The Karzai Factor

The Afghan president just lost his best friend in the U.S. government. And he's not happy about it.

BY NICK B. MILLS | JUNE 24, 2010

McChrystal is out. Petraeus is in. And Karzai is Karzai.

With the sacking of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, Afghan President Hamid Karzai has lost a buddy, and he's upset about it. You see, Karzai needs all the buddies he can get these days, having clashed with an impressively wide variety of U.S. and NATO officials during the conduct of the long, long Afghan war. Barack Obama, Richard Holbrooke, Karl Eikenberry -- name an official and there's been a spat. But General McChrystal was different. He went on trips around Afghanistan with Karzai to meet with tribal leaders (without the U.S. general and his formidable security blanket, those trips would have been too perilous for the Afghan president to undertake). McChrystal altered military tactics in an effort to cut down on civilian casualties, a long-time demand of Karzai's whose realization boosted the president's standing with his people. After years of complaints from Kabul, McChrystal finally came through.

Indeed, understanding why McChrystal was so welcome in Afghanistan means appreciating just how bad U.S. relations with Karzai have become. The first big deterioration took place in 2005, when Karzai went to Washington to ask then-President George W. Bush for more authority over the foreign forces on his sovereign soil. The request was denied -- publicly and to Karzai's humiliation, anger, and frustration. In the years since then, Karzai has grown more erratic and unpredictable to the point that some suggested he had gone mad, or was consuming some of the drugs made from Afghanistan's major cash crop, the opium poppy. Karzai acknowledged fraud in the August presidential election but accused the United Nations of perpetrating it; he was annoyed by the taking down of key Taliban operatives in Pakistan, claiming it upset his own backdoor peace negotiations; he blustered in a private meeting that maybe he should join the Taliban; and when the recent loya jirga, or grand council, meeting in Kabul was attacked by Taliban rockets, Karzai suggested that the West was to blame.

Enter McChrystal, the first foreign commander to treat Karzai as the President, capital "P," of Afghanistan. And now the general is gone, hoisted by his own petard, as it were, in a fit of foolish candor with a Rolling Stone freelancer. McChrystal was summoned to the Oval Office and summarily sacked, and rightly so. Military and civilian leaders rarely see eye to eye, and each side constantly grouses about the stupidity or intransigence or one-dimensional thinking of the other -- but not to Rolling Stone reporters. What McChrystal told Rolling Stone could simply not be tolerated in a democracy where the civilian side maintains absolute authority over the military; in that context, the general's offhand remarks bordered on insurrection.

Win McNamee/Getty Images

 

Nick B. Mills is an associate professor of journalism at Boston University and the author of Karzai: The Failing American Intervention and the Struggle for Afghanistan.

EE72

5:00 AM ET

June 25, 2010

REALLY Guys????

"Ahmed Wali Karzai is, of course, the strongman governor of Kandahar"

He may be the de facto boss of the province, but he is NOT the governor. Time for the editor to do some editing.

 

JKOLAK

8:55 AM ET

June 25, 2010

Widespread belief

"widespread belief that Afghanistan is militarily unwinnable"

This belief seems largely the result of western media buying into Taliban propaganda instead of reading military sitreps. Afghanistan is going the same direction as Iraq. Afghans know the Taliban cause more civilian casualties than NATO, and the Taliban are hated more and more because of it. Taliban morale is low, too, because of the constant loss of mid-level leaders and disruption of supplies and reinforcements.

 

RSAFSOZ

1:16 AM ET

June 29, 2010

big lost

it will be karzai's lost sikis porno sex