Down the AfPak Rabbit Hole

The village of Marjah is a meaningless strategic backwater. So why are the Pentagon and the press telling us the battle there was a huge victory?

BY THOMAS H. JOHNSON, M. CHRIS MASON | MARCH 1, 2010

The release of Tim Burton's new blockbuster movie, Alice in Wonderland, is days away. The timing could not be more appropriate. Lewis Carroll's ironically opium-inspired tale of a rational person caught up inside a mad world with its own bizarre but consistent internal (il)logic has now surpassed Vietnam as the best paradigm to understand the war in Afghanistan.

The war in Afghanistan, as we have written here and in Military Review (pdf), is indeed a near replication of the Vietnam War, including the assault on the strategically meaningless village of Marjah, which is itself a perfect re-enactment of Operation Meade River in 1968. But the callous cynicism of this war, which we described here in early December, and the mainstream media's brainless reporting on it, have descended past these sane parallels. We have now gone down the rabbit hole.

Two months ago, the collection of mud-brick hovels known as Marjah might have been mistaken for a flyspeck on maps of Afghanistan. Today the media has nearly doubled its population from less than 50,000 to 80,000 -- the entire population of Nad Ali district, of which Nad Ali is the largest town, is approximately 99,000 -- and portrays the offensive there as the equivalent of the Normandy invasion, and the beginning of the end for the Taliban. In fact, however, the entire district of Nad Ali, which contains Marjah, represents about 2 percent of Regional Command (RC) South, the U.S. military's operational area that encompasses Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, Nimruz, and Daikundi provinces. RC South by itself is larger than all of South Vietnam, and the Taliban controls virtually all of it. This appears to have occurred to no one in the media.

Nor have any noted that taking this nearly worthless postage stamp of real estate has tied down about half of all the real combat power and aviation assets of the international coalition in Afghanistan for a quarter of a year. The possibility that wasting massive amounts of U.S. and British blood, treasure, and time just to establish an Afghan Potemkin village with a "government in a box" might be exactly what the Taliban wants the coalition to do has apparently not occurred to either the press or to the generals who designed this operation.

In reality, this battle -- the largest in Afghanistan since 2001 -- is essentially a giant public affairs exercise, designed to shore up dwindling domestic support for the war by creating an illusion of progress. In reporting it, the media has gulped down the whole bottle of "drink me" and shrunk to journalistic insignificance. In South Vietnam, an operational area smaller than RC South, the United States and its allies had over 2 million men under arms, including more than half a million Americans, the million-man Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), 75,000 coalition troops, the Vietnamese Regional Forces and Popular Forces (known as "Ruff-Puffs"), the South Vietnamese police, the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) and other militias -- and lost.

Yet the media is breathlessly regurgitating Pentagon pronouncements that we have "turned the corner" and "reversed the momentum" in Afghanistan with fewer than 45,000 men under arms in all of RC South (including the Afghan army and police) by fighting for a month to secure a single hamlet. Last year this would have been déjà vu of the "five o'clock follies" of the Vietnam War. Now it feels more like the Mad Hatter's Tea Party. "How can we have more success," Alice might ask, "when we haven't had any yet?"

So here we are in the AfPak Wonderland, complete with a Mad Hatter (the clueless and complacent media), Tweedledee and Tweedledum (the military, endlessly repeating itself and history), the White Rabbit (the State Department, scurrying to meetings and utterly irrelevant), the stoned Caterpillar (the CIA, obtuse, arrogant, and asking the wrong questions), the Dormouse (U.S. Embassy Kabul, who wakes up once in a while only to have his head stuffed in a teapot), the Cheshire Cat (President Obama, fading in and out of the picture, eloquent but puzzling), the Pack of Cards army (the Afghan National Army, self-explanatory), and their commander, the inane Queen of Hearts (Afghan President Hamid Karzai). (In Alice in Wonderland, however, the Dormouse is "suppressed" by the Queen of Hearts, not the White Rabbit or the Cheshire Cat, so the analogy is not quite perfect.)

POOL/AFP/Getty Images

 

Thomas H. Johnson is a research professor in the Department of National Security Affairs and director of the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. M. Chris Mason is a retired Foreign Service officer who served in 2005 as a political officer in Paktika, Afghanistan, and is now a senior fellow at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies in Washington, D.C.

JAYDEE001

12:11 PM ET

March 2, 2010

THANK YOU FOR SAYING IT

The likelihood that all this will end badly for the US grows stronger every day. This does truly look more and more like our failed Vietnam adventure. And we can look forward to all the generals in 15 years writing in their memoirs about the lost opportunity for 'victory', even though none of them will dare to state what victory would really have cost. Marjah is nothing but a show for the US military to claim a small victory, even as the rest of the war continues to be an exercize in futility.

When did this change from a punitive expedition to destroy al Qaeda's principal base and its Taliban support to nation-building? And, despite our best attempts, we will not build a nation where one has never existed in modern times. Another quagmire! Our best bet would be to cash in our chips now, but that is something we do not know how to do, We are addicted to our own taste for military action, and we will invent enemies if we cannot find real ones, as it suits us.

As for Pakistan, that country has always put its own interests ahead of the US', and why should it not? The fact is that if Pakistan becomes a failed state, it will deserve that fate. Its relationship with the Taliban has roots further back than the Russian occupation of its neighbor, and certainly deeper than any alliance with the US.

 

VITO

5:07 PM ET

March 3, 2010

Obama Af-Pak is really a proxy war against China

This is why we went into the gulf, this is why we went into Iraq. We want to monopolize the oil supply so we can have control and be able to cut it off when other countries don't do as we say (look at Somalia, we're about to cut off food aid).

We'll eventually go after Bashir, and Hugo, and Mugabe, but it looks like we want Iran NOW so that we can bust up the oil pipeline that would be built from Iran, running through Pakistan, STRAIGHT TO CHINA!

The plan is to pay Jundullah terrorist to foment kaos and destabilize the Beluchistan area in Pakistan near the Iranian/Pakistani border. In addition to that, the objective in the Marjah offensive is to push the Taliban into this same area in Pakistan.

 

JPWREL

1:16 PM ET

March 2, 2010

Amen.

Amen.

 

EW66

2:08 PM ET

March 2, 2010

Interesting, and very

Interesting, and very possibly correct, analysis on Baradar/Quetta Shura. However, before bringing back the old Vietnam, and for that matter Alice in Wonderland, analogy, you should establish that it's consistent. I don't believe it is. Read the numerous articles on why Vietnam is not a consistent analogy with the Afghanistan. Yet here they are, bringing in back, with no new points on why it's even a viable comparison (except for the unconvincing Mead battle comparison). I've heard many viewpoints recently on why Marjah is insignificant, yet I don't think most people grasp what Gen. McChrystal is trying to do. It is somewhat of a public relations campaign, but not for the American media. It's somewhat of a practice run/show for the "government in a box" campaign to show the Afghans that it can be viable. You don't launch this kind of campaign in the most "significant" area right off the bat. I realize that people will point out that we've been there for 8 years and need to change the tides but rushing into a more "significant" Taliban stronghold right now and failing would be devastating at this time. I must confess, I got excited to see an article on the Marjah op and was very disappointed to see the same old Vietnam, dithering/clueless claims. That being said, very interesting analysis on the Quetta Shura and Pakistan. Scrap the first page though...

 

ZAINB

10:30 AM ET

March 5, 2010

Why should the analysis on

Why should the analysis on Pakistan be taken as credible and the comparison with Vietnam not?

The fact of the matter is that the authors have only provided yet another 'conspiracy theory' and speculation in the medley of theories doing the rounds in the very media they decry about the motivations behind Pakistan's actions.

Just because a conspiracy theory fits your biases and anti-Pakistan sentiment does not make it a credible theory.

 

DEPETRIS@WORDPRESS.COM

2:37 PM ET

March 2, 2010

Marjah is not useless

While I completely agree with your logic about Pakistan, I have to question your analysis of the Marjah campaign. Sure, Marjah is relatively unpopulated by our standards (a town of 80,000) and is underpopulated when comparing the town to Kabul and Kandahar. But just because Marjah is not a main Afghan city does not necessarily mean that it U.S./NATO and Afghan troops engaged in a meaningless endeavor.

Marjah- and Helmand Province more generally- is a main opium producing area in Afghanistan that funds the Taliban insurgency. Millions upon millions of dollars go through the hands of the Taliban, either through drug cultivation, drug distribution or the taxing of illicit narcotics. One of the main reasons why the Taliban continues to operate, despite low popular support among Afghans as a whole, is due to these funds. It does not take a rocket scientist to discover the correlation between money and capability; the more money an organization receives, the more likely that organization will expand its power.

The offensive in Marjah should not be interpreted to the media as a 21st century "D-Day," where a single battle paves the way for a quick American victory. Rather, Marjah should be looked upon as the first step in a series of U.S. and NATO assaults over the next year. If the United States bypassed Kandahar, the 2nd most populated city and the spiritual hub of the Taliban, I would agree with Dr. Johnson and Mason's analysis. But as we now know, General McChyrstal plans to take the fight into Kandahar in the next few months.

http://www.depetris.wordpress.com

 

LITTLEMANTATE

3:28 PM ET

March 2, 2010

A little ditty in time for Nowruz

(Chorus): Here comes Stanley Cottontail
Hoppin’ down the Marjah trail,
Hippity hoppity,
Development’s on its way!

Bringin’ ev’ry little Afghan boy
A basketful of Raytheon joy
Horrible wounds to make your Nowruz
Bright and gay!

For Iskandar he’s got a dollar
A school for the girls in blue
Otherwise they might hollar
And it makes for good p.r. too!

(Repeat Chorus)

Look at him hop and watch him say
“Now Afghans, do the things you should”
And maybe if you’re good
We’ll let you live another day!

You’ll wake up on Nowruz mornin’
And you’ll know that he was there
When you find destruction and
Empty houses, well, gosh, just ev’rywhere! Oh!

(Repeat Chorus)

 

JDULIN

12:24 AM ET

March 3, 2010

Differences Between Vietnam and Afghanistan

Although your overall analysis of what is going wrong in Afghanistan has been largely correct (Corrupt, illegitimate goverment, poor U.S. tactics, useless ANA, umotivated Pakistanis, political goals of administration and overeacting media...) there are some core differences between Vietnam and Afghanistan. First off, in Vietnam, the U.S. was doomed to failure from the beginning because its goals (fighting communism) clashed directly with the goals and idealogy of who it was fighting, the Viet Cong. However, in Afghanistan, the original goal of why the U.S. was there had nothing to do with the Taliban, but rather with who they were harbouring. Like you said, somewhere along the line the U.S. lost sight of that goal and decided to start nation-building. If the U.S. can get back to that objective of eliminating terrorists and Al-Qaeda instead of letting the Taliban run circles around Marine patrols, then Afghanistan is a salvagable situation, that really wouldn't resemble the Vietnam bloodbath. Afghanistan isn't similar to Vietnam because of who we are fighting or why, it's simply like Vietnam because we wanted it to be like Vietnam. Furthermore, the article mentioned the way that the Pakistanis and Karzai have been playing the U.S. like a flute in their campaigns "against" corruption and the Taliban. Karzai, however, is more expendable than he seems and the U.S. just needs to muster up the bravery to cut him loose, so he can be replaced by somebody, anybody, more legitimate. It would be able to buy the U.S. the time it needs to evaluate its goals and withdrawl. As for the thoughts on Pakistan, I find hard to swallow, although interesting. Baradar was a top coordinator and carried out effective attacks, so I couldn't imagine the Taliban simply eliminating him unless he outright challenged the Quetta Shura. And even though Pakistan certainly isn't the most willing or effective counterterrorism partner, it has not launched full blown military offensives for no reason, save for impressing the U.S. If the ISI and Pakistani military were so determined to protect the Taliban and Al-Qaeda leadership, they wouldn't allow U.S. drones in their airspace 24/7.

 

JIMBOCRU

1:44 PM ET

March 3, 2010

Pakistan & Taliban

Folks,

Pakistan will ALWAYS have 2 major ISSUES !!

1. Kashmir -- NOT a Religion Issue ---> Strictly a WATER issue -- All the "headwaters" of the major Rivers in Pakistan Originate in Kashmir !

2. Durand Line ---> 100 year Durand Line Agreement has expired !!!

So much of the Land "East" of the Durand Line -- FATA, Balochistan, and Taliban Areas ---> LEGALLY belong to Afghanistan !

How can we solve the "Taliban" Problem Permanently ?

1. Have the UN Security Council, pass a Resolution -- stating those AREAS belong to AFGHANISTAN !

2. Like Saddam Hussein, give the PAKISTANIS -- 90 Days to Vacate this AREA Permanently.

3. Drop a Few Daisy Flowers on Prominent Pakistani Military Locations to make a point !

Pakistani Military has never failed to "tuck its tail between its legs" & scamper away, when faced with a strong military foe !

 

ITONLYSTANDSTOREASON

3:12 PM ET

March 3, 2010

Sloppy is as sloppy does

I always appreciate reading an alternative take. The authors provide intelligence on recent events and the nature of the Taliban-ISI relationships which I haven't encountered elsewhere.

But the Afghanistan:Vietnam analogy is poorly supported. They spend more time on the fun but meaningless exercise of mapping AfPak to Alice in Wonderland than telling us why is is like Vietnam.

More important, their criticism of the Marjah operation demonstrates that they don't understand the kind of war McChrystal is fighting. They think it is a war of numbers. It is not, it is a war of symbols. The only way to victory (contra Vietnam, where "we had to destroy the village to save it") is to accomplish what we never did in Vietnam: convince the people to end their support for or fatalism about Taliban rule. Marjah is a proof-of-principles operation.

 

ABBOTT

4:31 PM ET

March 3, 2010

Read the Military Review Article which is hyperlinked

Instead of running your mouth about the Vietnam analogy being poorly supported, why don't you try reading their 14-page article in the November 2009 issue of the Army's magazine, Military Review, which is hyperlinked in this short article? It goes into extensive detail with over 60 endnotes documenting the facts. Obviously a short piece like this does not permit a lot of elaboration.

I think they understand the kind of war McChrystal is fighing better than McChrystal does. The notion of a "proof of principles operation" almost nine years into a war in which the enemy controls 90 percent of the ground in an operational area larger than Vietnam where there are total of 45,000 security providers is a bad joke. McChrystal used most of the combat power in Afghanistan for at least three months to take one village (and they're not going anywhere any time soon). Please enlighten us how 45,000 are going to succeed where 2,000,000 failed. With symbols? So which side of the mushroom did you eat?

By the way, have you seen pictures of Marjah recently? They DID have to destroy that village in order to save it.

 

ABBOTT

4:31 PM ET

March 3, 2010

Read the Military Review Article which is hyperlinked

Instead of running your mouth about the Vietnam analogy being poorly supported, why don't you try reading their 14-page article in the November 2009 issue of the Army's magazine, Military Review, which is hyperlinked in this short article? It goes into extensive detail with over 60 endnotes documenting the facts. Obviously a short piece like this does not permit a lot of elaboration.

I think they understand the kind of war McChrystal is fighing better than McChrystal does. The notion of a "proof of principles operation" almost nine years into a war in which the enemy controls 90 percent of the ground in an operational area larger than Vietnam where there are total of 45,000 security providers is a bad joke. McChrystal used most of the combat power in Afghanistan for at least three months to take one village (and they're not going anywhere any time soon). Please enlighten us how 45,000 are going to succeed where 2,000,000 failed. With symbols? So which side of the mushroom did you eat?

By the way, have you seen pictures of Marjah recently? They DID have to destroy that village in order to save it.

 

GUPTAN VEEMBOOR

6:31 AM ET

March 4, 2010

Down the rabbit hole

Sir, your satirical article about this million dollar adventure is very nice. Obviously it is for the benifit ot the US taxpayers who must be naturally being worried that all their tax is going down the drain.
Why US is still fawning over Pakistan knowing well that Pakistan is cheating with its illegal affair with Afghan Taliban? US cannot be so naive! If US could attack Iraq a sovereign nation it should not have any compuction to attack the bad lands in Pakistan and destroy the AlQuaeda and Taliban. Neither US will lose sleep over the collateral damages. It is not doing it. It very much wants Pakistan to fulfil its job in Afghanistan. It has to be something other than this wiping out of AlQuaeda and making US safer. This idea is also a counterfeit coin given to the public.

 

HELEADSTHEWAY

9:26 AM ET

March 4, 2010

U.S. strategy doesn't make any sense

Hmm,
So the Pakistanis are helping the Taliban fight our troops in Afghanistan with one hand, and they're collecting $1.5 billion/yr, drones, and fighter jets from us with the other. Who is coming up with these policies!?

 

ABBOTT

11:01 AM ET

March 4, 2010

The Cheshire Cat.

The Cheshire Cat.