Karzai Unhinged?

The concerns about Afghanistan's volatile president are legitimate, but allies shouldn't lose sight of the big picture.

BY JEFFREY GEDMIN | APRIL 8, 2010

During my recent visit to Afghanistan, I got the chance to meet with military officers, mullahs, and senior government ministers, as well as journalists, NGO activists, parliamentarians, provincial governors, tribal leaders, and Afghan President Hamid Karzai himself. The figures represented a wide range of views, but there's one thing virtually all agreed on: The sudden deterioration of relations between the United States and Karzai could not have come at a worse time.

Right now, the Afghan government is having trouble, simply put, governing. Nothing illustrates this more than the government's inability to control the violence that has rocked the capital, especially over the last nine months. The economy is shaky as well. Prices have been skyrocketing in Kabul. According to local real estate agents, home prices in some parts of the city have risen 75 percent in the past year.

Wealthy Afghans, including warlords and those earning money from defense contractors and construction and security firms, have prospered. Nearly everyone else seems to live in abject poverty. "Welcome to Afghanistan," one imam with very moderate social views told me. "Welcome to the poorest, most oppressed country in the world."

Which quickly gets us to the "c-word" and Karzai. According to Transparency International, the country is one of the most corrupt places on the planet, in a league with Somalia and worse than Haiti. The inability to make progress on the issue is the ostensible reason why the exchange between Karzai and U.S. President Barack Obama in Kabul at the end of March was so tense: 25 minutes, no photos, no news conference. Karzai's allies remain convinced that Washington wants regime change in Kabul and that the corruption issue is being used to delegitimize the current government.

Meanwhile, one opposition parliamentarian who attended a meeting with Karzai this week told me the president has "gone crazy." Karzai's recent accusations that the United States and the international community are to blame for fraud in last year's election stunned most people here. His comments that his government is on the verge of being seen as a "puppet government" and that the Taliban might even soon be seen as legitimate "national resistance" have been widely derided. His rival in the last election, Abdullah Abdullah, has accused him of "national treason." But scratch the surface, and you quickly encounter stark differences in narratives between the U.S. and Afghan sides.

Sean Gallup/Getty Images

 

Jeffrey Gedmin is president of the congressionally funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

DEPETRIS@WORDPRESS.COM

8:31 PM ET

April 8, 2010

No one can dispute the fact

No one can dispute the fact that Hamid Karzai is a corrupt public official, perhaps one of the most corrupt and ineffectual in the world. And it's understandable that President Obama is particularly upset about Karzai's lack of progress on governmental transparency, accountability, and his refusal to cut ties with brutal warlords.

But we cannot lay the blame solely on the Afghan Government. Like every diplomatic relationship, both sides of the street are effected, and when things go the way they aren't supposed to, both sides are most likely responsible.

The problem in my view is that the United States has unrealistic expectations for Hamid Karzai. Washington expects the Afghan President to severe all ties with warlords and civil rights abusers. But this would be a suicidal move if Karzai in fact caved-in to America's demands. Karzai's status as president is largely dependent on his ability to provide patronage and kick-backs to powerful (and mercelus) figures in Afghan society. Unfortunately, most of these powerful figures are warlords with their own militias and drug traffickers with their own agenda's.

If Karzai were to suddenly change the way of doing things, his administration would probably dissolve and Afghanistan would once again be susceptible to ethnic violence and civil war. The Taliban would make a comeback in the northern and western provinces, much like they did in 1994 when the movement sacked Kabul and controlled most of the country in 2 years. In this scenario, Karzai, moderate Islamists, the Afghan people, and the United States all lose.

Like it or not, Washington is stuck with Karzai for the forseeable future. Therefore, the bickering between both countries needs to stop. The U.S. mission depends on it, and Karzai's survival as a political leader depends on it. Sure, Karzai himself is an unreliable partner, but its better to have an unreliable partner than no partner at all.

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SURESH SHETH

5:24 PM ET

April 9, 2010

US mollycoddles Pakistan at the expense of Karzai

Poor Karzai! His Afghanistan is paying the price for US blunders.

There are three US blunders that are largely responsible for the failure of US mission and Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan.

First, during the siege of Kunduz in November 2001, the Bush administration allowed Pakistan to spirit away by airlift hundreds, if not thousands, of Taliban operatives cornered by the advancing Northern Alliance in Kunduz. Pakistan relocated those Taliban cadres including Mullah Mohammed Omar in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan from where Mullah Omar’s QST has been planning raids in Afghanistan ever since.

Second, Bush administration did NOT provide sufficient troops to secure Afghanistan against Taliban.

Third, Bush recruited Musharraf’s Pakistan to fight the very terrorist threat that Pakistan itself created. So Musharraf played duplicitous game of running with the hare while hunting with the hounds. While capturing and killing some Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders based on US intelligence, Musharraf continued to shelter, protect and support Mullah Mohammed Omar’s Quetta Shura Taliban in Quetta, provincial capital of Baluchistan and Haqqani network in North Waziristan.

Obama administration has continued the mollycoddling of Pakistan at the expense of Afghanistan.

The Obama Administration’s propensity to clutch at straws as it prepares for a hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan has been its illusion that there has been a ‘turnaround’ in Pakistani policies of supporting the Taliban because of the arrest of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the second-ranked Taliban leader, by a joint team of the CIA and ISI in Karachi. The reality appears to be that the CIA stumbled upon a Taliban hideout in Karachi and the arrest of Baradar was purely coincidental. More important, his arrest was an embarrassment, as Baradar was secretly —and unknown to the Pakistanis — in touch with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and a UN Envoy.

Both Mr Karzai and Baradar are Durrani Pashtuns, sharing common tribal loyalties. An infuriated Karzai now finds his reconciliation efforts with the Taliban undermined, with the Pakistanis procrastinating on his demand for the extradition of Baradar to Afghanistan. Pakistan, which for years has denied the presence of the Mullah Omar-led ‘Quetta shura’ on its soil, now brazenly demands that it should be the prime intermediary in any process of reconciliation with the Taliban — a demand the Obama Administration appears to be meekly succumbing to.

 

SERVANTES

9:44 PM ET

April 29, 2010

Both Mr Karzai and Baradar

Both Mr Karzai and Baradar are Durrani Pashtuns, sharing common tribal loyalties. An infuriated Karzai now finds his reconciliation efforts with the Taliban undermined, with the Pakistanis procrastinating on his demand for the extradition of Baradar to Afghanistan. Pakistan, which for years has denied the presence of the Mullah Omar-led ‘Quetta shura’ on its soil, now brazenly demands that it should be the prime intermediary in any process of reconciliation with the Taliban — travesti a demand the Obama Administration appears to be meekly succumbing to.