As a minor note, the exact amounts of defense spending spent by a nation don't matter. It's what percentage of the GDP the defense spending makes up that matters. For the U.S, it currently makes up about 3%-4% I think, a percent or two above the global norm.

It always amazes me when otherwise-sophisticated defence commentators reduce defence expenditure comparisons to straight nominal currency-exchange values without taking purchasing power into account. China's defence spending may be "only" $150B but China doesn't pay its soldiers $40,000-$80,000 per year. Nor do they pay their contractors, food & weapon suppliers or technicians the huge (often inflated) amounts paid by the Pentagon. Producing the simpler defence items such as APCs, food supplies, ammunition, etc. in China is vastly cheaper and the results are almost the same, if not equal.

So if you're comparing defence expenditures by PPP, a factor of at least 2.5 should be applied. Thus China's actual PPP-adjusted defence budget would be $450B, not too far off the American number, and growing much faster.

"Mao Zedong's doctrine of "human wave attacks" -- having more soldiers than your enemy has bullets -- would not meet China's defense needs in the 21st century."

Way to simplify PLA and Mao...US Army Center for Military History would disagree.

First of all, "human wave attack", in the words of Colonel Roy Appleman of the US Army Historical Detachment, is a "myth". Second of all, PLA rush machine gun nests in waves only when intels are bad or the enemy had already disintergerated. Thrid of all, when Mao said "man over weapon", he meant endurance of the soldiers can overcome PLA deficiencies in mobility, logistics and firepower, not that PLA grunts should be shot in a line. Finally, Mao never thought of the idea of "human wave attacks", his idea is the "mobile warefare", in which the PLA to infiltrate the gaps of the enemy formations and then elinmate them piecemeal.

Just because PLA abondoned the Maoist thinking of "man over weapon" and started to improve mobility, logistics and firepower, don't just assume he has no influnce in modern PLA thinking. On the individual level, the Maoist focus on endurance still makes regular PLA infantry a lot lighter than the US counterpart. On a tactical level, PLA still uses the maneuver smiliar to the concept of "mobile warefare". Finally, Mao's work on "protracted war" is still one of the best works on insurgency and asymmetric warfare. PLA maybe broke free from the the Maoist political dogma, but Mao's influence on Chinese warfighting is not something to be discounted.

the paper is one of best chinese policy assays. i agree with most of it. however, the "human wave attack" is major misunderstand of mao's strategy and reflects a negative view of chinese and china as whole. sunzi said, if you want to win your enemy, you have to understand it first, and understand yourself as well. the so called "human wave attack" is actually "people's war" and it has profound meanings in warfare. it is this factor, people, that this paper is failed to address.

the paper is one of best chinese policy assays. i agree with most of it. however, the "human wave attack" is major misunderstand of mao's strategy and reflects a negative view of chinese and china as whole. sunzi said, if you want to win your enemy, you have to understand it first, and understand yourself as well. the so called "human wave attack" is actually "people's war" and it has profound meanings in warfare. it is this factor, people, that this paper is failed to address.

"Official Chinese military writings now pay increasing attention to a greater range of military missions, focusing not only on China's territorial integrity, but on its global interests. From oil rigs in Nigeria to a crude-oil pipeline under construction that will connect Yunnan's capital city to Burma's port of Sittwe on the Bay of Bengal, Beijing thinks it must be able to defend its people, infrastructure, and investments in some of the world's most volatile places -- much as the British did in the 1800s."

This is certainly something which is overlooked. China's investment in rogue and/or volatile states (especially in Africa) is significant in some of Africa's most feeble states (Chad, CAR, both Congos) and most notorious dictatorships (Sudan, Angola). China is building billions of dollars of infrastructure and supplies arms in exchange for (considered a 'loan' in exchange for) an equal amount of minerals and metals in return. What would China's response be when a coup occurs and the new leader(s) (resenting China's support of the previous regime) cease to let China or Chinese companies mine for free or confiscate the mining operations of Chinese companies? Could China's military intervene in a Desert Storm-like manner? What lengths will China go to in supporting friendly regimes in countries rich in natural resources?

We will never fight China in a massive ground war. We both have apocalyptic WMD arsenals. The masses of tanks and mediocre infantry are more of an internal police force and a threat against neighbors. Our concerns should be the deterence forces (WMD's), any developments of a smaller, more efficient fighting force (Something roughly equivalent to US soldiers and special forces) and force projectors (Warships, long range airplanes) The deterence related forces are the only ones that would come into play if we ever fought China. A smaller more efficient branch in the Chinese military along with the force projectors would be an indirect threat to us, being easily deployable to conflict zones to promote Chinese interests, probably against ours. The huge numbers of AK wielding grunts arent equipped or trained to deal with any opponent tougher than unarmed monks.

...So the US can invade, ILLEGALLY, whatever country it so desires (Iraq 2003, on fake intelligence), and it's leaders face NO consequences...

And yet Drew Thompson speculates on China's military when China has economic interests (ports, shipping lanes, investments) in other countries...

China has the right to defend itself and the right to NOT relinquish its defence to ANOTHER country (such as the US)!!

Why is FP so hypocritical??

Why is the US so hypocritical??

This doesn't cover the issue of cyber warfare at all. There have been several cyber attacks from somewhere or someone in China (probably the PLA) against the United States, including some government websites. The pentagon even admits that the US is most vulnerable in its cyber-defense.

This article would have been better if it had engaged that issue.

With US Forces stationed in Korea, Japan, Guam, and Afghanistan, with massive weapons support of Taiwan, with globally projected and operating US naval forces it is China who should feel threatened.

And it is not that the US is a benevolent global operator, for most countries in the world, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was an act of unprovoked aggression based on lies. With the US Air Force controlling the skies of Iraq from the first Golf war up to the 2003 invasion (remember the "no-fly zones!), Hussein was never a threat to the USA.

China has shown considerable restraint in its activities outside of the mainland, centering almost exclusively on economic matters. With a rapidly growing wealthy middle class China will be reluctant to embark on any aggressive "foreign adventure". Wish that could be said of the USA.

By the way, I am a 20 year veteran of the "Cold War", which I supported vigorously.

About 15 years ago, I attended a summer course put on by the National Defense University for reserve officers. One session was about national strategy, and I clearly remember the faculty member (defense intellectual?) saying that the two greatest strategic threats to the US in the foreseeable future were Mexico and China. Mexico because of drugs and uncontrolled cross-border immigration. China because, obviously, it was big and growing in power. It occurred to me then, and it seems clear now, that the Pentagon needs a major enemy. It was the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and post-Cold War it had to be China, as the National Defense University predicted 15 years ago, before China even began its spectacular economic growth. So even if China's military growth were natural for a big country, and even if its strategic concerns were focused on its own borders, we will see them as enemies. And that will cause actions and reactions which will only reinforce that perception. It's a self-fulfilling prophecy, and one can only hope that it doesn't lead inexorably to conflict.

The United States has engaged in a string of attacks on foreign nations massacring millions of innocent civilians in its wake. That any country in the world, including China, should develop an adequate capability to ensure the United States does not invade, should come as no surprise. If a Chinese military buildup is a cause for alarm, the United States military buildup should have thrown a person into paroxysms of paranoia.

Threats are a function of both capabilities and intentions, and Thompson does well to provide a snapshot of the former. But unless you're a committed offensive realist, it's difficult to infer the latter simply from an account of China's military modernization. Thompson is correct to argue that capabilities do not necessarily tell us much about "China's willingness to use" its newfound and still developing military assets. What we need is rather an account of the circumstances under which China might be tempted to use force: when, where, how, and so on.

Take the question of Taiwan as an example. Under what conditions might China actually use the missiles and other offensive capabilities against the island? For now, as Thompson notes, this seems a remote possibility, given the thaw in relations between Beijing and Taipei. But what triggers might lead to a breakdown - not just to another display of force, as we witnessed in 1995-6, but to actual hostilities. What would have to happen either within China's domestic politics, or as a response to something Taiwan has done, to precipitate such an outcome?

From Thompson's analysis, we can't even lay out the scenarios under which an aggressive China, i.e. a China that not only has, but also uses, force, is not answerable. Arguments about the circumstances which may trigger the use of force, whether it is now or in 15 years, are important both from the point of view of preparing to counter it, and from the perspective of how such an eventuality might be avoided. So instead of bracketing the question of China's intentions, we need to explore what they may be and how they may evolve.

This preoccupation with capabilities is not limited to this particular article. Quite a bit of the conversation in Washington is based on the presumption that we simply don't know what China will do, and so we need to prepare for all outcomes. The catchphrase now is "strategic hedging," in which we both engage and find ways to contain a growing China, with its still-unknown military aspirations. But this prescription can and should be filled out with greater detail about how we should hedge; how to skillfully prepare for the possible Chinese use of force without creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.

I just saw a post in the blog "The Daily Dish" where American soldiers are guarding a mine owned by the Chinese in Afghanistan. Same with Chinese owned oil fields in Iraq. Maybe the Chinese military is not a strong adversary against the US military yet but combined with all the money we owe China I don't feel good about our long term prospects. I'm still trying to figure out why we borrowed money from China to fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Are the Chinese going to lend us money when we try to protect Taiwan from China?

I just saw a post in the blog "The Daily Dish" where American soldiers are guarding a mine owned by the Chinese in Afghanistan. Same with Chinese owned oil fields in Iraq. Maybe the Chinese military is not a strong adversary against the US military yet but combined with all the money we owe China I don't feel good about our long term prospects. I'm still trying to figure out why we borrowed money from China to fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Are the Chinese going to lend us money when we try to protect Taiwan from China?

Hey, I agree with the view that "Pentagon gotta find enemies"

Its like your finance department's gotta tell you they got too much work and need headcount.
Then the sale department says "man, we are generating more revenue but we need more salesmen"
then the accountants says "all these people are gonna commit fruad unless u gimme more accountants for control purposes"

some people just like to think that everyone is gearing up against them. Others try to profit from it.

If US policymakers really do not understand Chinese military behavior and intent, Reagan would be turning in agony in his grave. It seems that many have to ask for the whereabouts of the elephant is in the room for political correctness. Obviously, this is a trans-Pacific idea of "peace through strength" that is working well for the Chinese.

First, Chinese military objective is not restricted to Taiwan. This should be obvious as China is such a large country and has many abutting countries of various possible designs. Taiwan, Taiwan and Taiwan; many people are just blind to the fact that Taiwan is only 1.5% of the Chinese population, and 1/200th of the landmass of China, politics or no politics. China has a totally legit reason to have a large military, diplomatically considered, even as a cordial trade partner. There is nothing reproachable for even a friendy trade partner to spend 2-3% of GNP on defense. I hate to be the US diplomat that suggests to China it has too large a military. It can be that trite charge of lack of transparency. What if China is more transparent and spends only twice as much as it declares, still 100% kosher diplomatically. The US wants genuine transparency from the Chinese and she gets it, so what?

Second, Taiwan is going to be another Hong Kong. The island’s fate is already sealed. The fact is that Taiwan is an island without energy source just 90 miles from the Chinese mainland. The mainland will one day be able to simply control the Taiwan economy (or economic climate for a long duration) with only very limited force, but with enormous standby to stymie any military resistance from Taiwan. All weapons bought from the US will be useless and will not be used. In order for the US to interfere, it has to virtually START a war that actually causes calamity to Taiwan. I don’t see this happening. Taiwan will not want the US to interfere but will want to accept a Hong Kong deal, which will not be bad for the island in sum total.

May be by 2040, the mainland would virtually target oil tankers leaving Taiwan. I doubt if the mainland would really have to fire a single shot to compel Taiwan to negotiate for a Hong Kong deal, or just a few shots. Threat without execution will work for the Chinese mainland, thus the mainland builds up in the decades to come.

One major development in this economic crisis is that China appears to be able to increase domestic consumption. Its dependence on international trade seems to be already diminishing. In the decades to come, it will be less dependent on trade with the ideological West, particularly the rootless four: the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These countries, due to their rootless ethos, have the greatest sympathy for Taiwan. Even the more traditional Western countries with fewer percentages of immigrants (in political power) are more tolerant and understanding of the Chinese position on Taiwan. When the Chinese domestic consumption becomes a greater and greater percentage of GNP, China will start to behave more assertively on Taiwan, may be starting 20 years from now.

Reunification across the Taiwan Strait a la Hong Kong is inevitable in due course. Even if Taiwan knows about the mainland design and has all the time to prepare against it, there will still be no recourse to escape its fate, which is already sealed.

The situation across the Taiwan Strait is actually very stable. Taiwan is far from declaring indepenence and the mainland has very strong incentive to just wait, as Taiwan is already in the bag. Well, Taiwan has already applied for independence at the UN, just to have Ban declare openly that Taiwan is a part of the PRC. What is the difference between declaration of independence and application for independence? No major responsible country will recognize Taiwan, not even the rootless four, as it would trigger a war to Taiwan's detriment, and ruin a hopeful mainland China.

At least diplomatically speaking, what matters for accusation and polemics is the percentage GNP spending on military.

PPP consideration is important for other types of discussion. PPP does not apply if China has to buy from abroad; if the RMB value rises, China can buy more weapons from abroad. For salaries paid and things made in China, the PPP consideration matters more.

China is a large country so in normal situations, without racism and colonialism and their residual impacts, China, which has a tradition of mercantile ability, is fully expected to be a powerful country.

China also has greater intrinsic defensive needs as it borders numerous countries with different designs; whereas the US has fewer abutting countries but has acquired defensive needs as it is the world’s policeman.