It doesn't grab headlines the way a public spat between a commanding general and the White House, or reports that contractors are paying off Taliban insurgents, can.
But the unglamorous business of reforming Afghanistan's police may be among the most important challenges for the U.S. mission right now. There are, of course, other urgent tasks that will confront Gen. David Petraeus when he takes charge in Kabul. Foreign forces must push back the insurgency to buy time. The Afghan Army must grow in size and proficiency, and the Afghan government must improve. But it is the police who must secure the population. Without effective police, the U.S. Marines in Marjah will continue to be stuck in a small area, unable to deploy elsewhere in force without risking the security they have fought for. New plans for securing Kandahar likewise must include effective contributions from Afghan police. Unfortunately, the police are the weakest link in the security forces.
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The U.S. approach to the Afghan police has been fraught with problems. Following years of drift in which the effort was left to others, serious police funding began only in 2007, after Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, then the top U.S. commander in Kabul, and I recommended a substantial increase. At the time, as U.S ambassador to Afghanistan, I warned in telegrams and in conversations with senior officials -- including Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and President George W. Bush himself -- that the additional money would be wasted without sufficient trainers. But my concerns went unanswered. The State Department fought with the military over whether the force was being too militarized for proper policing. The reality was that it remained ineffective in either realm.
On my recent visit to Afghanistan, I saw decisions moving in the right direction, but with critical dangers ahead. The United States and its Afghan partner are focused on first building a paramilitary force because, as then Interior Minister Hanif Atmar told me, Afghans and internationals alike view securing Afghan civilians as an urgent priority. That requires advisors with military skills, such as patrolling, defense against ambushes and roadside bombs, and so on. Yet a paramilitary emphasis should not exclude policing skills, such as criminal investigation, forensic science, and protecting evidence, that are critical to the longer-term formation of a functioning justice system.
That means that civilian mentors and trainers, not just military advisors, are needed. There are real differences between how military and police organizations build ties with the communities they secure. Senior police officers need to lean policing skills. The NATO training command in Kabul, a joint U.S. and NATO operation, knows this and wants more civilians as well as military trainers. But neither the right balance nor the numbers of military and civilian advisors are present. Police trainers of all kinds are at only 59 percent of required numbers. Despite impressive work by Canadian and Italian gendarmerie trainers, the NATO effort is not meeting its goals. The United States must not repeat the mistake of past years by leaving a critical hole while waiting for others.
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