Man Without a Plan

Perhaps the most disheartening aspect of Aaron David Miller's cri de coeur is its silence about the future ("The False Religion of Mideast Peace," May/June 2010). The situation is not static, and if there is no peace process, there will be no two-state solution. As two former Israeli prime ministers, Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert, have warned, if there is no two-state solution, then Israel will be an apartheid state and it will face growing international censure and an internal struggle for Palestinian political rights. When that happens, Olmert noted in 2007, "the state of Israel is finished."

Reading Miller's essay, I could not help but think of Britain. The British did a masterful job of screwing things up in Palestine between 1919 and 1947, and then they decided the whole business was "too hard" and washed their hands of the matter. Miller is understandably unhappy with the track record of U.S. peacemaking efforts, and he is in effect throwing up his hands as well. I can understand his reaction and even sympathize with his feelings, but it's not going to make things any better. In fact, the situation is likely to get worse, and history will judge the United States harshly for its contribution to that. Advising President Barack Obama to stand aside now is irresponsible because the United States is a central player in this conflict so long as the "special relationship" continues. Standing aside now also guarantees a worse outcome for all concerned.

So here's the question I'd really like Miller to address: If it becomes clear that "two states for two peoples" is no longer an option, what exactly does he think U.S. policy should be?

Stephen M. Walt
Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University
Contributing editor, Foreign Policy
Cambridge, Mass.


Aaron David Miller's piece is as typically passionate and insightful as many of his other contributions, and as a fellow negotiator and a former Egyptian ambassador to the United States, I share much of his frustration.

But though I don't envisage comprehensive peace with the present set of players in the region, I believe in the possibility of peace between Arabs and Israelis and in the commitment to its pursuit.

Regrettably, I don't see permanent-status negotiations starting and concluding successfully in the near future. However, in the absence of any real possibility for progress, it is imperative to consolidate our gains and preserve the fundamentals that govern the peace process. As such, I would suggest that the U.N. Security Council adopt two resolutions as soon as possible.

The first resolution would be short and straightforward, emphasizing that Arab-Israeli peace is a strategic international goal and that Israeli building in East Jerusalem is illegitimate and rejected by the international community.

The second resolution would recognize the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and Gaza, and as a consequence preserve the possibility of a two-state solution for future negotiations. On that basis it would further allow the Palestinians to negotiate with Israel the arrangements that might bring the realization of peace.

Needless to say, these suggestions would not solve the conflict, but they do preserve the fundamentals and prevent the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from becoming irresolvable.

Nabil Fahmy
Dean, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy
American University in Cairo
Cairo, Egypt

Aaron David Miller replies:

Stephen Walt and Nabil Fahmy lament the absence of a compelling "how can we fix it" section in my article. Having spent the past 20 years or so looking for those fixes unsuccessfully, I understand their frustration.

But that's precisely the reason I wrote the piece. Official Washington lives in an in-box. Doing before thinking is of course never a good idea; in fact, it's how the United States gets itself into trouble. I've lost count of the number of "next steps in the peace process" memos I wrote even when I knew that there were no next steps that would work.

It's quintessentially American to want to fix things and make them better. An unresolved Arab-Israeli problem or a world without a peace process and hope for a negotiated solution isn't a good thing, though I'd argue we've been in such a world for the last 10 years or so.

My piece wasn't designed to try to create a solution where there is none. I've been down that road too many times. Instead, the piece was written as a cautionary tale designed to get people to think before they act.

So what to do? Plunge ahead anyway with the big-bang solution on the assumption that trying and failing is better than not trying at all? Or try to make some headway where you can: identify one issue, like borders, where the gaps are the narrowest, and if your approach is successful, you can address both settlements and security; build Palestinian institutions; get the Israelis to ease up on checkpoints; and expand the Palestinian security presence into the West Bank?

It's not sexy. But it's a lot smarter than what I suspect might be coming: yet another U.S. plan or policy statement on the big issues that will raise expectations and hopes without the capacity to actually succeed. We all remember what happened after the Camp David talks fell apart in 2000: a decade of chaos and stagnation. Another failure by overreaching could well bury the peace process for good.


Who Needs NATO?

Dmitry Rogozin and Ronald Asmus on why Andrew Bacevich's call to pull America out of NATO is unrealistic.

Andrew Bacevich is quite right that Europeans are not happy about NATO being used as an instrument for "underwrit[ing] American globalism" ("Let Europe Be Europe," March/April 2010). And I agree with his premise that European pacifism has taken over the organization, which evidently runs counter to U.S. military aspirations. However, he has chosen to omit some important political realities.

There's not much point in talking about letting Europeans take responsibility for their own security at a time when U.S. nuclear weapons are still deployed in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy. In addition, the United States makes no secret of its plans to deploy its missile defense systems in Southeastern Europe. As residents of Odessa say to such proposals, "Don't make my slippers laugh!"

Bacevich also suggests that a NATO free of U.S. influence could take responsibility for "guarantee[ing] the territorial integrity of Poland and Lithuania." As a linguist by training, allow me to translate. In the Western press, "the territorial integrity of Poland and Lithuania" tends to mean "defense from Russian aggression." This idea is simply ridiculous: Democratic Russia has never given cause for Baltic or Eastern European states to tremble over their sovereignty or security, despite NATO's attempts to portray Russia as an enemy threatening to attack in the dead of night (the way "NATO ally" Mikheil Saakashvili launched an attack on South Ossetia in 2008).

Moscow intends to develop partner relations with NATO as a military bloc and with each of its 28 members on a bilateral basis. All the initiatives of Russia's political leadership are aimed at our dream to be friends with the peoples of Europe, to live in the same home with them.

We will even find a place in this common cause for Bacevich, too.

Dmitry Rogozin
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to NATO
Brussels, Belgium

I would like to disagree with Andrew Bacevich's argument that the United States should pull out of NATO. In Afghanistan, U.S. allies have now deployed more troops than they did in the Balkans in the 1990s and have absorbed casualty rates equal to or even exceeding America's. In response to U.S. President Barack Obama's latest request, they contributed an additional 10,000 troops. Their civilian contribution is also critical. Although far from ideal, it's a sacrifice we shouldn't diminish or demean.

There is no push in Europe for the United States to go home. Opinion polls regularly show that the U.S. and European publics have similar views of the threats they face and the agenda they want their leaders to pursue. The fact that Europeans have largely banned war on the continent is to be welcomed. But European officials often tell me in private they wish they had a few more sticks in their foreign-policy portfolio. The United States will certainly need their cooperation in managing a nuclear Iran or if it ever achieves a breakthrough in the Middle East.

The United States is in NATO today because it is a power that shares values and interests with Europe. There is no effective multilateralism without Atlanticism. If the United States withdraws from NATO, it will simply find itself with fewer allies and more instability. You don't need to be Carl von Clausewitz to understand why that is not a good outcome.

NATO today has real problems. But it needs to be fixed, not abandoned. A U.S. president who followed Bacevich's advice would indeed be guaranteed to go down in history -- as a failure.

Ronald Asmus
Executive Director of the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Center
Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Brussels, Belgium

Andrew Bacevich replies:

If Europeans choose to help in "managing" a nuclear Iran or achieving "a breakthrough in the Middle East" -- whatever that means -- they will act because doing so accords with their interests. The United States' remaining in NATO will do nothing to increase the likelihood of European assistance. Or has Ronald Asmus -- as with most other Americans -- already forgotten the Iraq war?

Dmitry Rogozin assures us that Russians "dream to be friends with the peoples of Europe." This is excellent news. Yet we should treat such assurances the same way Russians respond when NATO expansionists claim that their proposed incorporation of Ukraine or Georgia into the alliance merely reflects the West's commitment to peace and democracy.