This Week at War: Does the Pottery Barn Rule Still Apply?

What the four-stars are reading -- a weekly column from Small Wars Journal.

BY ROBERT HADDICK | MARCH 12, 2010

A painful decade has improved civil-military relations

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced civil-military relations in the United States to grow up and leave behind a naive adolescence that prevailed at the start of the last decade. Before the wars began, the "normal" theory of civil-military relations, described in Eliot Cohen's book Supreme Command) still ruled. Under the "normal" theory, civilian leadership determines war policy and then leaves the generals and admirals alone to run the war. Thankfully those days are gone; hardly a month passes without the secretary of defense or some other senior figure heading out to the field, questioning not just generals, but also colonels and sergeants about their tactics. Likewise, soldiers now deeply immerse themselves in questions about the connections between policy objectives and military strategy, the evidence for which can be found every day at websites such as Small Wars Journal. By dropping the normal theory and letting policymakers and military officers into each other's "lanes," the result has been a generally smarter use of military power.

Although U.S. civil-military relations are more mature, Mackubin Owens, a professor at the Naval War College and editor of Orbis, thinks further improvement is needed. In an essay written for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Owens argues that several persistent problems are inhibiting the country's ability to formulate better strategy.

First, Owens thinks that residual traces of the normal theory live on, and not without good reason. The theory's exclusion of the military leadership from policy formulation was designed to maintain civilian control over the military and keep the military out of politics. Likewise, military officers viewed the execution of war plans as closely resembling an engineering project, to be performed only by highly trained professionals -- civilian amateurs should not meddle. But the theory created barriers between policy objectives and the military actions that should be designed to achieve those objectives.

Second, Owens asserts that the enduring culture of the normal theory has created organizational cultures in each of the military services that resist interference and calls for change from civilian political leaders. Yet when those civilian political leaders formulate a national security policy that requires military force, who will be held responsible for ensuring that the proper military tools are ready to implement the policy? If the "normal" theory walls off the institutional military from close political supervision, the country may find itself unprepared for new eras of conflict (as happened at the start of the last decade).

Finally, Owens blames the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 for further raising the wall between policy formulation and military strategy. The disastrous attempt in 1980 to rescue U.S. Embassy employees from Tehran and the 1983 invasion of Grenada revealed serious problems in interservice cooperation. The solution was Goldwater-Nichols, which reduced the authority of the Washington-based service chiefs and increased the power of regional field commanders, who are responsible for executing joint-service military operations. Many have applauded the act for improving interservice military efficiency. But Owens claims the price has been the creation of further distance between civilian policymakers and warfighters, resulting in a greater disconnection between policy objectives and military strategy.

The solution, according to Owens, is twofold. First, military leaders must reassert a voice in strategy and, presumably, engage their civilian masters on the integration of military actions with policy objectives. On the other side, civilian leaders should closely probe and supervise the services' plans for force structure, acquisition programs, training, and doctrine to ensure that the services are creating military capabilities that will support national policies. On these measures, civil-military relations have improved. But it has taken a decade of painful wars to bring about this improvement.

AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP/Getty Images

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Robert Haddick is managing editor of Small Wars Journal.

GRANT

5:02 AM ET

March 13, 2010

I think the man has managed

I think the man has managed to forget that post-invasion Iraq went into a civil war (lets be honest) here and almost certainly will be on much better terms with Iran than it was in 2002. Admittedly we might have averted the fighting (though I have my doubts) but I can't see how we could have prevented the Iranian factor with 'repetitive raiding'. Furthermore, the theory is possibly legally dubious and would definitely give other nations a blanket excuse to attack weaker nations as they please.

 

JKOLAK

11:04 AM ET

March 15, 2010

Plus

Plus raiding won't stop the ability of enemies to build up in failed states. It would only be reactionary tactic with no end in sight.

 

WILDTHING

6:30 PM ET

March 15, 2010

Rogue who???

I'm afraid a war for lies, disinformation, and strategic dominance of resources makes the attacker the rogue state. There is no moral ground from then on and there is only costs and no benefits and there will be no owning. Multiple raids based on lies and disinformation are no different. Might makes Right only goes anywhere for a limited amount of time and then becomes a moral quagmire.
Allocateing unlimited obedience to a Commander-in-Chief without the Constitutional limits of Advice and Consent based on fact not lies is a prescription for a Monarch or dictatorship not the a Constitutional government. A govenment of secrets and CIA covert actions is one of paranoia and feart of the thing that can be done in darkness with no accountability. That world is one of suspicion and fear.

 

LITTLEMANTATE

5:04 PM ET

March 29, 2010

The man actually used metrics and goals!

More than we can say for many other folks. The pottery barn rule is based on the factually and morally dubious argument that if the US manages to re-establish a new, legitimate (read US friendly) regime they will then be our allies and will be a force for stability in the region. Leaving aside the moral implications of supporting corrupt regimes fostered on a defeated people by the conqueror under the guise of democracy, the rule is too general and ignores specifics. What worked in Germany or Japan might not work in Iraq, but people think the Marshall plan can be recreated time and again. Those specific conditions will never be recreated. Also the pottery barn rule commits the US to long-term investment in a foreign country, the benefits of which do not necessarily accrue to the American populace. The Altruism argument fails here because war, particularly privatized war, has proven to be so lucrative for certain parties, and has also a pernicious cyclical effect on domestic politics via campaign contributions. Now this influence is paltry compared to Wall Street but it still exists. A government exists to benefit its citizens, or at least should; therefore, if government bodies or leaders commit the nation's resources to a war and in doing so in debt future generations for a cause not related to national defense, then the legitimacy of such leaders should be questioned. Finally, nation-building and interventionist war do a lot to cloud the destructive nature of warfare and provide moral cover for aggressive actions. Raids, by their very nature, are hard to justify except in cases of legitimate defense.