What, then, can it expect to get in exchange? Number one, of course, is cooperation on Iran. Administration officials point to the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) recent condemnation of Iran and Russia's newfound willingness to consider tough sanctions as signs that engagement, including with the NPT's core bargain, has already worked. China has begun to at least discuss the issue. On the other hand, many key states, including Brazil, have refused to criticize Iran, and several of the U.N. Security Council's nonpermanent members appear disinclined to vote for tough sanctions. It's still not clear if the coin of engagement will purchase real collaboration.
It's about to become much clearer. The heart of the nuclear quid pro quo is the upcoming NPT conference in early May (the treaty is reviewed and extended every five years), at which Washington will be looking for strong, widespread commitments on nonproliferation. In his speech before the U.N. General Assembly last September, Obama said that only by strengthening the "fragile consensus" of the NPT can the world prevent "the prospect of wars and acts of terror on a scale that we can hardly imagine." White House officials and the advocate community largely agree about what "strengthening" would mean: gaining the widest possible endorsement of the "additional protocols" that permit the IAEA's nuclear inspectors to carry out unannounced spot checks on a signatory's nuclear facilities, thus making it extremely difficult for states to pursue a clandestine program, as Iran has; agreement that states that violate the NPT's terms will be punished and that states that withdraw will face some sort of automatic response; and a commitment to the CTBT and a fissile-material cutoff treaty.
The White House can argue that it has already made progress: In a striking contrast to 2005, the agenda was established with little ado last May, soon after the U.S. president outlined his expansive vision of doing away with nuclear weapons in a speech in Prague. Here, as elsewhere, the mood music is vastly different from what it was in the Bush era. The best-case scenario for an outcome, according to Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, would be a formal statement in which the nuclear-weapons states pledge to make deeper and broader cuts in their arsenals, while all states commit to strengthening the treaty's nonproliferation provisions.
But is that likely? Alas, no. Egypt, which is the head of the Non-Aligned Movement this year and is single-mindedly focused on making the Middle East a nuclear weapons-free zone, may well play a spoiler's role at the May conference, as it has in the past. Iran will pull out all diplomatic stops to block stronger enforcement measures. And developing countries genuinely concerned about proliferation might keep a prudent silence, as often happens at U.N. forums. George Perkovich, a nonproliferation expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says that the attitude of many such states about their end of the NPT bargain is, "We already gave it to you" -- by eschewing a weapons program -- "and we keep giving it to you." Perkovich's own bottom line is: "If it's not a disaster," like 2005, "it will be a success."
A measly outcome might be seen as vindicating conservatives who think that the assumption of mutuality at the heart of Obama's engagement policy is naive: We do our side, but they don't do theirs. Of course, Bush tried nonproliferation without mutuality, and it didn't work very well either. One Obama administration official involved with nuclear policy conceded to me that the disarmament-for-nonproliferation bargain is still "an article of faith." But he added an important proviso: If making deep cuts in the U.S. arsenal and signing treaties constituted a sacrifice of national interest, "then the article of faith would be dangerous." In fact, he said, "they are good in themselves."
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