Don't Call That Warlord a Warlord

In Afghanistan, the term is no longer useful -- though it should be.

BY ANTONIO GIUSTOZZI | FEBRUARY 25, 2010

Afghanistan has been at war for much of the past 32 years -- hence the proliferation of warlords. Everyone from international pundits to local governors uses the term to discredit certain political factions or insult the "bad guys." Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, for example, is often described as a "warlord," but bad armed behavior does not a warlord make.

In reality, the term has a specific and more useful meaning in the historical literature. It describes a charismatic military leader who, because of the weakness or absence of a state, ends up playing a political role, though he lacks political legitimacy. In Afghanistan, the two characters who best fit this definition are Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum and Mohammed Ismail Khan. The former dominated northern Afghanistan between 1992 and 1997, re-emerging as a regional power after the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001. The latter ran much of western Afghanistan from 1992 until 1995, similarly returning to prominence after the 2001 invasion.

In the Hobbesian world of war-torn Afghanistan, warlords are "service providers" to a much larger "military class" of petty local military commanders. Those local commanders network to secure supplies, political representation, and -- most importantly -- military backup. Warlords often command the networks, especially in western and northern Afghanistan. The most powerful, influential, and charismatic leaders (such as Dostum and Ismail Khan) even develop "networks of networks," becoming national players and formulating alliances with political actors struggling for control in Kabul.

Dostum and Ismail Khan differed from each other in their approach to power. The former ran a decentralized operation, leaving much space to his regional and provincial-level subordinates. Organizations accusing him of human rights abuses often forget that he made few orders, or even authorizations, from the top; it is often difficult, if not impossible, to determine which commanders made which decisions. Indeed, this was a key strength and key weakness of his governing system. Unable to mobilize and direct his considerable military resources at will, Dostum's performance in the civil wars of the 1990s was mediocre at best. Faced with a weaker but more determined adversary in the Taliban, his forces were eventually overwhelmed. Yet, the decentralization of his military also provided resilience. The "military class," Dostum's key constituency, saw him as a patron who did not demand too much from them.

In contrast, Ismail Khan was a centralizer and micromanager who attempted to enforce strict discipline on his subordinates and organize them into a state-like system. Instead of appeasing and negotiating, he used disciplined units under his direct control to conscript military commanders into a regimented force, modeled after an early-modern state. (He called this system the Emirate.) From 1992 on, he was more able than Dostum to direct the forces under his control, crushing revolts against his rule in 1992 and 1993, for instance. But Dostum was popular -- and Ismail Khan was not. Ultimately, the latter's own constituency of petty military leaders rejected him. They resented their lack of autonomy, and the Emirate collapsed in 1995 after a major battlefield defeat.

Paula Bronstein/Getty Images

 

Antonio Giustozzi is a research fellow at the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics. He is the author of several articles and papers on Afghanistan, as well as three books, including Empires of Mud, from which this article is adapted. He also recently edited a volume on the Taliban, Decoding the New Taliban.

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 SUBJECTS: AFGHANISTAN

DEFANNIN

6:26 AM ET

February 27, 2010

Conclusion

In plain English you are saying that the only effective government Afghanistan has ever know are War Lords.

Why does that surprise anyone. Up until about 750 years ago Britain and Western Europe was rule by Warlords. Oh we called them Duke, Earl, Baron etc but they were basically warlords. There were many areas where the writ of the King did not run. Not the system we have now but it worked then.

Why do we think we can occupy a country and move it forward thru 750 years of political development, instantly.

 

AHMAD SHAHIR

4:20 PM ET

March 4, 2010

Dostum has may be 80% of

Dostum has may be 80% of Uzbeks backing him and this gives him a political legitimacy as well.
but the question is why does such personalities gets this back up? if this question was answered correctly a way would be found to solve many social problems in Afghanistan.
right now in Afghanistan north many uzbeks mainly thinks America is backing only pashtoons as i am from that part ppl has these views growing day by day.
dostum can be replaced by bringing a good governement and justice right now if u look at the government its only pashtoons or tajiks who has all key posts in hand others have nothing.
Americans actually didnt wanted to replace dostum if the wanted they would have supported and helped civil uzbeks grow inside the government by giving them important posts. and enabling these civil uzbeks to help their fellow men in the country to gain legitimacy inside their society and backup. but what i see so far US government enjoys this system.