How Not to Run an Empire

Ignoring human rights in favor of stability is backfiring not just in Kyrgyzstan, but all over Central Asia -- big time.

BY TOM MALINOWSKI | APRIL 9, 2010

This week's uprising in Kyrgyzstan didn't appear out of nowhere. For the last several years, many of this Central Asian country's people have felt betrayed by a government that came to power promising democracy and reform, but in their eyes delivered repression and nepotism instead. A confrontation had been brewing for months, with arrests of opposition leaders and restrictions on the media prompting public protests, which escalated when the government hiked utility prices. Meanwhile, the government's heavy-handed police methods have, according to some analysts, helped radicalize a growing part of the Muslim population in southern Kyrgyzstan.

If you raised these problems with U.S. government officials in the last year or so, they would typically say something like: "Yes, all of that is true, and we're very concerned. But [sigh], there are other equities." In Washington nowadays, "equities" is bureaucratic parlance for "the Pentagon has a stake in this issue." In the case of Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia, it means that the U.S. government's chief concern is keeping the region's roads, airfields, and airspace open for supplies moving to Afghanistan.

U.S. policymakers increasingly view Central Asia as a transit point to somewhere else. It is a region through which oil and natural gas flow to Europe, reducing U.S. allies' dependence on Russian energy supplies. It is a region through which fuel, food, and spare parts flow to surging U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, reducing their dependence on a precarious Pakistani supply route. Officials and policy experts even have a new name for this region that captures its status as a logistical intermediary, rather than a set of distinct countries that matter in their own right: They call it the "Northern Distribution Network."

One hub in the "network" is Uzbekistan. Ruled for two decades by the government of Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan is a place where dissidents are routinely imprisoned and tortured; a few weeks ago, the government convicted a photographer for "insulting the Uzbek people" because she took pictures showing poor people in the country. Brutal repression in Uzbekistan's Fergana Valley -- including the 2005 massacre of hundreds of protesters in the city of Andijan -- has shut all avenues for peaceful dissent in Central Asia's most densely populated subregion and could create opportunities for radical groups to gain support. Five years ago, Uzbekistan expelled U.S. forces from an air base in the country, but continues to allow U.S. supplies to pass through. So the Pentagon has pushed for an easing of congressionally mandated sanctions that forbid direct U.S. aid to the Uzbek government.

Another hub is Kazakhstan. Unlike Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan has energy wealth and a relatively stable government. But that government, led by President Nursultan Nazarbayev, also maintains an atmosphere of quiet repression, stifling opposition media and manipulating the political process. Nazarbayev has rebuffed repeated requests from U.S. President Barack Obama's administration to accelerate political reforms and release from prison the country's leading human rights defender, Yevgeny Zhovtis. Yet Nazarbayev will be one of only a few leaders attending next week's nuclear security summit to get a one-on-one meeting with Obama.

VYACHESLAV OSELEDKO/AFP/Getty Images

 

Tom Malinowski is Washington advocacy director for Human Rights Watch.

SOLMSTEA

4:26 PM ET

April 9, 2010

Almost right

The only type of leadership existing currently in Central Asia seems to be dictatorship, and in most countries it is pretty successful (if you're judging success by the ability of a government to maintain power and order). Kyrgyzstan was actually relatively free compared to neighboring Uzbekistan when Bakiev took power in 2005. Repressive/police states like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are considerably more stable than someplace like Kyrgyzstan where the people were allowed to taste some sort of freedom and then had to watch as it was slowly taken away. Trouble only started brewing more recently because Bakiev started closing down independent media outlets and arresting opposition leaders, as well as raising energy prices, as you mention. So it was not the repression exactly that was the problem; if there had been significantly more repression, Bakiev would still be in power. It seems to me it's more the transition from relative freedom towards repression and the lack of strict repressive control in Kyrgyzstan that allowed for the events of the last couple of days.

 

IMERGENT_69

1:43 AM ET

April 10, 2010

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STRATEGIC DISCOURSE

3:24 AM ET

April 10, 2010

Is the Pentagon Losing Central Asia?

I understand Malinowski's argument about corruption and US / foreign support of corrupt regimes that do not observe human rights standards... after all, Malinowski represents HRW (a well respected policy institute).
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That said, I'm not sure that I am in agreement with his characterization of the situation in Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan in particular. For instance, the linking title of this article is, 'Is the Pentagon Losing Central Asia?' I wasn't aware that the Pentagon could HAVE Central Asia in the first place. As for running an empire? I suppose you could get into a debate about neo-imperialism or post-modern imperialism, but I don't think reality jives with such a academic notions.
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Major powers like the US have had interests (equities) in other areas of the world for centuries. When a democratic power such as the US, which values the ideals of civil rights, free speech, freedom of assembly, religion, etc, and engages with states that do not, there is undeniably going to be tension and calls of duplicity.
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While I won't excuse the negotiated suspension of our beliefs for expediency and material or strategic gain, one cannot also overlook the context, reasoning, and perceptions which influenced such decisions.
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There is little doubt that Akayev and Bakiyev led corrupt governments, though let's also acknowledge that corruption is a primary and unfortunate factor in many areas around the world, including the US, though to a much lesser extent. The US government and US businesses are involved in numerous countries where corruption is rife, along with many that also flout human rights standards. In comparison, what is so special about Kyrgyzstan or the rest of Central Asia? Aside from the fact that it happens to be newsworthy at the moment.
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In 2006, there was discussion that some US$100 million worth of contracts and sub-contracts had been direct from the US toward members of Akayev's family and supporters. Certainly not all of that lined their pockets, but it is still fairly significant. What about the rent charges for Manas, well it went from US$17-60 million, which is a decent sum, but not overly significant. Certainly it is nowhere near the US$2 billion low-interest loan Kyrgyzstan received from Russia.
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My point is, given the amount that the US has spent, is it possible that we would have enough influence to force their government and society to change direction in terms of corruption and human rights abuses? I would guess not. What if we did not engage in Kyrgyzstan at all, and procured basing rights elsewhere? Well, if it was somewhere else in Central Asia, how fundamentally different would the situation be? Moreover, would that move change the course of Kyrgyz corruption and human rights? What if we didn't have any bases in Central Asia at all (outside Afghanistan)? That may be possible, but it certainly would seem tenable over the near-term given US and NATO personnel and material requirements.
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I'm not saying that Malinowski's arguments aren't appropriate, I just don't know how feasible it is to demand such changes of another government and society, given our current level of involvement and interest in that country. Its also been my experience that when you make demands of another country, even if reasonable (to us), the reaction is usually to reject the demands outright unless exceptionally compelled to do so. Perhaps it would be more reasonable to engage Kyrgyzstan and the rest of Central Asia in a long-term process, supporting, not demanding, social and policy changes in the areas of corruption and human rights. But then again, if that were the goal, wouldn't an organization like the UN, supported by HRW, be a better representative? Would it help or hurt such a cause to have the US involved in that process? Undoubtedly, many arguments could be made for and against what I have just stated.

 

AMERICANKOCHEVNIK

2:41 PM ET

April 10, 2010

Incredibly shortsighted policy

While I tend to agree with Malinowski's points in general, what for me is even more galling than our cooperation-for-rights trade-off, is that we seem to have been completely, totally, and inexcusably myopic in our policy. I lived in Kyrgyzstan from '05 - '09, and anyone who had half a brain would have known that the Bakiev regime was not the most stable - there were regular protests against him, constant intrigue with the ever-shifting alliances of his government and the opposition, and the odd political "car accident" or "free and fair election." In fact, the fact that there would be protests this year and that there was perhaps a greater chance than ever of those protests turning violent was common knowledge to anyone with even a passing knowledge of the country (which is, admittedly, not that many people). That's not to say that anyone could have predicted that things would turn this violent, and that Bakiev would be driven out, but it certainly should have been well on the State Department's radar as not unlikely possibility. So for me, what gets me isn't the deals that we made, it's that we seem to have no "Plan B" for what we would do if the regime was thrown out of power. So far, the only thing we've managed to do is issue statements that would make a used car salesmen look honest and forthright, while Russia has seized the opportunity with gusto. Are we really so understaffed that we don't have the time to bother considering contingency plans for countries hosting one of our most critical supply lines to our most urgent foreign policy concern???

 

NICHOLAS WIBBERLEY

10:06 AM ET

April 12, 2010

Where have all the flowers gone

The US is engaged in so many disparate purposes it is a wonder anyone can keep track of them all. Meanwhile, countless people all over are suffering a disillusion unmatched since Israel ceased to be a great white hope forty years ago. Obama was supposed to change things, talk to people and bring about the Peace we (mostly) all long for. So great was the expectation he even got a Nobel Peace prize, pre-packed for his crusade. But here we are, everything the mess it was, perhaps worse because we know Peace won’t happen and Hope is flown out the window leaving only scenarios of Armageddon swirling round the bleak laburnum of Human Rights.

 

NICHOLAS WIBBERLEY

11:18 AM ET

April 12, 2010

Labarum

of course. Perfection is an aspect of Deity and I often feel them guiding me gently from it.

 

WILDTHING

6:24 PM ET

April 12, 2010

No way

There is no way we are going to dominate the resources in that region. We might as well get out now. It is foolhardy and dangerous and is bankrupting us and harming lots of people and their homelands in a very selfish way.