It's Not Too Late to Save Kyrgyzstan

Russia and the United States weren't able to stop the recent outbreak of violence and ethnic cleansing in Osh. But there's still time to prevent the worst.

BY JAMES TRAUB | JUNE 22, 2010

In 2005, the world's heads of states, gathered at the United Nations headquarters in New York, agreed that they had a responsibility to protect their own peoples from mass atrocities -- and that the responsibility would fall to the larger community when a state proved unable or unwilling to prevent such crimes. Since that time, violence reaching the legal threshold of crimes against humanity (the other specified constituent crimes are genocide, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing) has been perpetrated in Sudan, Sri Lanka, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and arguably in Kenya, Burma, and Zimbabwe, among other places. In almost every case, the world has failed to muster an even remotely effective response. So far, it looks like we can add Kyrgyzstan to the list; but it's not too late to get things right.

In the explosion of ethnic violence that rocked the southern city of Osh starting June 10, as many as half the country's 800,000 Uzbeks were forced to flee their homes before marauding mobs of ethnic Kyrgyz, apparently abetted by government troops. An untold number, which the New York Times now puts at "thousands," have been killed. Arson, rape, and other atrocities have been widespread. Late last week, the very fragile government in Bishkek finally seemed to gain control over the army; or perhaps, with the victim population largely terrorized and dispersed, the violence simply burned itself out. But this might be the lull before another storm: Uzbeks may seek revenge, in turn provoking new attacks from Kyrgyz or from the Kyrgyz-dominated security forces. Naomi Kikoler of the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect calls the violence "a textbook case of R2P," as the norm has come to be abbreviated. Her organization as well as Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group have called for urgent international action.

In the first moments of the crisis, Kyrgyzstan's interim president, Roza Otunbayeva, issued a desperate call to Moscow to provide troops. Instead, Moscow referred the matter to its own regional body, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which then declined to authorize action. Russia had cited R2P -- with transparent cynicism -- to justify its 2008 invasion of South Ossetia and Georgia. Why not now, with a willing government and a genuine crisis? It is morally satisfying to say, as human rights advocates often do, that nobody is acting because nobody cares. And that's often true: The death of several hundred thousand Darfuris weighed far less with most states than assuring "African solutions to African problems" or preserving commercial ties with an oil-rich regime. But Kyrgyzstan, the world's only country with both a U.S. and a Russian military base, is scarcely a geopolitical orphan; and because the government, in this case, is not perpetrating the atrocities, potential actors do not have to defend a regime at the cost of neglecting citizens.

Whatever its strategic or moral preferences, Russia faced an extremely daunting calculus, as Peter Zeihan, an analyst for Stratfor, which provides "strategic intelligence," pointed out in a recent article. Kyrgyzstan is 1,800 miles from the Russian heartland and has a rugged geography and little economic value. There is also the huge complicating factor of Uzbekistan, which borders the inflamed area, aspires to be the regional hegemon, and would almost certainly have objected to the Kyrgyz request. Indeed, any dispatch of Russian troops to the periphery would have instantly reminded both Russians and their neighbors of very painful experiences in Afghanistan and Chechnya. The CSTO is widely viewed in the West as Russia's Potemkin NATO, but Moscow would have been loath to act unilaterally in the face of opposition from other members (one of which is Uzbekistan). Finally, ethnic Uzbeks were the victims -- and "Russians and Uzbeks don't like each other," as Stephen Sestanovich, a Russia expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, puts it bluntly.

VIKTOR DRACHEV/AFP/Getty Images

 

James Traub is a contributing writer for the New York Times Magazine and author of, most recently, The Freedom Agenda. "Terms of Engagement," his column for ForeignPolicy.com, runs weekly.

BBOYZ

9:22 AM ET

June 23, 2010

ill informed report

“as many as half the country's 800,000 Uzbeks were forced to flee their homes”

The total population of the Uzbek population is 700,000. According to the UNHCR 400,000 (women and children) Uzbeks fled towards the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. 300,000 ethnic Uzbeks remained in Kyrgyzstan to defend their houses. According to the UNHCR, there are more than 700,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) ethnic Kyrgyz who fled to other regions within Kyrgyzstan.

Lumping together Sudan, Sri Lanka, DRC, Rwanda etc with Kyrgyzstan clearly demonstrates that the author of this note does not know the complexity of the issue, main actors, catalysts, and politico-criminal dynamics in the south of Kyrgyzstan, where Uzbeks are not mere observers but participants. I would encourage the author to conduct deeper studies and not to get carried away by populist tags such as “genocide” etc.

“Russia had cited R2P -- with transparent cynicism -- to justify its 2008 invasion of South Ossetia and Georgia. Why not now, with a willing government and a genuine crisis?”

Because the government of Russia does not want to take sides, which it will have to once its troops are on the ground. Secondly, there is a very strong resistance from Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who is afraid that the Russians will stay on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, as they did in Tajikistan under the pretext of securing fragile borders.

What I agree is that Kyrgyzstan needs international help, in the form of peacekeepers, humanitarian aid, criminal investigators for international commission, and reconciliation specialists, and good shrinks to help the people to live with haunting memories of atrocities...

 

CAMAELJAX

1:04 PM ET

June 23, 2010

Not R2P but failed CIA Colored Revolution

There are a couple of neglected points in this article that make it clear why this is anything but a "textbook case of R2P", itself en illegitimate challenge to existing international law based on the UN Charter, promoted by the West under the normalizing euphemism as an "emerging body" of law...lmfao...

1. The article completely neglects the many substantial sources (inlcuding the UN, the Kyrgyz interim government, and the Karimov government in Uzbekistan) that while there are certainly latent ethnic tensions in the region which were ignited - that the spark and fuel of this conflict was a deliberate and organized covert political effort by the ousted corrupt Bakiyev regime hiring mercenaries, locally and from afar as Afpak and Tadjikistan, to instigate inter-ethnic violence and use it as a cover to de-legitimize and if possible disrupt planned elections in the fall which would cement his clan's fall from power, and potentially to re-seize control in the isolated South of Kyrgyzstan.. In Maxim Bakiyev's (now requesting political asylum in the UK) own words, "Out of spite alone, I will drown them in blood.". It is notable that as soon as the reported "suitcases of cash" handed out on the streets of Jal-Abad and Osh dissapeared (Stratfor), that the mobs dissapeared and the violance subsided to a cinder...
2. There is a good reason why this was neglected, The Bakiyev clan seized power in the wave of CIA sponsored Color Revolutions during the Bush II regime in the US, the so-called Tulip Revolution. In addition, Bakiyev's family has also been accused of corruption in regards to payments of rent and fuel for the US Airbase in Manas. This Bakiyev-US connection is a clear delineation of why this is not a typical case of "R2P", and is politically embarrassing for the US. Further, reports that Russia was involved in supporting the counter-Color Revolution that saw Otunbaeva and the interim government kick out the corrupt Bakiyev regime, indicates a shift towards Russia in the geopolitical balance of power in Kyrgyzstan and the broader Central Asian region. The violence in Kyrgyzstan is not a case for R2P at all, but the aftermaths and dying convulsions of geopolitical games between the US and Russia. (source Stratfor)

 

RSAFSOZ

3:03 PM ET

June 23, 2010

i think

i think Russia does not want to take sides, which it will have to once its troops are on the ground. sikis sex

 

ENGUZELSIN

7:31 AM ET

July 5, 2010

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