even if China's military growth were natural for a big country, and even if its strategic concerns were focused on its own borders, we will see them as enemies. And that will cause actions and reactions which will only reinforce that perception. It's a self-fulfilling prophecy, and one can only hope that it doesn't lead inexorably to conflict.

 

MIKE SACRAMENTO

2:07 PM ET

March 3, 2010

Bogeyman

The United States has engaged in a string of attacks on foreign nations massacring millions of innocent civilians in its wake. That any country in the world, including China, should develop an adequate capability to ensure the United States does not invade, should come as no surprise. If a Chinese military buildup is a cause for alarm, the United States military buildup should have thrown a person into paroxysms of paranoia.

 

PTIGER2003

5:39 PM ET

March 3, 2010

intentions

Threats are a function of both capabilities and intentions, and Thompson does well to provide a snapshot of the former. But unless you're a committed offensive realist, it's difficult to infer the latter simply from an account of China's military modernization. Thompson is correct to argue that capabilities do not necessarily tell us much about "China's willingness to use" its newfound and still developing military assets. What we need is rather an account of the circumstances under which China might be tempted to use force: when, where, how, and so on.

Take the question of Taiwan as an example. Under what conditions might China actually use the missiles and other offensive capabilities against the island? For now, as Thompson notes, this seems a remote possibility, given the thaw in relations between Beijing and Taipei. But what triggers might lead to a breakdown - not just to another display of force, as we witnessed in 1995-6, but to actual hostilities. What would have to happen either within China's domestic politics, or as a response to something Taiwan has done, to precipitate such an outcome?

From Thompson's analysis, we can't even lay out the scenarios under which an aggressive China, i.e. a China that not only has, but also uses, force, is not answerable. Arguments about the circumstances which may trigger the use of force, whether it is now or in 15 years, are important both from the point of view of preparing to counter it, and from the perspective of how such an eventuality might be avoided. So instead of bracketing the question of China's intentions, we need to explore what they may be and how they may evolve.

This preoccupation with capabilities is not limited to this particular article. Quite a bit of the conversation in Washington is based on the presumption that we simply don't know what China will do, and so we need to prepare for all outcomes. The catchphrase now is "strategic hedging," in which we both engage and find ways to contain a growing China, with its still-unknown military aspirations. But this prescription can and should be filled out with greater detail about how we should hedge; how to skillfully prepare for the possible Chinese use of force without creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.

 

THEBLUEAMERICAN

6:49 PM ET

March 3, 2010

I'm no expert but

I just saw a post in the blog "The Daily Dish" where American soldiers are guarding a mine owned by the Chinese in Afghanistan. Same with Chinese owned oil fields in Iraq. Maybe the Chinese military is not a strong adversary against the US military yet but combined with all the money we owe China I don't feel good about our long term prospects. I'm still trying to figure out why we borrowed money from China to fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Are the Chinese going to lend us money when we try to protect Taiwan from China?

 

CKWEBBIT

4:18 PM ET

March 9, 2010

Moot

why you gotta protect taiwan?

Should Britain have send troops to Robert E Lee?

 

THEBLUEAMERICAN

6:49 PM ET

March 3, 2010

I'm no expert but

I just saw a post in the blog "The Daily Dish" where American soldiers are guarding a mine owned by the Chinese in Afghanistan. Same with Chinese owned oil fields in Iraq. Maybe the Chinese military is not a strong adversary against the US military yet but combined with all the money we owe China I don't feel good about our long term prospects. I'm still trying to figure out why we borrowed money from China to fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Are the Chinese going to lend us money when we try to protect Taiwan from China?

 

FREETRADER

10:24 PM ET

March 3, 2010

You raise an interesting point...

It would be China, not the US, that has problems if they go to war with us over Taiwan. The US government could, for example, simply appropriate the debt the Chinese hold. The PRC are much more at risk than the US by holding so much US government debt.

 

TYRTAIOS

5:00 PM ET

March 16, 2010

What, Me Worry? : )

Don't worry about our treasury debt held by the Chinese. Be concerned with Beijing's vast Sovereign Wealth Fund that buys into U.S. corporations with little transparency.

 

CKWEBBIT

4:22 PM ET

March 9, 2010

What the

Hey, I agree with the view that "Pentagon gotta find enemies"

Its like your finance department's gotta tell you they got too much work and need headcount.
Then the sale department says "man, we are generating more revenue but we need more salesmen"
then the accountants says "all these people are gonna commit fruad unless u gimme more accountants for control purposes"

some people just like to think that everyone is gearing up against them. Others try to profit from it.

 

BETALOVER

4:54 PM ET

March 25, 2010

If US policymakers really do

If US policymakers really do not understand Chinese military behavior and intent, Reagan would be turning in agony in his grave. It seems that many have to ask for the whereabouts of the elephant is in the room for political correctness. Obviously, this is a trans-Pacific idea of "peace through strength" that is working well for the Chinese.

First, Chinese military objective is not restricted to Taiwan. This should be obvious as China is such a large country and has many abutting countries of various possible designs. Taiwan, Taiwan and Taiwan; many people are just blind to the fact that Taiwan is only 1.5% of the Chinese population, and 1/200th of the landmass of China, politics or no politics. China has a totally legit reason to have a large military, diplomatically considered, even as a cordial trade partner. There is nothing reproachable for even a friendy trade partner to spend 2-3% of GNP on defense. I hate to be the US diplomat that suggests to China it has too large a military. It can be that trite charge of lack of transparency. What if China is more transparent and spends only twice as much as it declares, still 100% kosher diplomatically. The US wants genuine transparency from the Chinese and she gets it, so what?

Second, Taiwan is going to be another Hong Kong. The island’s fate is already sealed. The fact is that Taiwan is an island without energy source just 90 miles from the Chinese mainland. The mainland will one day be able to simply control the Taiwan economy (or economic climate for a long duration) with only very limited force, but with enormous standby to stymie any military resistance from Taiwan. All weapons bought from the US will be useless and will not be used. In order for the US to interfere, it has to virtually START a war that actually causes calamity to Taiwan. I don’t see this happening. Taiwan will not want the US to interfere but will want to accept a Hong Kong deal, which will not be bad for the island in sum total.

May be by 2040, the mainland would virtually target oil tankers leaving Taiwan. I doubt if the mainland would really have to fire a single shot to compel Taiwan to negotiate for a Hong Kong deal, or just a few shots. Threat without execution will work for the Chinese mainland, thus the mainland builds up in the decades to come.

One major development in this economic crisis is that China appears to be able to increase domestic consumption. Its dependence on international trade seems to be already diminishing. In the decades to come, it will be less dependent on trade with the ideological West, particularly the rootless four: the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These countries, due to their rootless ethos, have the greatest sympathy for Taiwan. Even the more traditional Western countries with fewer percentages of immigrants (in political power) are more tolerant and understanding of the Chinese position on Taiwan. When the Chinese domestic consumption becomes a greater and greater percentage of GNP, China will start to behave more assertively on Taiwan, may be starting 20 years from now.

Reunification across the Taiwan Strait a la Hong Kong is inevitable in due course. Even if Taiwan knows about the mainland design and has all the time to prepare against it, there will still be no recourse to escape its fate, which is already sealed.

The situation across the Taiwan Strait is actually very stable. Taiwan is far from declaring indepenence and the mainland has very strong incentive to just wait, as Taiwan is already in the bag. Well, Taiwan has already applied for independence at the UN, just to have Ban declare openly that Taiwan is a part of the PRC. What is the difference between declaration of independence and application for independence? No major responsible country will recognize Taiwan, not even the rootless four, as it would trigger a war to Taiwan's detriment, and ruin a hopeful mainland China.

 

BETALOVER

5:54 PM ET

March 25, 2010

At least diplomatically

At least diplomatically speaking, what matters for accusation and polemics is the percentage GNP spending on military.

PPP consideration is important for other types of discussion. PPP does not apply if China has to buy from abroad; if the RMB value rises, China can buy more weapons from abroad. For salaries paid and things made in China, the PPP consideration matters more.

China is a large country so in normal situations, without racism and colonialism and their residual impacts, China, which has a tradition of mercantile ability, is fully expected to be a powerful country.

China also has greater intrinsic defensive needs as it borders numerous countries with different designs; whereas the US has fewer abutting countries but has acquired defensive needs as it is the world’s policeman.