Reviewing the Review

Obama's new nuke strategy is a good start. But the Cold War's legacy lives on.

BY DAVID E. HOFFMAN | APRIL 6, 2010

Obama had raised hopes that he would opt for some more radical ideas in this nuclear strategy. But after months of internal wrangling, the administration clearly decided not to touch them. The status quo won the day on some big-ticket items.

One idea that was examined but discarded would have been to change the basic structure of America's nuclear forces, which are in a land-sea-air triad. Instead of getting rid of one leg, such as the bombers, as some have suggested, the new nuclear strategy endorses keeping all three. The thinking is that the bombers have power as signals, if moved onto the runways in a crisis; the land-based missiles are quick to launch; and the submarines are invulnerable. Another more dramatic idea would have been to declare that the United States would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. That was also discarded.

The review re-examined the question of keeping nuclear missiles on alert. Many analysts have questioned whether it is still a good idea to keep the land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles ready to launch within four minutes and submarine-launched ballistic missiles within 12 minutes now that the superpower confrontation is over. The review concludes that the nuclear alert status quo "should be maintained for the present." The main reason given is that if the missiles were taken off alert, it could give an adversary "the incentive to attack before the 're-alerting' was complete." Over the longer term, the document calls for studies to improve the command and control system and give the president more time to make an informed decision in case of a warning of nuclear attack. For a president under pressure, such decisions as whether to launch a retaliatory strike have been the nightmare of the nuclear age.

On tactical nuclear weapons -- the short-range, or battlefield nukes -- the administration decided not to decide, for now. The United States currently has about 200 such small weapons in Europe, and the nuclear strategy review calls for waiting for NATO to complete a new "strategic concept" later this year. However, one such weapons system, the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile, is to be retired.

All in all, the words of Obama's nuclear strategy bore the marks of his avowed goal to reduce the nuclear danger, but he eschewed taking more dramatic steps away from the legacy of the Cold War arms race.

YURI KADOBNOV/AFP/Getty Images

 

David E. Hoffman is a contributing editor to the Washington Post and the author of The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy.

SIR_MIXXALOT

1:25 AM ET

April 7, 2010

NPR boooooorrrrriiiing!

I agree the NPR was mostly PR as Steve Walt also pointed out in his FP blog.

The NPR was also a big disappointment as it expands the role of untested, ineffective and expensive missile defense:

http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/06/obama_embraces_missile_defense_in_nuclear_review

when independent scientists all say that it is not a good idea -- see FP opinion piece from some months ago:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/21/what_missile_defense?page=full

and

http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/scientists-letter-to-obama.pdf

and for a technical view:

http://www.thebulletin.org/files/064002009.pdf

The NPR says missile defense is a "deterrent" -- not sure how a "defense" can be a "deterrent". Does anyone think North Korea is more afraid of a missile defense than they are of massive nuclear retaliation. What idiocy.

Anyway, all in all it is a boring consensus document written by a committee with pleasant sounds but no new realities on the ground.

Take the goddam weapons off hair-trigger alert at least -- how asinine.

I don't trust them on the no new weapons bit either..................

 

KEITHEDWHITE

11:49 AM ET

April 7, 2010

NPR Compromises Were Necessary and Prudent

Hoffman's right: the NPR doesn't satisfy those eager to constraint the use of nuclear weapons.

But a cautious NPR makes sense (refer to www.proliferationpress.com for more discussion):

The alternative would have Obama pushing a NPR that may not be favored by a) his Defense Secretary or b) the Defense Department. While forcing the issue may result in lasting change, its a debate the administration can't afford--especially since more important nonproliferation mile-markers lay ahead: the nuclear security summit and the NPT conference.

To get the changes Hoffman seems to support, Obama must win over legitimate disagreement (lest his change last as long as he is in office). To do that he must show some tangible security gains form pursuing a nuclear security policy more dependent on multilateral cooperation. How does he get that? 1) Start with small change that the administration can rally around and critics will find hard to criticize, 2) get some real progress on Chinese, Russian, North Korean and Iran nukes soon, and 3) go back and push for greater NPR in the second term.

If the NPR included Hoffman's preferred policies without Step 2), they wouldn't have outlasted Obama's administration.

 

MIKE3050

8:47 AM ET

April 11, 2010

What about Otho countries

What about Otho countries with nuclear bombs?

 

YARINSIZ

10:25 AM ET

May 3, 2010

To get the changes Hoffman

To get the changes Hoffman seems to support, Obama must win over legitimate disagreement (lest his change last as long as he is in office). To do that he must show some tangible security gains form pursuing a nuclear security policy more dependent on multilateral cooperation. sesli sohbet sesli chat How does he get that? 1) Start with small change that the administration can rally around and critics will find hard to criticize, 2) get some real progress on Chinese, Russian, North Korean and Iran nukes soon, and 3) go back and push for greater NPR in the second term.

If the NPR included Hoffman's preferred policies without Step 2), they wouldn't have outlasted Obama's administration.